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Limited financial resources have led many governments including Indonesia to find alternative 
ways to fund their development. Public Private Partnerships (PPP) offer governments 
substantial benefits by accessing the private sector’s funding, knowledge, and experiences. In 
regard to public asset management (PAM), PPPs are expected to address the problem of surplus 
assets. However, the involvement of the private sector through PPPs in public affairs sparks 
accountability questions. 
The research aims to explore PAM and PPP practices in a developing country using the 
concepts of governance and accountability. Compared to developed countries, few studies have 
been conducted in the context of developing countries. In the current literature, numerous 
studies explain PPPs yet only a few investigate PAM practices. Moreover, even less research 
discusses accountability concerns regarding PPP practices in the PAM context. The research 
answers the questions ‘How and why have PPPs been adopted in the Indonesian PAM context?’ 
and ‘What are the accountability challenges of PPPs in Indonesia’s PAM?’. 
The multiple case study approach underpins the research design. Four cases have been studied 
because of their diverse and influential criteria where semi structured interviews, government 
documentation and publicly available information are the sources of information. The 
information gathered is categorised and analysed to identify the emerging themes which are 
discussed further through the views of the current literature on PAM, PPPs and accountability 
in order to deliver the findings. 
The research presents the development and challenges of the Indonesian PAM. Despite its 
adoption of the principles of transparency and accountability, its PAM still suffers from the 
problem of surplus assets, asset security and flaws in current policies. PPP adoption is viewed 
as effectively addressing the surplus asset problem, yet the adoption faces the major difficulties 
of inflexible regulations and procedures and inappropriate organisational structures. 
Furthermore, accountability issues arise in many stages of PPP. The research argues that factors 
of risk allocation, cost benefit analysis and expertise are the factors which most influence 
accountability. There are also accountability problems in relation to compliance and 
transparency. 
The research contributes to knowledge in three ways. First, it extends the understanding of 
governance and NPM concepts at the national level of PAM practices in the developing world. 
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Second, the focus at the project level on property-based PPPs, expands the discussion of asset-
based PPPs by presenting the perspectives of different types of actors. Last, in the debate about 
accountability theory, the research proposes new evidence about the factors that influence 
accountability. 
With regard to policy and practice, the study advances three ideas to be discussed further. It 
proposes that the Indonesian government clearly reduce the impact of past unsound PAM 
practices, which has discouraged government officers from taking further actions in managing 
a large number of surplus assets illegally utilised by other parties. To address the problems of 
PPP adoption, regulations and policies need to be more flexible. Along with accountability and 
transparency, flexible policies are argued to foster the PPP adoption. Last, as dynamic attributes 
in both the government and private sector, the policies issued should encourage innovations. 
Measurement should be designed to promote innovative actions among government officers in 
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 Research Setting 
A large variety of assets including infrastructure are owned and operated by governments around 
the world, but different perspectives exist on how those governments view public real-properties 
or public assets. Some believe that a large number of real properties under their control indicate 
how rich they are. Indeed, real properties are valuable assets for governments in delivering 
services for their people, and those assets could be utilised as leverage for a government budget. 
However, there are underlying risks in holding large real property assets (Grubišić, Nušinović & 
Roje 2009; Tanzi & Prakash 2000). The assets could be seen as a risk due to maintenance costs 
and as a potential mismanagement problem. 
New theories have emerged in public sector management and governance in recent decades, 
including in public asset management (PAM) where several perspectives have been adopted. 
Organisational factors and performance measurement are mostly the focus of these perspectives 
(Tywoniak et al. 2009). In PAM, the asset affairs are viewed throughout their lifecycle starting 
from asset planning, procurement, use and utilisation until the asset is transferred or disposed of. 
Performance, accountability and public satisfaction are among many principles applied under the 
banner of New Public Management (NPM) which is actually not a new concept anymore since 
it has been discussed for decades (Kaganova, McKellar & Peterson 2006). Those NPM principles 
are beneficial in addressing the challenges of PAM. 
One of PAM’s challenges in developing countries including Indonesia is in dealing with surplus 
or underutilised assets (Hanis, Trigunarsyah & Susilawati 2011). Moreover, not only in 
developing but also in affluent countries, governments frequently fail to identify surplus or 
underutilised real property assets (Barton 2007; White 2011). Once they are identified, questions 
arise about how to address the problem and how accountable are the government’s actions. The 
surplus or underutilised assets can either be utilised or disposed of by selling to unlock 
government capital. Yet, the second option raises other issues (Kaganova & Polen 2006). How 
does the government fund the development of surplus assets? Could the government invite the 





The involvement of private sector in utilising surplus assets is often preferred due to the 
limitations of government budgets. Public private partnerships (PPPs) as a collaboration between 
the government and the private sector offer opportunities as well as challenges for both parties 
in achieving their individual objectives. The government provides surplus real properties to be 
developed, and the private sector partners can deliver funding, expertise and risk sharing. 
Partnerships between the government and the private sector could take various forms depending 
on the agreement reached. PPPs are hybrid organisations where public organisations collaborate 
with private parties in managing public assets for the public interest. 
However, PPPs as hybrid organisations raise accountability concerns. The signatories to PPPs 
have different objectives. On the one hand, the government must put the public interest above all 
other measures. On the other hand, the private sector’ prime goal is profit maximisation for 
shareholders. Nevertheless, both parties do have common grounds in many different aspects and 
principles. They both seek efficiency, economy, and effectiveness in every business activity 
(Chung 2016; OECD 2008). The differences and the similarities regarding objectives and 
principles give rise to accountability issues with the use of PPPs (Demirag & Khadaroo 2008; 
Forrer et al. 2010; Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton 2012; Steets 2010; Watson 2004). 
 Research Context 
The approaches to how governments worldwide manage their properties have changed in recent 
decades, where the significance of the property assets has been more recognised (Kaganova & 
Amoils 2020). Five motives can be identified as the drivers of those changes: cost efficiency, 
asset performance, shifting of political and ideological agendas, new inventions in technology 
and business operations, and environmentally friendly policies (Kaganova & Amoils 2020). 
Several of those drivers can be identified with the concept of NPM which features efficiency, 
effectiveness, and economy (Harrow 2005) and so fit into the NPM premises (Hood 1995). 
Emerging countries such as Indonesia have implemented some NPM principles especially in 
involving private parties in utilising their surplus assets. To some extent, in comparison with 
practices in developed countries such as Japan and Australia, there are differences in how the 
Indonesian government views and treats surplus assets. There is a tendency for the Indonesian 
government to keep their surplus assets in their portfolio (Prayoga 2016). To address the funding 





Post-Soeharto Indonesia has experienced public sector reform in a quest for improved 
performance, governance, and accountability. An early reform milestone is in the treasury and 
finance sector which introduced three laws regarding the state treasury, the state finance, and the 
auditing of state finance. The state treasury law became the basis for Indonesian PAM, and the 
laws have adopted the basic NPM principles by promoting transparency and accountability (GoI 
2004c). 
The Indonesian Ministry of Finance (MoF) by law has been given vigorous control in PAM 
reform (Hadiyanto 2009). It has the authority to take over surplus or underutilised assets from 
other ministries. Every asset utilisation through a PPP contract must obtain the MoF’s approval 
before the tender process. There is also authority for monitoring and evaluation given to the MoF 
throughout the contract period. The role of the MoF in the PAM and its relationship with other 
ministries will be discussed further in the policy framework section. 
Given the importance to Indonesia of the optimal use of its numerous real property assets, the 
thesis assesses the reasoning for and practices of PPPs in the Indonesian PAM context as well as 
the accountability concerns which arise. In order to have an in-depth understanding, four cases 
of Indonesian PPPs have been selected and studied. They are an office building, a shopping 
centre, an international airport, and a sports complex. 
 Thesis Proposition and Research Questions 
This thesis aims to study the reasons behind and the process of adoption and practices of PPPs in 
the Indonesian PAM context. In the beginning, the thesis analyses the implementation of NPM 
concepts in managing public assets. The principles, objectives and approaches of PAM are 
investigated. In Indonesian’s case, the government’s bureaucratic reform as part of its public-
sector reform changed the course of its PAM. This reform altered how government agencies view 
and manage public assets, however some resistance still exists.  
Furthermore, regarding how the government manages a surplus or underutilised asset, the thesis 
investigates the advantages and drawbacks of PPPs, types of PPPs that have been implemented 
in the PAM context, and the compliance challenges of PPP implementation. How well PPPs have 
been implemented is explored by studying the pre-existing conditions, underlying problems and 





Finally, as PPPs are believed to raise accountability concerns, it is essential that the thesis 
explains and analyses how several aspects of PAM as well as transparency influence the 
accountability of PPPs. The thesis applies several approaches from current literature to identify 
and analyse factors influencing the accountability concerns. These approaches will be discussed 
further in the methodology and the literature review chapters. 
Addressing the issues above, the thesis is guided by the following research questions: 
1)  How and why have PPP practices been adopted in the Indonesian PAM context? 
2)  What are the accountability challenges of PPPs in Indonesia’s PAM? 
Answering the first question, the thesis addresses the recent development of PPPs and PAM, the 
rationales and challenges of PPP adoption and the influential characteristics of PPPs to be 
considered in PAM. To answer the second question, the thesis analyses what aspects influence 
accountability in PPPs and how transparency affects accountability.  
 Scope and Research Approach  
The thesis considers PPPs in the Indonesian PAM context after the enactment of the 2004 State 
Treasury Law (GoI 2004c). This law is seen as the first milestone of Indonesian public sector 
reform in PAM. There is an analysis of conditions, before and after the law was enforced to 
reveal the significant differences. The PPP process is the unit of analysis of this thesis, in which 
the reasons for and stages of PPPs are examined to identify the accountability issues that might 
arise. The problems of PPPs in PAM can be found during the initiation, set-up, operation, and 
termination. The problems, as well as their origins, are formulated based on the perceptions and 
experiences of government officers and private sector parties involved in PPPs both in policy 
making and implementation. 
The thesis considers the government, the private sector parties, and the social construct of the 
PPP adoption and their accountability issues which conform to anti-foundationalism or 
constructivism as this will be discussed further in Chapter 5 Research Methodology. The 
relationship that exists between the research subject, which is PPPs in Indonesian PAM, and the 
researcher confirms the epistemology position. The nature of social construction can be drawn 
by the interaction between the researcher and the participants (Guba & Lincoln 1994). The 
research strategy mostly emphasises an inductive orientation in interpreting the social 





Four cases of PPPs utilising public assets are selected to obtain an in-depth understanding of 
every stage of PPP adoption. Those cases are nominated purposefully and are argued to reflect 
diverse and influential criteria. The cases are an office tower, a shopping centre, a sporting 
complex, and an international airport. One of them is the largest PPP contract in Indonesia in 
terms of an asset market value of more than fifty billion rupiahs. Two of the cases offer the most 
common asset utilisation in commercial activities by renting office spaces and shops. One case 
presents valuable information about how the Indonesian military transforms itself fulfilling the 
direction of Indonesian public asset reform. 
Forty participants from five categories were interviewed to understand how PPPs are adopted 
based on their experience and perceptions. Twenty-two participants are Directorate-General of 
State Asset Management’s (DGSAM) officers, five from other ministries, seven from the private 
sector, five from audit agencies, and one from Indonesian House of representative. For each case 
study, there are participants from the DGSAM representing the asset manager, from the related 
ministries as the implementing agencies, and from the private sector as the operator of the utilised 
assets. 
Document analysis and in-depth interviews are utilised to collect data from the multi-case study. 
The document analysis delivers contextual data in the research field which then is developed in 
arranging questions for next steps of research (Bowen 2009). Using document analysis offers 
benefits for the research process because it is considered to be efficient in the collecting process, 
materials are already available in many institutions, and it is non-reactive and impartial (Bowen 
2009). The documents analysed include government policies and regulations, project specific 
information, and public materials from media coverage regarding government policies and their 
implementation. There are some inbuilt characteristics of document analysis that are taken into 
consideration. The documents collected could be too vague and not detailed enough to be deeply 
analysed. The need for confidentiality and the caution of government officers may prevent access 
to relevant information. 
 Significance and Contribution 
The thesis is significant and justified for the following reasons. Firstly, the thesis focuses on the 
edge of contemporary and prospective discussions on, PAM, PPPs, and accountability. There are 
six themes of  PPP research direction: examining beyond the details of PPPs, elaborating critical 





understanding worldwide economic problems, and last, dealing with research influence on policy 
and practice effects (Andon 2012). The thesis extends the critical explanations of PPPs by 
elaborating the motivations and reasons for PPP adoption in the PAM context. The thesis also 
focuses on accountability in a hybrid organisation which is seen as one of several thematic 
frontiers in future research agenda in specific sectors and context (Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton 
2012).  
Secondly, there have been studies on PPPs and accountability in emerging countries (World Bank 
2014) but until recently no research that focuses on PPPs in the context of Indonesian PAM has 
been found.  Therefore, this thesis is genuine in delivering a significant contribution to analysing 
practices in emerging countries, especially in Indonesia. 
Next, this thesis is considered as applied research which discusses the present-day development 
of policy and practices of PPPs in the Indonesian PAM context. The thesis contributes to the 
knowledge of public policy making and government practices and also provides further evidence 
regarding the adoption of PPPs from the PAM perspective. In terms of public policy making, the 
study delivers a new outlook from the people involved: Indonesian policy makers, implementing 
agencies, the private sector, auditors, and legislators. The study gathers ideas and views from 
relevant parties which could enhance the discussion of accountability in PPPs in Indonesian 
PAM.  
Finally, in terms of methodological advancement, the thesis applies a qualitative approach while 
most PPP research on Indonesia utilises quantitative approaches. The thesis is underpinned by a 
constructivist paradigm where the qualitative approach seeks a deeper understanding of the real-
life experience of the participants intensely involved in the phenomenon of PPPs in the context 
of Indonesian PAM. The thesis enriches the literature by providing the perspectives of the key 
actors (Bryman 2012). 
 Thesis Organisation 
The thesis presents the results of the research in nine chapters, with supporting documentation in 
appendices. 
The present chapter has summarised the thesis and provides the background to the research. The 
thesis proposition and research questions are briefly discussed to guide the discussion in the 





context is also presented to guide the discussion. This chapter briefly conveys the rationale, 
justification, and contribution of the research.  
The next chapter outlines the practice of PAM and PPPs in Indonesia and selected countries. The 
context of the research, which is Indonesian PAM practice, is described. The practices from other 
selected countries provide information for assessing the practice in Indonesia compared to other 
countries both developing and developed. 
The literature is reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4 where the former discusses NPM and PAM and 
the latter analyses literature on PPPs and accountability. Chapter 4 also maps the current studies 
grouped by PAM, PPPs, and governance and accountability, from which the gap in the literature 
can be identified and discussed in the last section.   
Chapter 5 outlines the research methodology elucidating the theoretical and pragmatic reasons 
behind the selection of the paradigm, research design and method, and data analysis. Due to the 
nature of the ontological position adopted and its epistemology, the thesis chooses the course of 
qualitative analysis to assess the research areas. The thesis employs the case study as its research 
design and selects four case studies based on their diversity and influential criteria. To collect 
data from those four cases, document analysis, semi-structured interviews and publicly available 
materials are employed as the research methods. 
The findings regarding the development and challenges of the Indonesian PAM are covered in 
Chapter 6. It captures and analyses the views and experiences of the participants from different 
institutions and levels of management. The current problems and progress of the Indonesian 
PAM provide foundations for further discussion in Chapter 8. 
In the following two chapters, the importance of PPPs in the Indonesian PAM is discussed. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the adoption of PPPs. The chapter gathers, summarises, and compares the 
perspectives of the participants. It also explains the current problems of PPP adoption and the 
impacts of those case studies on social and economic aspects. Then in Chapter 8, the 
accountability issues surrounding PPPs are explored. This chapter draws interesting facts about 
how the participants view accountability, transparency, and legal compliance. It also discusses 
factors influencing PPP accountability and its forms concerning the stages of a PPP. 
The findings from the previous three chapters are discussed and synthesised in the penultimate 





with the analysis of the current Indonesian PAM and its differently perceived challenges. Then 
the chapter discusses the motives and challenges of PPP adoption and analyses how 
accountability, transparency and compliance are practised in PPPs. 
The concluding chapter assesses the thesis findings and delivers the findings’ implications for 
both the knowledge and practice. The chapter also indicates the research limitations and suggests 







Public Asset Management and Public Private Partnerships Practices 
 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the context of the research by providing an overview of PAM and PPP 
practices in Indonesia. For the purpose of comparative analysis, there is also discussion of how 
other countries are managing their public assets and involving their private sector in 
infrastructure development. 
The second section of the chapter introduces the characteristics of Indonesia by providing 
relevant preliminary information. Then the chapter summarises PAM practices in the country 
since the early years of the Soeharto era until recently. The summary also briefly describes the 
DGSAM, an institution under the Indonesian MoF which manages all central government assets. 
After that, the practices of PAM from selected countries are outlined for the purpose of 
comparison and to explain what the country practices. A discussion of the motives and 
development of PPP practices in the country follows. The Indonesian version of PPPs is also 
compared and analysed in relation to other countries’ practices. 
 Indonesia, the Country Profile 
Indonesia is the largest country in the South East Asia region both in total area and population. 
its population density can be seen in Figure 2.1. Having a large percentage of areas of water, 
Indonesia has great challenges to provide basic infrastructure for more than a quarter of a billion 
of its people. These people live in more than fifteen thousand islands with a disproportionate 
population density which has added more problems to fulfilling their needs. Almost 80% of the 
country’s population live on the island of Java and produce around 60% of the national gross 
domestic product (BPS 2018). 
Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia’s geopolitics can be divided into three eras namely the 
revolutionary period, the new order regime, and after the reform movement. The first era lasted 
for about two decades when Indonesia faced its independence wars against the Dutch and armed 
rebellion from many separatist movements, religious groups, and a communist party. After 1966, 
under the Soeharto regime, Indonesia was ruled by an iron fist to maintain its economic stability 





develop for the first time its economy and benefit from its rich natural resources such as oil, gas, 
and minerals. However, due to rampant corruption and political nepotism, the blessing of natural 
resources did not increase economic activities as significantly as it should have although the 
massive income from the 1980s oil boom made Pertamina, a state-owned company, a major cash 
cow for the regime. 
Figure 2.1 – Indonesian Population Map in 2017 
 
Source: BPS-Statistics Indonesia (2018) 
The regional monetary crisis hit Indonesia in 1997. The exchange rate of rupiah to the US dollar 
was hit the hardest amongst Asian countries from IDR2,500 for USD1 prior to the crisis, into 
almost IDR20,000. The economic crisis turned into political turmoil as student movements began 
demanding democratic reform to the regime. The people power dethroned Soeharto one year later 
and he was succeeded by his deputy as an interim president. Habibie, as the successor conducted 
reforms in many sectors including the legal, political, and financial. He ensured freedom of 
speech as part of his agenda and successfully held a general election in the following year. Later 
in 2004, Indonesia held its first ever direct presidential election.  
The monetary-crisis-triggered political reform changed the Indonesia government system into a 
democratic, transparent, and accountable form of governance in several ways (Heryanto & Hadiz 
2005; Lindsey 2004).  The national government restructured many of its state institutions by 
forming new essential bodies and disbanding unnecessary agencies (Lindsey 2004). In addition, 
the government also established some independent commissions to support its legal system, 





Commission and the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (Lindsey 2004). The 
reforms were fruitful as can be seen from the long term political stability and economic 
development of Indonesia two decades in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis (Aswicahyono & 
Christian 2017; Holidin, Hariyati & Sunarti 2017). 
Figure 2.2 – GDP Growth of Four ASEAN Countries 
 
Source: World bank (2019) 
The Indonesian economy has grown steadily since the political reforms in 1998. However, once 
considered as one of the Asian Tigers, the nation’s economic performance is only average 
compared to other developing countries in a similar economic situation such as Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. Its latest economic growth is 5.07% in 2017, and in the last decade, 
the growth is in the range of 4.6 – 6.2%. In the period, Indonesian fluctuated less compared to 
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines as can be seen in Figure 2.2.  With a gross domestic 
product (GDP) of almost I billion US dollars, it is the largest economic power in the region and 
the 16th worldwide. Its GDP per capita is USD 3,846 (current), which is still lower than those of 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Corruption and its root cause 
Despite efforts with establishing transparency and accountability after the 1998 regime-change, 





exist until recently but in a different magnitude. Irregularities within the government bodies and 
the parliament still occur. BPK reported hundreds of cases that led to billions of rupiahs of public 
money lost along with suspicious bank accounts owned by government officials (Detikfinance 
2009; Hukum Online 2006).  
The nation’s corruption perception index of the Transparency International confirms the problem 
of accountability in the country. In 2019, its index of only 40 from the 100 scale, ranks 85 of 183 
countries surveyed by the organisation (Transparency International 2020). Appendix K shows 
that the country’s indices had gradually increased from only 32 in 2012 to 40 in 2019. 
In addition, the Indonesian parliament is also viewed as a part of the problem since a study found 
that it is one of the most corrupt institutions in the country (Mukhtar 2017). Hundreds of members 
of parliament both from the national and regional houses of representatives have been caught by 
the Anti Corruption Commission while they were collecting bribery or illegal money (Putra 
2016). In the latest, the highest figure of the Indonesian House of Representatives, its speaker 
was arrested in late 2017 for his involvement in an electronic identity card graft case (Devina 
Heriyanto 2018). Moreover, law enforcing agencies such as the court and police failed to act. In 
fact, many officials of those institutions were involved in corruption activities (Suparman 2019).  
The corruption problem in Indonesia in the past could be explained by three different factors, 
namely political, economic and the Javanese culture (Robertson-Snape 1999). Indonesian 
administration under Soeharto lacked accountability, transparency, democratic institutions, and 
press freedom. The political system was created to serve unity under Soeharto himself by placing 
executive, legislative, and judicial institutions under his hegemony. The government also tightly 
controlled the press where several national presses were banned for their coverage of issues the 
government was sensitive to (Imron, Sariyatun & Yuniyanto 2016). Next, the Soeharto regime 
also deeply intervened in the nation’s economic activities which generated rent and rent seeking 
behaviour. Furthermore, elements of the Indonesian economy were highly centralised among 
Soeharto’s inner circle that included his family members, military figures, and businesspeople.  
Regarding the role of the Javanese as the ethnic majority in the country, their culture has 
dramatically shaped the national culture not least because two dominant Indonesian post 
independent leaders are Javanese (Robertson-Snape 1999). Old Javanese customs, where people 





common. Another traditional custom where clan loyalties are strong, could explain the thriving 
nepotism and collusion.  
Historically, insufficient budgets for almost all government agencies, including salaries lower 
than the cost of living, are believed to have been a means for the Soeharto regime to obtain loyalty 
from government officers (McLeod 2008). In regard to military institutions, the regime allowed 
them to conduct commercial activities to cover the needs of the institutions and the employees. 
However, it was said that those kinds of activities largely benefited the high-ranking officials and 
did not increase the living standards of the low rank military personnel.  
 Indonesian Public Asset Management 
To comprehend the context, Indonesian PAM is discussed in this section. Firstly, the six 
milestones of Indonesian PAM are explained to understand its historical background. The 
following section discusses the organisational framework that describes its concept of the asset 
life cycle. Last, how the current regulations and policies define the principles, the asset 
classification, and the actors and their activities are discussed.  
 Milestones of Indonesian PAM 
As mentioned above, due to political and physical struggles in the early periods after 
independence, Soekarno could not pay much attention to the nation’s development program 
(Kingsbury 2002). Nevertheless, he managed to build some mega infrastructure projects. One of 
them was the largest sporting complex in Asia at that time which was built in the early 1960s. 
Likewise, in the early years of his term, Soeharto focused on consolidating his power after taking 
power from his predecessor and the economic development faced a difficult path (Van Zanden 
& Marks 2013). Five years later, Soeharto managed to show periods of economic recovery and 
political stability once his five year development plan had been introduced (McCawley 2017). 
Due to a lack of infrastructure funding, Indonesia issued a new foreign investment law in 1967 
that welcomed overseas investors. Then, within three years, ground-breaking for several 
infrastructure projects began that made 1970 the first milestone of Indonesian PAM practice 
(Prayoga 2016). Yet, there was no adequate tool to manage the infrastructure assets. It was not 
until 2004, that the government implemented its new budgetary system that required its bodies 
to record their income and expenditure (GoI 2004a). As a result, there was no information 





Figure 2.3 – Milestones of Indonesian PAM 
 
Source: Directorate of State Assets (2012)         
Post-Soeharto government has experienced public sector reform in a quest for performance, 
governance, and accountability (Harun, Van Peursem & Eggleton 2012; Jones & Kettl 2003; 
McLeod 2006; Olson, Guthrie & Humphrey 1998). In promoting accountability, the reform 
process has emphasised the NPM prime principles of effectiveness and efficiency. One of the 
early milestones in the process was the passing of three acts on: The State Treasury, State 
Finance, and the Auditing of State Finances (McLeod & Harun 2014). The State Treasury Law 
has provided the basis of public asset management reform in Indonesia as it obliges the 
government to implement transparency and accountability. Milestones of Indonesian PAM can 
be seen in Figure 2.3. 
A financial statement is one of the instruments to indicate accountability and transparency 
(Bolívar, Galera & Muñoz 2015; IPSASB 2018; Ives 1987). Indonesia issued its first financial 
statement in 2004 (GoI 2005b). Although the BPK disclaimed giving an audit opinion, the 
financial statement played an important role in Indonesian PAM. For the first time, the number 
of government assets could be figured out, and the statement could be utilised for the decision-
making process. 
Prior to the issuance of its first central government financial statement, Indonesia recognised the 
principles of good governance in the constitution. The 2003 State Finance Law introduced five 
principles in Indonesian public sector management, namely result-oriented accountability, 
professionalism, proportionality, transparency and independence audit (GoI 2003). Following 





State Treasury and the Audit of State Finance Management and Responsibility (GoI 2004c, 
2004b).  
Having been prepared with a legal infrastructure yet still having problems with the reliability of 
asset data in its financial statement, the Government of Indonesia conducted a nationwide asset 
arrangement program in 2007 (Asset 2012). The four-year program had two main objectives 
namely the physical examination of assets and asset revaluation. The first was to compare an 
asset physical existence and condition with the records, the latter was to update the asset’s market 
value. The output of this program was enormously important for PAM decision making such as 
asset supply side to fulfil requests from government institutions across the country. 
In the last five years, Indonesian PAM has focused on three issues regarding asset utilisation, 
accrual-based accounting, and state-owned land legal certification (Asset 2012). The policy on 
those issues has been available since 2006 with the issuance of Government Regulation 
No.6/2006 (PP No.6/2006) regarding State Asset Management. The regulation gives a more 
comprehensive perspective regarding PAM by incorporating an asset lifecycle concept and its 
integration with the budgeting aspect. A new institution namely the Directorate-General of State 
Asset Management (DGSAM) was established to manage central government assets with 
considerable authority in regulating and giving decisions in every stage of the asset lifecycle.  
 The Current Policy Framework 
Current practices of the Indonesian PAM are built on a framework consisting of four aspects 
namely types of assets, actors, principles, and activities as can be seen in Figure 2.4. The first 
aspect, government assets are classified into real property and non real property. The real 
property assets are any type of asset that consists of land or buildings. Government offices, 
employee’s housing, and infrastructure such as road, railways and ports are examples of this type 
of asset. The use, utilisation and disposal of real property assets are highly regulated. Approval 
from the Ministry of Finance is required prior to any action taken by other ministries (GoI 2003, 
2004c). The terms use and utilisation are differentiated from the perspective of which parties are 
served by the assets. In contrast, for non real property assets such as vehicles and machinery, the 
asset users have more room to decide their action. 
Next aspect, there are two actors playing the roles of the asset manager and the asset users or 
asset custodians. The MoF, in this case the DGSAM plays the role of the asset manager where 





assets life cycle especially for real property assets. Meanwhile, the other ministries as the asset 
users are responsible for routine activities in maintaining the assets under their custody.  
Figure 2.4 – Indonesian PAM Framework: The Central Government 
 
Source: GoI (2014) 
Third, the principles of the Indonesian PAM are functionality, legal certainty, transparency, 
efficiency, accountability and value creation (GoI 2004c; Tutik & Widodo 2016). The 
functionality principle is defined as meaning all government assets must serve the duties and 
function of the asset custodians. Otherwise, the assets are categorised as idle or surplus that 
require the custodian to utilise them by commercialising or to hand over the asset to the DGSAM 
(MoF 2016b). Legal certainty is considered highly important in Indonesia where thousands of 
state-owned lands are still not supported by proper legal documents (Jannah 2018). Furthermore, 
the principles of transparency, efficiency, and accountability have been adopted by the 
Indonesian bureaucracy not just in asset management but in wider aspects such as its state finance 
affairs (GoI 2003).  
The concept of value creation considers that every asset owned by the government should 
contribute to national development. In relation to this concept, the PAM policy in this country 





an asset by government entities in conducting their duties and functions. Meanwhile, the 
regulation refers to the word ‘utilisation’ to describe the utilisation of state assets by the private 
sector when surplus or underutilised assets are rented or offered to them (GoI 2014; MoF, MoF 
2014). 
Asset Life Cycle Based Organisation 
The activities in Indonesian PAM adopt the asset life cycle model as depicted in Figure 2.5 which 
start from planning and budgeting and end with asset disposal. The DGSAM designs the policy 
and monitors the implementation (MoF 2012a). The institution also has its in house appraisal 
services that can be assigned to determine the market values of the state assets (MoF 2017).  
Figure 2.5 – Asset Life Cycle in the Indonesian Regulatory Framework 
 
Source: Abdullah et al. (2012), GoI (2006a)  
The role of the DGSAM is particularly significant in the planning and disposing phases. In the 
planning phase, the DGSAM integrates the need for assets from all government bodies with the 
budgeting process. In the disposing process, the DGSAM is obliged to verify that the asset is sold 
based on the market value to prevent financial loss in the transaction. In the operating phase, the 
role of user institutions is more dominant regarding operational asset maintenance. However, 
where a government body has surplus assets, it is required to inform the DGSAM and decide the 





Besides playing the role of the policy maker, the MoF also has two other responsibilities in 
Indonesian PAM namely monitoring and control, and valuation (GoI 2006a). The monitoring 
and control activities are to make sure that PAM by the state asset users follows the regulations 
and policies issued by the state asset manager. Meanwhile, the DGSAM conducts valuations in 
the procuring, operating, and disposing phases. In the operating phase, the valuation is held only 
for assets which will be utilised by private sector including under public-private partnership 
contracts. 
The PPP policy 
By law, the process of PPPs in the Indonesian PAM involves three different actors: the MoF as 
the asset manager, the ministries as the asset user and the private parties. In addition to those 
roles, there are auditors and the parliament who monitor the accountability of the Indonesian 
PAM. The MoF as the asset manager has two important roles in the PPP process as the 
policymaker and as the policy implementer. As the policy maker, the MoF issues policies 
regarding Indonesian PAM, and as the policy implementer, the MoF is involved in the 
operational decisions on asset management such as giving approvals to asset utilisation 
proposals. Meanwhile, as the asset user, a ministerial office has the authority for managing and 
administering state assets within their ministry. Last, the role of private parties emerges once 
they have been selected in the tender process.  
All PPP actors are subject to periodic audits for an accountability check. Three audit bodies 
monitor the PPPs: the internal audit unit of every ministry, the National Government Internal 
Auditor (the BPKP), and the Audit Supreme Board (the BPK). Those three audit bodies have 
different emphases and themes regarding their audit activities. At the policy level, the Indonesian 
parliament, together with the government, has the authority to enact law regarding PAM 
including PPPs. Nevertheless, at more operational levels, the MoF is fully authoritative.  
 Public Asset Management Practices in Selected Countries  
Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and Canada are the pioneers of PAM reforms (Anfara Jr & 
Mertz 2014; Kaganova, McKellar & Peterson 2006; Olson, Guthrie & Humphrey 1998). In 
Australia, asset management reform has arisen from preceding broader reforms in accountability, 
productivity, competition and fiscal discipline (Conway 2006). The Australian reform was 





(ANAO) in 1995. As a result, the ANAO suggested five foundations of asset management 
namely: (1) the integration of decision making in asset management with strategic planning; (2) 
the adoption of cost, benefit, and risk in asset planning; (3) the recognition of accountability in 
asset condition, use and performance; (4) the inclusion of options in asset disposal policies; and 
(5) the establishment of internal control. 
Meanwhile, Australian state governments have implemented their own reform programmes. In 
New South Wales, for instance, the government has adopted Total Asset Management (TAM) 
which contains a decade-long strategy as a reference for all units of the state government in 
managing their assets (The Treasury of NSW Government 2006). In their TAM guidelines, the 
objective of TAM is to promote better planning and management of the state’s property in 
providing future economic benefits as well as delivering public services. All agencies developed 
their own asset strategy based on the Department of Treasury’s guidance covering the three major 
areas of capital investment, asset maintenance, and asset disposal.  
In 2013, the NSW government issued some revisions and additions to its TAM policies regarding 
asset submission requirements (The Treasury of NSW Government 2013). In the policies, the 
state agencies are required to submit their asset strategy, TAM data tables, capital proposals, 
business cases and review reports in October/November. The submissions are an important 
contributing factors to the budget cycle and the infrastructure development strategy due to their 
purposes in: evaluating agencies capital expenditures either current or forecast; aligning the 
state’s capital plan with its priorities and service deliveries; assessing the agencies’ capital 
program; advising the Expenditure Review Committee of potential implementation risk in the 
state’s infrastructure strategies; delivering information to the agencies on capital strategies, asset 
management, and relevant financial risks; and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
capital project review procedures. 
In the developing world, Malaysia has tried to follow the path of developed nations in reforming 
their PAM by implementing international practices (Xavier 2013) yet the impact has still been 
limited and problems continue in some areas (Abdullah, Razak & Pakir 2011).  Lack of a national 
context consideration has impeded the public sector reform of the nation and several problems 
occurred in terms of its strategic approach; resources, knowledge and expertise; performance 
measurement; information systems; and institutional configuration (Abdullah, Razak & Pakir 






which places emphasis on the management of government property assets in a 
systematic and holistic way in order to achieve optimum benefits from the assets (Yusof 
2013, p. 23). 
Despite being a federal nation, Malaysian PAM is, to some extent, more centralised compared to 
that of Australia. Since 2009, the Malaysian federal government has employed Total Asset 
Management designed by the Prime Minister’s office as a reference for all federal entities which 
is not the case in Australia (Abdullah, Razak & Pakir 2011). Besides that, under the Ministry of 
Finance, the Valuation and Property Services Department provides services to all government 
entities regarding property consultancy and property valuation (JPPH 2016).  
Government real properties in Malaysia are managed by either the Property Management 
Division (PMD), a division in the prime minister’s office, a custodian agency, or outsourcing 
parties (Mohd Isa 2001). PMD plays a major role in the country’s PAM where it holds most 
federal government assets. As well, it issues policies and standards that apply to all government 
buildings regardless of the building’s management. A small percentage of government 
institutions occupy and manage their own office complexes and the rest outsource their property 
management to private parties through a variety of contracts, one of which is a public-private 
partnership. 
Canada takes a different path to the above countries in managing its public assets. It used to 
centralise all property management in the hands of the Public Works and Government Services  
Canada (PWGSC) (McKellar 2006a). Since the enactment of its Federal Real Property and 
Federal Immovables in 1991, Canada assigns custodian ministries to manage their own properties 
in almost all aspects but disposal. The custodians have the flexibility to plan, procure, upgrade, 
maintain, and even lease part of their surplus properties to private parties. They apply regulations 
set by the Treasury Board as the policy maker for government properties as well as common 
property regulations regarding health and safety which also apply to private-owned properties. 
Nevertheless, there are still a small number of properties under the management of PWGSC. 
Besides as the policy maker, the Treasury Board also establishes and manages the Directory of 
Federal Real Property, a database of all federal government real properties (Secretariat of 
CanadaTreasury Board 2019).  
The custodians in the Canadian Federal Government while managing their properties have 
options on whether to use the services from PWGSC, private parties, or in-house. However, they 





a full-sized custodial ministry to have some in-house property service units, and at the same time 
hire some property agents as well as obtaining services from the PWGSC. In cases of asset 
disposal, despite the policy stating that the authority belongs to the PWGSC, for non-strategic 
assets, the custodial ministries could dispose of the assets in the market through a private agent 
or the PWGSC. 
Another perspective of PAM can be seen in New Zealand where asset management is integral to 
strategic, operational, service, and financial planning (Audit New Zealand 2010). In a quest for 
efficiency and effectiveness, the New Zealand national government has highly decentralised and 
provides considerable flexibility in its PAM to the departments (Dow et al. 2006). Compared to 
the three countries previously discussed, the custodial departments have significant authority in 
all phases of the asset life cycle including in the disposal phase. Departments are allowed to 
dispose of their unneeded assets according to the policy made by the Land Information New 
Zealand (LINZ) and to use the proceeds of the sale to obtain other properties as they see fit (Dow 
et al. 2006).  
The current PAM policies of New Zealand have delivered positive impacts on several aspects 
(Dow et al. 2006). They argue that besides its decentralization and flexibility, the policies 
encourage the departments to adopt private sector practices that coupled with the performance 
measurement system will deliver more efficient asset management. They also comment that the 
regulations adopted promote accountability and effectiveness, because the departments are given 
incentives to openly declare their surplus assets and divest them. In the end, this is believed to 
improve the position of their asset portfolios.  Nevertheless, there are still drawbacks that New 
Zealand has to face. Its high level of decentralisation has created fragmentation in its asset 
management expertise, especially in smaller institutions. New Zealand needs to establish a pool 
of knowledge that collects and shares the experiences of PAM from and to all its custodian 
departments  (Dow et al. 2006).  
 Public Private Partnerships in Indonesian Infrastructure Development 
The Government of Indonesia has set infrastructure as one of its eight sectoral priorities in its 
long term national development plan (President of Indonesia 2005). Although the infrastructure 
was positioned as the last sector in the plan, the amount spent by the national government in 
recent years has spiked. Figure 2.6 shows that in 2014, the spending was only IDR 178 trillion 





20% of the 2017 budget) (Databoks 2016). In the following year, the fund required for 
infrastructure development was USD 359 billion which is 30% more than the government could 
provide (Bappenas 2018).  
In comparison with its GDP, the infrastructure investment of Indonesia since the end of the 20th 
century has levelled off between 3-5% (Lubis 2015). The percentage is only a half of that targeted 
by the government in its 2015-2019 midterm national development plan (President of Indonesia 
2015). Compared to India and China, it is also quite low. Those countries’ percentages have been 
above 7%, and between 9-11% respectively since 2005 (Maryouri 2017).  
Figure 2.6 – Infrastructure Spending in Indonesian Annual Budget 
 
Source: DGB (2017) 
The government has realised the problem of infrastructure underinvestment. Its budget can 
provide around 30% of the investment, state-owned companies are encouraged to deliver another 
30% and the remaining percentage is expected to be covered by some types of financial 
engineering mechanisms (Yudhoyono 2011). One very suitable financial mechanism is public-
private partnerships and since 2009, the government of Indonesia has annually issued a PPP book 
to publish its PPP policy framework as well as planned projects either under construction or being 





There are seven major sectors of infrastructure development in Indonesia that involve private 
participation namely electricity, information and communication technology, natural gas, ports, 
railways, roads, and water and sewerage. World Bank indicates that in the period 1990-2019, 
there were 141 projects of the seven sectors that had successfully finalised the financial closures. 
The total investment in the last three decades was almost USD 67.5 billion (World Bank 2020). 
Figure 2.7 displays that in the 29-year period, the country channelled almost two thirds of its 
infrastructure funding to the electricity sector (USD 43 billion). 
Figure 2.7 – Private Participation in Indonesian Infrastructure Development (1990-2019) 
 
Source: World Bank (2020) 
The policy framework of PPPs in Indonesia is designed under a presidential regulation and the 
technical implementation is regulated by four ministries/institutions namely the Ministry of 
National Development Planning (Bappenas), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, and the National Procurement Agency (Bappenas 2018). Bappenas provides guidelines 
for PPP infrastructure provision for every sector offered. Meanwhile, the MoF offers policies on 
viability gap funding as well as the availability payment. Likewise, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
renders policy on payments from provincial and local governments. The procurement procedure 
is delivered by the National Procurement Agency. In addition to those PPP-related policies, 





Despite the regulations being delivered by those four institutions, the government established a 
joint office whose jobs are internally coordinating and facilitating all PPP-related government 
agencies and externally providing assistance for investors (Bappenas 2018). The joint office 
plays a role in three stages of PPPs namely planning, preparation, and transaction. In the planning 
stage, a preliminary study is conducted by government agencies or state/regional owned 
companies to depict the feasibility study of the project including the funding sources. Next in the 
preparation stage, the pre-feasibility study activities provide information about the project 
regarding its business core, social and environmental aspects, and PPP readiness. Once the 
previous stages are completed, the project is ready for tender. In this transaction stage, the private 
sector organisation is announced as the winner and a special purpose vehicle is established. 
The problems Indonesia faces regarding PPP projects include risk allocation, and complexities 
in regulation and institutions (Abednego & Ogunlana 2006; Maryouri 2017). The first problem, 
dealing with the risk allocation between the government and the private sector, can be classified 
into seven categories: political, construction, operation, legal, income, financial and force 
majeure (Wulan 2005). Types of related risk in PPPs will be discussed and analysed further in 
Chapter 4. 
Regarding regulatory and institutional complexities, three issues became concerns in Indonesian 
PPP practices namely coordination, land acquisition, and the PPP framework (Maryouri 2017). 
The coordination is an issue due to the complexities of relationships not only amongst agencies 
within the same governmental level but also at different governmental levels. Silo problems arise 
between sectoral ministries with coordinating ministries and the unsound competition between 
local governments where any project cuts across their territories. As a result, every stage of PPP 
development requires lengthy consultation, time-consuming discussion, and complex 
coordination. To address the problem, the government published a nation-wide master plan for 
economic development that integrated various national, sectoral, and regional plans to minimise 
overlapping and increase coordination (President of Indonesia 2011). 
The next issue is related to the procurement of land which is essential for every infrastructure 
project. Landowners tend to hold onto their properties to obtain profit from high market value 
appreciation. This problem causes a significant interruption to the project timeline that in the end 
will also increase the cost. Two significant policies have been issued to address the problem. In 
2012, a land acquisition law was approved by Indonesian lawmakers (GoI 2012b). Four years 





budget (Indonesia 2016). A special fund is allocated annually and managed by a government 
property agency named LMAN which in 2017 managed around IDR 30 trillion.  
The complexity in the Indonesian PPP framework is caused by many aspects including the two 
issues already discussed above (Maryouri 2017). Firstly, there are the local and central 
government relationships that create both planning and budget complications. Next, the lack of 
public sector comparator analysis that causes mismanagement in PPP budgeting. Then, as in 
other countries, most PPP projects are financially unviable which means that government support 
is essential.  
 PPP Practices in Selected Countries 
As in the PAM discussion above, PPP practices in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Malaysia 
are discussed in this section. The purpose of explaining the practices of these four countries is to 
understand how NPM principles in PAM practices compare with those in PPPs especially 
focusing on the accountability concerns. 
Australia 
PPP policies in Australia are issued by the national government and the state governments. The 
national policy applies nationwide while the latter only to its state regions. The Department of 
Infrastructure and Regional Development of the Australian Federal Government issued national 
PPP policy and guidelines that were already endorsed by the State, Territory and Federal 
Governments (DIRD 2016). All PPP projects offered to the private sector follow these guidelines 
that regulate seven aspects of PPPs in Australia: procurement, practitioners, commercial 
principles for social and economic infrastructure, public sector comparator, discount rate and 
jurisdictional requirement.  
At the lower level, the state governments publish their own specific requirements regarding the 
PPP projects in their jurisdictions. The specific requirements are not against the national policies; 
hence they just regulate some technical aspects in more detail. For example in the state of New 
South Wales, the government issued guidelines, the latest of which is NSW Public Private 
Partnership Guidelines 2017 (NSW Treasury 2017). The guidelines cover the approval processes, 
governance aspect, procurement strategy, and contract management that suit the objectives and 





PPPs in Australia basically can be categorised into social and economic infrastructure (DIRD 
2008; PWC 2017). The first category refers to income generating infrastructure such as ports, 
roads, and railways and the latter is for non-income generating ones like hospitals, schools, and 
other social infrastructure. The use of those PPP categories is not that strict where the second 
PPP category has been applied to some roads, railways, and ports. The Sydney Metro Northwest 
and the Waratah train project are examples of economic infrastructure but they utilised the social 
infrastructure PPP model (PWC 2017). In the last decades, PPPs represent around 10% of all 
infrastructure projects (PWC 2017). Most infrastructure projects still rely on the traditional 
procurement method which is still acceptable. PPPs are considered for projects with a minimum 
capital cost of $50 million (Infrastructure Australia 2019). Relatively small projects offer better 
value for money using the traditional procurement technique. 
Since 2000, several issues surrounding Australian PPP practices have been investigated and 
addressed by academics as well as practitioners. Those issues fall into four categories: 
preparation and project development, accountability, competitive pricing, and ongoing contract 
management (Duffield 2005). In the first category, one audit finding shows evidence of barriers 
regarding PPP procurement (Infrastructure Australia 2015). Those barriers include a limited 
project pipeline, a lack of commitment to PPP from the Australian legal system, an expensive 
bidding process and an uncoordinated project launching to market by state/territory governments. 
Next, the accountability issue is related to how the government can be accountable both to the 
public by transparency and appropriate pricing, and to the private parties by proving incentive, 
and governance (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 2011; Duffield 2005; Hodge et al. 2017). 
Furthermore, in the quest for competitive pricing, the bidding process must be high quality, the 
risks significantly transferred and the financial closures satisfying both parties (Duffield 2005). 
Last, to maintain the contract as a going concern, the government and its private partners have to 
nurture a culture of partnership and make sure that knowledge transfer is materialised (Duffield 
2005). 
New Zealand 
There is a delay in PPPs adoption in New Zealand, compared to other OECD countries and the 
New Zealand government realised its position by establishing the National Infrastructure Unit 
(NIU) in 2009 (Liu & Wilkinson 2011). The roles of the NIU are quite similar to its Australian 
counterpart which include developing PPP policy, procedures and standards; providing 





and monitoring the ongoing PPP projects (The Treasury of New Zealand Government 2018). Not 
long after its establishment, the NIU issued the Guideline for Public Private Partnerships in New 
Zealand (NIU 2009).  
Figure 2.8 – PPP Market Maturity Curve in 2011 
 
Source: (Eggers & Startup 2006; Provost 2011) 
During 2006-2011, the maturity of the PPP market in this country developed in terms of activity 
and sophistication yet it was still considered to be in the stage two of the three-stage market 
maturity curve as depicted in Figure 2.8 (Eggers & Startup 2006; Provost 2011). The market 
maturity curve classifies PPP markets of countries in the world into three stages based on their 
activity and sophistication (Eggers & Startup 2006). Stage One is for a developing PPP market 
and when the market becomes active it enters Stage Two. The last stage is when the market 
matures and is well-functioning. In 2006, the PPP market in this country was in early Stage Two 
although some sectors of its infrastructure market were still in Stage One. Then, due to the 





Two. A policy guideline has been set up and the early projects indicate some kind of innovation 
in terms of outcome contracting, and structural arrangement (Provost 2011) 
PPP development in New  Zealand faces problems that can be identified into: political, social, 
and legal risks; unfavourable economic and commercial situations; high transaction costs and 
time consuming bidding processes, and internal problems within both the public and private 
sector (Liu & Wilkinson 2011). Compared to other countries in the Australasian region including 
Australia, New Zealand and the neighbouring islands of the South Pacific Ocean, PPP practices 
in New Zealand are less extensive than Australia, yet more advanced than any other countries in 
the region (Hodge 2005) 
Canada 
Figure 2.9 – Canadian PPP Projects - 2019 
 
Source: the CCPPP (2019a) 
Figure 2.9 shows Canada’s PPP market has matured since 2011. It took six years to enhance its 
maturity from stage two to fully mature in stage three. PPPs have been in this country since the 
mid-1990s (Boardman, Poschmann & Vining 2005). In the earliest years of its PPP development, 
Canada established the Canadian Council of Public-Private Partnerships (CCPPP) which is a 
member-based organisation from across the government and private sector (CCPPP 2019b). The 
council has issued the guidelines for PPP practices in Canada both for all levels of government 
involved as well as for private sector. It also plays a role as a centre of excellence where 
experiences and knowledge from international best practices and domestic success stories as well 





Of the ten infrastructure sectors, Canada currently has 284 active PPP projects with a market 
value of CAD136 billion and 67 projects still in the pipeline as can be seen in Figure 2.9 (CCPPP 
2019a). Almost two thirds of the active projects are from health (35%) and transport (28%). 
However, in terms of market value as presented in Figure 2.10, almost half of the active PPP 
projects are in the transport sector, followed by health (21%) and energy (19%). Those three 
major sectors represent 90% of all operating Canadian PPP projects in terms of market value. 
Figure 2.10 – Proportion of the PPP Active Projects  
by their market value (CAD millions) 
 
Source: the CCPPP (2019a) 
Over the last three decades, Canada has passed through two stages of PPP development where it 
tried to address the concerns arising from the first stage and made improvements in the second 
stage (Siemiatycki 2015). The first stage is in the period between 1990 and early 2000 where a 
series of early PPP projects such as the Confederation Bridge and the Highway 407 projects were 
developed. In this stage, the government stated their reasons for adopting PPPs for large 
infrastructure projects. The second stage was in the first decade of the twenty first century. In 
this stage, Canada answered the critiques and strengthened its PPP organisation to provide robust 
analysis. In the current timeline, the way Canada responded in the second stage has been analysed 





As Canada has the most mature PPP market compared to other countries discussed here 
(Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Indonesia), it shows several perspectives regarding 
problems and the efforts to address them. Several concerns have been addressed by the Canadian 
government, yet some negative outcomes still need to be addressed. Concerns coming from the 
first stage were: excessive political influence on PPP selection, inexperienced government 
operatives, insufficient assessment regarding the worthiest method of procurement, lack of 
transparency, and loss of significant control. (Siemiatycki 2015; Vining & Boardman 2008).  
The Canadian government has responded to those concerns by: establishing PPP special purpose 
vehicles in most of its provinces; hiring highly specialised officers in every aspect of PPPs 
including finance, law, business, accounting, and project management; publishing advanced 
standardised procedures for procurement selection analysis; enforcing its PPP agencies to 
transparently publish their documentation; retaining more control over recent PPP projects 
(Siemiatycki 2015; Vining & Boardman 2008). Despite those responses, some concerns still exist 
regarding bias because of favouring PPP over traditional procurement methods, confidential 
business information that cannot be open to the public, and high premiums paid by the 
government for transferring some risks (Rachwalski 2013; Siemiatycki 2007, 2015; Vining & 
Boardman 2008). 
Malaysia 
Malaysia formally recognised PPP as a means for delivering infrastructure projects in 2006 when 
the country released the Ninth Malaysia Plan where the terminology of the private financing 
initiative was introduced (Office 2006). Malaysian private sector had already participated in 
infrastructure projects from 1983 after the issuance of the Malaysia Incorporated Policy two years 
earlier  (Ismail & Harris 2014b). No different from other selected countries discussed in this 
thesis, Malaysia also established a special agency dedicated to develop the PPPs in infrastructure 
projects namely the Public-Private Partnerships Unit (3PU) in 2009 (3PU 2019). 
The 3PU is structurally under the Ministry of Finance whose functions include policy and 
guideline formulation, advisory services, and stakeholders collaboration in many technical 
aspects of PPP programs (3PU 2019). According to its publication, the total market capitalisation 
of Malaysian PPPs as of 31 December 2015 was MYR 293 billion (USD 68 billion) of 824 active 





The motives of PPP adoption in Malaysian infrastructure development differ from the 
perceptions of different actors in either public or private sector. There are five reasons most 
offered by government officials and private sector practitioners as to the motives (Ismail & Harris 
2014a). Both sets of participants have the same perspective about the two main reasons for the 
Malaysian PPP adoption, which are firstly to elevate the participation of the private sector in 
economic development and then to enhance the efficiency of how public services are being 
rendered. Regarding the third and the fourth motives, the perceptions of those classes of 
participants are not similar but overall, the most offered reasons are to further the privatisation 
programme, followed by to decrease the government expenditures for infrastructure. Last, 
lowering the government roles in infrastructure development is also one of the motives.  
Table 2.1 – The Constraints of Malaysian PPPs 
No. 
Constraints 
(Ordered based on their importance) 
1 Lack of government guidelines and procedures on PPP 
2 Lengthy delays in negotiation 
3 Higher charges to the direct users 
4 Lengthy delays because of political debate 
5 Confusion over government objectives and evaluation criteria 
6 High risk relying on private sector 
7 High project costs 
8 A great deal of management time spent in contract transaction 
9 High participation costs 
10 Lack of experience and appropriate skills 
11 Very few schemes have actually reached the contract stage (aborted 
before contract) 
12 Excessive restrictions on participation 
13 Reduce the project accountability 
14 Less employment positions 
Source: Ismail and Harris (2014a) 
Malaysians have gained significant benefits from the adoption of PPPs in their public 
infrastructure development where many key projects in transportation, housing, government 
service and health sectors are thriving  (Abdul Aziz & Jahn Kassim 2011; Kaliannan, Awang & 
Raman 2010; Phua, Ling & Phua 2014; Ward & Sussman 2006).  
However, there is still room for improvement. Some problems have been identified and need to 
be appropriately addressed. Otherwise, the outcome could be devastating and harm the 





management of risk especially political risk, lack of transparency, and low public participation 
(Ward & Sussman 2006). The complication of those concerns brings the suspicion that the 
selection process is conducted not for the sake of public best interest, but for political association 
(Ward & Sussman 2006). In addition, there are fourteen constraints from the key players’ 
perspectives regarding Malaysian PPPs that can decide their development in the future as can be 
seen in Table 2.1 (Ismail & Harris 2014a).  
The discussion on PPP practices in the above five countries, including Indonesia, reveals that 
these countries experience similar difficulties yet in different magnitudes as well as time frames. 
They encounter issues with accountability and transparency; risks and premiums allocation; 
expensive and extensive bidding processes yet uncompetitive pricing; coordination among 
agencies; and public participation. 
 Conclusion 
The Indonesian political situation influences how the central government runs its affairs 
including in infrastructure development and its PAM. In the Soekarno’s era, several mega 
structures were built as white elephant projects in the middle of the cold war between world 
powers. At this period, the physical development was not followed by the adoption of good 
governance as armed struggles still happened in large parts of the country. In the following 
regime, Soeharto’s authoritarian government, with the support of political stability and windfalls 
from the 1980 oil boom, gradually changed the nation’s economy into one of the Asian tigers. 
The development had not sustained when an economic crisis followed by the political crisis hit 
the nation in 1998. One of the impacts of the 1998 crisis brought not only political but also 
bureaucracy reform. The principles of professionalism, transparency and accountability were 
officially adopted in the national law. 
The development of Indonesian PAM has recorded six milestones. Firstly, 1970 has been 
recognised as the infrastructure construction started. Then in 2003, five years after political 
turmoil brought democracy to the country, the government adopted the principles of good 
governance in their regulations. One year later, the country issued its first central government 
financial statement then conducted its initial asset revaluation. The next progress was achieved 
when idle or surplus assets obtained more attention. Last, in 2014, the government adopted 






The PAM framework in Indonesia is built on the concept of an asset life cycle where the assets 
are considered following through the circle of planning, procuring, operating, and disposing. In 
the adopted life cycle, Indonesian PAM includes policy making, asset appraising, monitoring and 
controlling, and periodical reporting. The current PAM regulation takes into account the asset 
types, actors, principles, and activities. The main actors for real property and non real property 
assets are the asset manager and the asset user. The principles of all those policies are 
functionality, legal certainty, transparency, efficiency, accountability, and value creation. 
To provide greater understanding, the research analyses PAM practices in several countries both 
in the developed and developing worlds. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are regarded for 
their PAM reform in adopting the principles of accountability, productivity, competition, and 
fiscal discipline in their total asset management program. From the developing world, Malaysia 
is one of a few nations, considered to be successful in managing both federal and state 
government assets through a unit inside its prime minister’s office. 
Meanwhile, more attention has been given to the adoption of PPPs in Indonesian infrastructure 
development in the last decade. The nation has realised that its budget cannot solely fund 
development without involving the private sector where there was a 30% funding gap in 2018. 
A set of regulations and a dedicated joint office are provided to support the PPP adoption. The 
problems of PPP practices in the country are related to risk allocation and regulation and 
institutional complexities. Another issue is relatively technical when almost every infrastructure 
project has to deal with difficulties in the procurement of land.  
The practices of PPP in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Malaysia are also discussed to do 
comparative analysis in terms of their adoption motives, policies, and regulatory bodies. Of those 
four countries, the Canadian PPP market is seen as the most mature from the aspects of activity 
and sophistication. In that country, two third of active PPP projects are in the health and transport 
sector. Meanwhile in Indonesia, more than half of the projects arise from the energy sector 











   
Public Asset Management: The Adoption of NPM 
 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of two literature review chapters. It examines the concepts and approaches 
relevant to the understanding of the key features and accountability concerns in the adoption of 
public private partnerships in relation to public asset management. The chapter discusses two of 
four areas of literature related to the thesis topic: NPM and PAM. The other two, PPPs and 
accountability are discussed in the following chapter. 
Furthermore, this chapter explores the theoretical basis of the research. The purposes of a 
literature review include setting the scope of research, understanding the current literature, 
identifying the research gap, obtaining methodological comprehension, and preparing a 
framework for the research contribution (Randolph 2009). However, the gap in the literature will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. 
The chapter is organised into five sections. After the introduction, there is a discussion on how 
the NPM movement shapes the way governments manage their public assets. Besides the 
discussion on the concept and principles of NPM, this chapter analyses how the literature 
discusses asset management theory and its framework. The chapter concludes by summarising 
the important points of the whole chapter and providing a connection to the following chapter. 
 New Public Management Paradigm  
The concept of NPM is closely related to the topics of governance, government, and public 
administration. Governance is the leadership approach chosen by the public sector in acquiring 
and utilising authority in providing for public needs (Kaufmann & Kraay 2007; Oehler-Sincai 
2008). World Bank (2003) describes further dimensions of governance that include five areas 
namely: the separation of powers among legislative, judiciary, and executive; the accountability 
of its political system; public sector management; private sector competitiveness; the 
circumstance of civil society, citizen’s voices and their participation. The government is the party 
who conducts the endeavours of governance.  
Within social sciences, the study of government and governance is called public administration 





aspects they involve (Hughes 2017). The former involves instructions and service which are 
dominated by processes and procedures. Those processes and procedures are designed by 
political leadership. It does not recognise personal responsibility and has no direct responsibility 
for the delivery of result. In contrast, the latter emphasises the achievement of results and 
personal responsibility as its form of accountability (Hughes 2017).  
Disregarding results delivery and accountability in its spectrum, public administration focuses 
on process, procedures, and bureaucracy in the formal manner of conducting orders from political 
leaders (Hughes 2017). On the other hand, public management takes a different path for debates 
by focusing on deliverables and accountability (Hughes 2017).   
Not all researchers follow the same idea regarding public administration and public management. 
Once, public management was a subdiscipline of public administration. Public management was 
seen to emphasise the implementation of governance (Oehler-Sincai 2008). Another view is that, 
despite the natures of public management and public administration where the first is considered 
dynamic and the latter static, the difference between two is stereotypical (Pollitt 2016). The two 
share similar methods and academic theories and as result, they are from the same unified 
discipline and community (Pollitt 2016). 
Figure 3.1 – Governance, Government and Public Management 
 
Source: Oehler-Sincai (2008) 
The relationship between governance, government, and public management can be seen in Figure 
3.1 (Oehler-Sincai 2008). Governance activities by government deliver strategies, policies, and 
regulations which become the basis in arranging the programs as well as the projects. Public 
management addresses how to implement all deliverables of the governance activities. The 
results are products or services to fulfil the citizen's needs. The quality of governance provides 





Figure 3.2 – Shifting from Traditional Public Administration to NPM 
 
Source: Dunleavy and Hood (1994) 
The new style of public management is well known as New Public Management (NPM) which 
transforms the style of classic public administration in two directions (Dunleavy & Hood 1994). 
Firstly, it increases the freedom of government officials for example in managing resources, 
staffing, and contracting, and diminishes the role of regulation. Secondly, the involvement of 
private sector in public affairs is enhanced and the degree of government isolation is reduced. 
The shift is depicted in Figure 3.2. 
The shifts in the management approach of NPM significantly influences how  governments view 
their activities by changing their orientation from input and process to output based (Christensen 
& Lægreid 2007); and contracting out more activities to private sector (Osborne 2006). The 
output-based approach causes a fundamental change in measuring the performance of 
government officials. The main attribute of performance management is it can enhance the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the output (Den Heyer 2011).  The rigorous involvement of 
private sector in public affairs raises the question about how output is specified in contracts and 
how the output will result in the designated outcome (Christensen & Lægreid 2007). 
Premises and elements 
The NPM paradigm has been one of the most discussed and debated in the public administration 
discipline since the 1980s. New Zealand, along with other Anglo-Saxon countries pioneered 
NPM reforms before it spread globally (Schedler & Proeller 2005). The rise and adoption of 
NPM in other parts of the world are due to the people’s demands to their own governments to 





triggered by the reaction to the country’s current challenges such as democratic participation, 
business competition, public dissent, political, administrative, and financial hardship. The way a 
country chooses to address those challenges, determines its NPM style, which is distinctive to 
other countries (Schedler & Proeller 2005). 
NPM is a loose concept that recognises the need to modernise the public sector. It has three main 
features that can be described as efficiency, customer focus, and competitive orientation (Taylor 
2005) or by another study as efficiency, effectiveness and economy (Harrow 2005). In addition, 
the interpretation of NPM has been constantly debated against newly developed perspectives of 
public management but the early studies offer a wider explanation where NPM is discussed based 
on its premises, elements, and results (Figure 3.3). NPM is built based on seven doctrines or 
premises, which are grouped into two categories, namely public sector distinctiveness and rules 
discretion trade off (Hood 1991, 1995). The first four premises: product-based organisation units, 
contract based competitive provisions, private-sector styled management practices, and 
disciplined and frugal use of resources, are grouped in public sector distinctiveness. The last three 
premises, active and visible high-ranking management, explicit standards and performance 
measurement, and controlled output, display a trade off between rules and discretion. 
 
The premises: 
Private sector distinctiveness 
• Product based 
organisation units 
• Contract based 
competitive provisions 
• Private sector styled 
management practices 
• Disciplined and frugal use 
of resources 
Rules vs discretion 
• Active and visible high-
ranking management 
• Explicit standards and 
performance 
measurement 
• Output controls 
The elements: 
• Decentralising authority and 
providing flexibility 
• Ensuring performance, 
control, and accountability 
• Enhancing competition and 
options 
• Offering responsiveness 
• Enriching human resources 
• Employing information 
technology 
• Improving regulation quality 






• Higher efficiency 
• Larger 
effectiveness 
• More capable 
administration 
Figure 3.3 – Premises, Elements and Results of NPM 





Once adopted, the premises bring several benefits and accounting consequences (Hood 1995). 
The first premise makes units within an organisation manageable and more efficient by virtue of 
separating provision and production. However, as more units are created, the organisation will 
have more cost centres. From the following premise, cost decrease and better performance 
standards can be achieved. Nevertheless, it will be more difficult to identify and safeguard the 
cost data as the data become commercially confidential. Thirdly, the private sector styled 
management means governments are required to employ tools from the private sector, and thus 
they also need to adopt private sector accounting principles. The last premise in private sector 
distinctiveness is the disciplined use of resources that can be interpreted as direct cost cutting and 
an increase in employee discipline. As expected, these policies will put more pressure on the 
bottom line as the employees have less job security. 
The second category of the premises explains shifting from rule based doctrines to more flexible 
discretionary policies (Hood 1991). Because of that shifting, high ranking managements play a 
more active role in exercising their discretionary authority. The impact of it is fewer technicalities 
but more use of financial data to verify management accountability. The penultimate premise, 
standards and performances are explicitly measured. These actions are to serve accountability 
and efficiency, where goals are clearly asserted and scrutinised. Therefore, performance 
indicators have to be established and audits conducted. Last, NPM requires more weight on 
output controls which means it is result oriented. The impact of this premise is similar to that of 
the first premise. 
Despite its lack of a theoretical foundation and political perspectives, as an authoritative source, 
OECD provides eight elements of NPM based on an empirical survey and operational 
perspectives (OECD 1995). Those elements (Figure 3.3) are more practical than theoretical as 
they are constructed as guidance for OECD members. In general, those elements are the 
implementation of both NPM main features and its premises. Furthermore, the elements mostly 
mimic the proven private sector practice such as flexibility, performance control, and 
responsiveness. 
Several countries have benefited from their efforts reforming their public administration by 
adopting NPM. The benefits include decreased budget appropriations, faster and better processes 
in both internal activities and external services, higher efficiency that is shown by better input-





examples of those benefits can be named as follows (Pollitt, C 2005). The Thatcher 
administration successfully cut its officers by more than 20%. The US government also managed 
to reduce its workforce by almost a quarter million in1996. Then, the improved process of 
American pensions delivered more benefits to around ten million workers. 
Rule of law 
Different from many studies in NPM and public management where the rule of law is not 
featured, the rule of law in modern public governance is vital because it regulates the four 
involved parties: the government as the institution, its officials, private sector and the citizens 
(Lane 2002). Much depends on the administrative tradition of countries, those in Europe have 
more emphasis on law as a mode of operating. In the Indonesian legal system, similar to other 
countries with years under colonialism, its role of law is deeply influenced by its colonial master 
in the past (Katherine 2011), especially the Dutch. The principles of its administrative law come 
from Dutch law such as the general principles of good governance in the Indonesian legal system 
(Tutik & Widodo 2016). 
The contract-based competitive provisions require both constitutional and administrative laws as 
they involve three parties, the government, its officials, and the private sector. Meanwhile, 
disciplined use of resources is regulated mostly by administrative law because it is an internal 
government activity involving merely its officials. It is necessary to have a general understanding 
of constitutional and administrative law. Constitutional law regulates matters as follows: 
changing of government, the relationship among government bodies, the accountability of 
government, authority division between different levels of governments, and the relationship 
between citizens and government. Unlike constitutional law, administrative law deals with 
specific government affairs such as customs and immigration (Alder & Syrett 2017).  
The enforcement of the rule of law in developing countries faces resistance because of the 
existence of privilege and the rise of rent-seeking (Weingast 2013). The rule of law itself is 
defined as ‘a system of rules that are transparent, public, and enforced regularly, predictably, and 
equally against all persons, both citizens and political elites’ (Katherine 2011, p. 876). The 
principle of equality before the law in many developing countries is difficult to realise. Privilege 
and rent seeking exist and they are used to lower the problem of violence. For instance, in 





servants were allowed to seek rent amidst the conditions of small budget allocation and low 
salaries (McLeod 2008).  
The concept of the rule of law itself is still debatable within the political science discussion as it 
could be: 
just an empty slogan, useful perhaps as decoration for whatever else one wants to assert 
into a political dispute, but incapable of driving one’s argument much further forward 
than the argument could have driven on its own (Waldron 2002, p. 139). 
However, in the developing countries context, the rule of law could be discussed for its 
requirement of transparency, public availability, regular enforcement, predictability, and 
equality. In Indonesia for example, all these criteria have been breached during the Soeharto era 
as the corruption was systemic and institutionalised across ministerial and other civilian agencies, 
the judiciary and the law enforcement system, and military intuitions (McLeod 2008). In other 
words, ‘To say that the rule of law under Soeharto was weak would be a gross understatement 
(McLeod 2000).’ 
Recent studies discuss more current conditions regarding the Indonesian rule of law in 
eradicating corruption. One study, comparing the implementation of 1971 and 1999 Anti 
Corruption Law concludes that in the period from 1971 to 2007, the nation had failed to meet the 
policy objective of eradicating corruption within governmental bodies (Brata 2014). Five aspects 
have contributed to this failure, namely policy design, political, institutional, managerial, and 
societal. Though, from 2012 onward, the nation’s corruption perception index has increased 
gradually, indicating improvement in progress (Transparency International 2020).  
Performance management  
Although as a terminology, performance management was not heard  of at least until 1970,  it 
had been implemented in a simple form by the Wei Dynasty  in the middle of the 3rd-century 
(Armstrong & Baron 2005). In the modern era, performance measurement has been a worldwide 
trend for almost fifty years (Pollitt 2006). The main objective of performance management is to 
increase effectiveness, efficiency, and the accountability of governance activities by displaying 
clear organisation objectives  (Hood 1991; Speklé & Verbeeten 2014).  
Historically, the evolution of managing performance in the public sector is in five stages namely: 
traditional/per-performance, performance administration, managements of performances, 





3.4 explains all those development types of managing performance from four dimensions: what 
are they measuring; what factors they are taking into account; what methods they use; and what 
are the disadvantages. This section only discusses performance management type, which is 
relevant to the research topic. 
Figure 3.4 – Performance Management Framework 
 
Source: Poister (2015) 
Table 3.1 shows that in the performance management type, the measurement is hierarchically 
integrative that taking three broad levels of management: top, middle, and operational. 
Performance indicators are designed and cascaded top down or bottom up in the organisational 
structure (Brignall & Modell 2000). Integrative performance management enables the analysis 
of the interaction of performance measures across levels and departments within the organisation 
(Kaplan & Norton 2007). The hierarchical and integrative characteristics of performance 
management are the strengths of its style. Yet, due to the system complexities within a 
government context, performance management is hardly sustainable (Bouckaert & Halligan 
2008). 
Table 3.1 – Managing Performances 
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Source: Bouckaert & Halligan (2008) 
Despite the fact that performance management is dynamically evolving following the changing 
of management style and organisational culture, a successful performance management system 
can still be identified through its attributes (Bititci et al. 2006; Fryer, Antony & Ogden 2009). 
The attributes include: the alignment with all other systems and organisation strategy; the strong 
commitment of high-level management; the existence of a culture that promotes the good 
performers and supports the poor performers; the active involvement of all stakeholders; a 
continuing improvement which is based on monitoring, feedback, learning outcomes (Fryer, 
Antony & Ogden 2009). 
Performance measurement is a crucial part of performance management. Effective performance 
measurement has four aspects namely: appropriate indicators, measurement procedures, data 
interpretation, and results communication (Fryer, Antony & Ogden 2009). Under their concept, 
and as shown in Figure 3.4, performance measurement and reporting continually interacts with 
each aspect of a management cycle from planning, budgeting, managing, and evaluating (Poister, 
Aristigueta & Hall 2015).  
Contractibility 
Another important issue added by NPM into the debate on public sector management is 
contracting including both contracting out where public affairs are conducted by private sector, 
and contracting in or in house provisions (Lane 2002). Contracting in for a NPM regime means 
that the government binds its officials with two types of contractual agreements namely 
employment and performance contracts (Lane 2002). The first is just a private law contract, and 
the latter comprises the expectation of what the officials need to do or not do. Contracting out 
deals with agreements between the government and private sector as suppliers of goods or 
services. 
The likelihood of successful contracting out is influenced by the magnitude and specificity of the 





competitive supply in the market (Domberger & Jensen 1997). The contracting out is expected 
to be more successful when the magnitude and specificity of the physical assets are smaller, the 
quality characteristics are less significant, and the supply market is more competitive. In practice, 
the contracting out can be exercised in three forms: alliance, prime provider, and outcome-based 
contracting (Domberger & Jensen 1997). 
 Asset Management Theory and Framework 
A wide range of assets including infrastructure owned by governments, are to serve the needs of 
the population as well as the economic development of the nation (Kaganova, McKellar & 
Peterson 2006). A reform in public asset management has been driven by several principles: 
performance enhancement, public sector role, function separation, financial flexibility, 
accountability, and transparency (Kaganova, McKellar & Peterson 2006). Those principles are 
the important parts of NPM concepts which have evolved in the last several decades (Christensen 
& Lægreid 2007; Lane 2002). Although those reforms are mentioned to bring public asset 
management closer to that of its private sector counterpart, in the absence of an autonomous 
monitoring agency, it will generate corruption and abuses (Oehler-Sincai 2008). The roles of 
audit will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
Prior to discussing the PAM further, it is necessary to define the meaning of assets and real 
properties from the accounting and legal perspectives. The International Public Sector 
Accounting Standard Board (IPSASB) (2015) defines an asset as ‘a resource presently controlled 
by the entity as a result of a past event’. The IPSASB further comments that the control of assets 
exists when the government has legal proprietorship, access to the asset, the means to ascertain 
the utilisation of the assets and enforceable rights to obtain economic benefits. In both public and 
private sector, assets are generally divided into current assets and non-current assets (IPSASB 
2015; Mackenzie et al. 2012). In a balance sheet of a public sector entity, there are two classes 
of a non-current asset that usually have significant values, namely: infrastructure, plant and 
equipment, and land and buildings.  
From a legal perspective, the terminology of real property is more recognised. It is defined as all 
rights related to the proprietorship of land and all things naturally part of the land (IVSC 2013). 
In other words, real property is the right of a legal entity either to own or to utilise real estate. 
For the purpose of the research, public assets refer to public real properties, taking into account 





The next term that needs to be defined in this research is public asset management (PAM). In the 
literature, academicians propose their own definition based on what aspects they emphasise 
regarding PAM. One definition that pays more attention to the asset’s performance, defines PAM 
as the process of managing assets by analysing their performance for the support of  decision 
making in asset holding, disposing, and repositioning (Gruis, Nieboer & Thomas 2004). Another 
definition views PAM as part of a complete picture in an organisation where PAM plays a role 
in connecting the needs of strategic level decision making with the deployment of its resources 
either for current demand or future investment possibilities (Lyons 2004).  
PAM can be considered as a subset of the study and practice of public sector management in the 
area of how a government manages its property assets to serve the public demands. Though PAM 
has been defined differently, some authors share similar ideas about the purpose of PAM. PAM 
can serve as: a decision making tool (Lyons 2004; Wittwer, Bittner & Switzer 2002), support for 
the organisation’s activities (Jones & White 2008), and as a basis for planning (Lyons 2004; 
Wittwer, Bittner & Switzer 2002). From the activity point of view, PAM includes four stages of 
asset life cycle (Abdullah et al. 2012).  
PAM in many countries has evolved to adapt to public demands for productivity, accountability, 
and transparency (Kaganova & Nayyar-Stone 2000). Nevertheless, PAM as a part of public 
sector management is mostly led by five government circumstances (Grubišić, Nušinović & Roje 
2009). In the first place, PAM is established as a result of legislative, institutional, and control 
processes. It is also limited by national interest where foreign and domestic affairs are taken into 
consideration. The assets are earned from the national revenues that consequently are utilised 
either for public consumption, debt repayment, or investment. PAM also serves as a national 
heritage and defence protector where those interests cannot be compensated by financial 
considerations. Last, it plays a role in public goods and service delivery.  
A more comprehensive definition of public asset management is ‘a structured, holistic and 
integrating approach for aligning and managing overtime service delivery requirements and the 
performance of property assets to meet business objectives and drivers within a central 
government organisation’ (Male et al. 2007). This thesis follows this definition regarding PAM 
due to its comprehensive approach that incorporates many aspects within an organisation 
especially a central government organisation. Those aspects are organisational structure, time 






One of frequently referred to frameworks of asset management is proposed by the Institute of 
Asset Management (2015). The model as shown in Figure 3.5, has been tested and debated 
amongst asset management practitioners, academics, and related stakeholders through the Global 
Forum. Yet, it is a dynamic model due to the ongoing evolution of asset management. As can be 
seen the framework consists of six subject groups namely strategy and planning, asset 
management decision-making, life cycle delivery, asset information, organisation and people, 
and risk and review.  
Figure 3.5 – Asset Management Conceptual Model 
 
Source: The Institute of Asset Management (2015) 
The institute breaks down each group into 39 asset management subjects as presented in Figure 
3.6. The framework shows how the PAM is held accountable to its stakeholders including 
customers, legislation, investors, and the commercial environment. In addition, in Group 6, it is 
mentioned that the stakeholders are engaged in determining the risk and review. Meanwhile, the 
subjects in Group 5 and Group 6 serve accountability to internal parties. Group 4 – Asset 





stakeholders. Last, Group 1 – Strategy and Planning serve the principle of the rule of law in 
preparing the PAM strategy, policy, and objectives. 
Figure 3.6 – Grouped Asset Management Subjects 
 
Source: The Institute of Asset Management (2015) 
The above PAM framework is beneficial in understanding proper public asset management in 
four ways namely public asset identification, asset needs analysis, asset life cycle reference, and 
performance measurement (Hanis, Trigunarsyah & Susilawati 2010). First, asset identification is 
the early process in establishing a robust asset management system. The identification should 
cover information dealing with assets specification, location, purposes, users, operation and 
maintenance (Hanis, Trigunarsyah & Susilawati 2010). The framework is also advantageous in 
answering questions regarding the need of assets and government service delivery (Lu 2011). 
Assets should be only acquired in appropriate numbers and quality to support service delivery. 
Then, in regard to asset life cycles and performance measurement, the following sections will 
discuss those issues further.  
Asset life cycle and types of decision areas 
The process of PAM includes four stages starting with planning, followed by procurement, then 





2004). Each of those cycles can be seen in two time-frames namely strategic and operational 
(Male et al. 2007). The strategic time frame includes long to medium term activities, and the 
operational one ranges between medium and short-term activities. From an engineering point of 
view, the lifecycle of an asset is started from the concept and design, construction and 
commissioning, operation and maintenance, and then the asset disposal (Van der Lei, Wijnia & 
Herder 2012).  
The decision regarding asset management based on its process model or asset life cycle basically 
can be classified into three types: asset objectives, situation and asset intervention (Schraven, 
Hartmann & Dewulf 2011). Several researchers analyse various types of decisions across 
different kinds of public assets in regard to their objectives, situations and interventions.  
Decisions regarding asset objectives deal with the efforts of a government entity in achieving the 
objectives of its assets. In this part of decision making, an extensive policy framework must be 
established beforehand, followed by the policy goals identification, and a list of asset objectives 
containing more detailed information (Neumann & Markow 2004). Considering the government 
limitations either financial or in personnel, a set of selection criteria have to be determined to 
define which assets are to be acquired, rehabilitated, or disposed of (Šelih et al. 2008). That 
selection criteria must be consistent with the predetermined asset broad policy (Iniestra & 
Gutiérrez 2009). In addition, the determination of objectives must be specified when designing 
an asset program to ensure the longevity of the asset utilisation (Malano, Chien & Turral 1999). 
In regard to the asset situation, the decision making is related to the performance measurement 
of an asset use by a particular government entity (Schraven, Hartmann & Dewulf 2011). Areas 
of this decision making include: the stipulation of a minimal asset performance level (Haffejee 
& Brent 2008); the determination of investment timing, cost, effectivity, efficiency, and financial 
model (Malano, Chien & Turral 1999); the measurement of asset performance (Neumann & 
Markow 2004); the balancing of asset risk, performance and cost (Vanier 2001); the definitions 
of an asset, capital and operational expenditures, the method to assess its condition and 
revaluation time, the determination of an asset information system (Howard 2001). The 
measurement of asset performance for entity, project and network level is also part of the decision 
regarding asset situation (Gharaibeh, Chiu & Gurian 2006; Neumann & Markow 2004). 
Last, there is decision making regarding the intervention policies in terms of predetermined 





& Dewulf 2011). Intervention policies are planned by the government to conduct a project which 
could be routine maintenance, renovation, and reconstruction of a specific asset in order to 
maintain or increase its functionality (Malano, Chien & Turral 1999; Schraven, Hartmann & 
Dewulf 2011).  The intervention projects are selected from the current asset portfolio, followed 
by prioritising them based on performance measurement results, and then allocating the fund to 
the project accordingly (Gharaibeh, Chiu & Gurian 2006; Karydas & Gifun 2006; Šelih et al. 
2008).  
During its operation, the performance of an asset could be measured on the basis of cost, 
effectiveness and efficiency. For example, an underperforming asset problem has been identified. 
Then the government decides the type of intervention whether a renovation or reconstruction 
project to rectify the problem. Once an intervention policy has been determined, a set of 
alternative projects as well as their capital requirements are prepared (Haffejee & Brent 2008; 
Malano, Chien & Turral 1999). To cover the project fund, various channels of funding could be 
used by considering the trade-off between the asset performance and its project cost (Neumann 
& Markow 2004). 
 Approaches and Principles of NPM in PAM  
Many governments, especially in developed countries adopt three approaches towards their 
public property management (Kaganova & Nayyar-Stone 2000). First, there is a decreasing trend 
of government proprietorship of public real property, which is due to the fact that most assets of 
public ownership underperform those of the private sector.  Therefore, governments tend to 
privatise their assets and to give private sector more access to public services (Freeman 2000). 
Thus, they acknowledge that public properties are productive assets that need to be managed in 
the way the private sector manage theirs. This acknowledgement leads to the third approach, 
which is those governments which have started to harness the principles and practices of the 
private sector’s asset management. 
The current development of PAM is in line with the application of NPM concepts. The main 
reason is to enhance public sector performance by improving efficiency and effectiveness 
(Campbell, Jardine & McGlynn 2010; Den Heyer 2011; Flynn 2012). The profession in the 
property sector says that PAM is designed to align an organisation’s activities with its strategic 
aims by ensuring usage efficiency and promoting economic growth (Jones & White 2012).  





achievement, service excellence, and relationship with tenants (Abdullah, Razak & Pakir 2011; 
Lemer 1999).  
To achieve the above various objectives of PAM, governments must carry out its primary 
functions. Five duties are considered as the  key functions of PAM, namely: (1) the establishment 
of real estate management policies which are related to acquisition and disposal, building design, 
real estate maintenance and operations; (2) the supervision and monitoring of portfolios using 
the best management practices as set out for local authority real estate managers; (3) ensuring 
that acquisition and disposal transactions are carried out at optimal values; (4) maximising returns 
from the capital invested in the assets; and (5) ensuring assets are efficiently and effectively 
utilised and that costs are minimised from occupancy, management operations, and maintenance 
(Ching 1994). 
The three ‘E’s of performance management: economy, efficiency and effectiveness are inhibited 
by one of the main problems in public management, namely risk avoidance (Flynn 2012). In the 
asset management context, members of the organisation tend to avoid any risks to change the 
existing condition. For example, a problem of idle assets is an indication that risk avoidance 
exists in the organisation where the management refuses to take a proper action to address it. The 
fifth function of PAM indicates that the government is required to ascertain that all assets are 
fully utilised to obtain maximum returns from the capital invested in the assets as stated in the 
fourth criterion (Ching 1994).   
Classifying public assets is essential in order to provide appropriate actions based on assets role 
in the government main functions. Categorising public assets into three major categories namely 
core, additional and surplus assets, could improve efficiency by emphasising core assets and 
reducing surplus assets (Kaganova, Tian & Undeland 2001). Core assets are used to deliver the 
main functions of government bodies, meanwhile additional assets are used for the same function 
but are not obligatory or main. Assets which are not in those categories are surplus assets. The 
decisions are enforceable if there are dedicated, specialised, small, short-term task forces to 
inform the high ranking management about policies on surplus assets (Lyons 2004). As part of 
this assignment, the task force should advise on further opportunities for private sector 






As the NPM emphasises accountability and transparency, the role of financial reporting is 
inevitable. PAM which utilises information generated by public sector accounting could obtain 
several benefits such as optimising the asset utilisation by increasing the occupancy rate and the 
betterment of accomplishment lead time  (Summerell 2005). Despite the benefits, there are 
several accounting issues regarding assets reporting: implementation of accrual instead of cash 
basis and the application of fair value accounting as the opposite of historical cost accounting 
(Kaganova 2012). Should fair value accounting be applied, the assets are presented at their fair 
values coming from an asset valuation process by certified appraisers. In addition to that, the 
market values of public assets are necessary for any decisions related to the assets such as asset 
transfer and infrastructure development by PPPs utilising public lands or buildings (Kaganova 
2012). 
A public asset registry as the precondition in presenting a government’s assets in its financial 
reporting is considered as the landmark in accountability and transparency (Grubišić, Nušinović 
& Roje 2009). The registry becomes the basis for the government to prepare its financial 
statement as well as to conduct benefit, cost, and risk analysis. (Grubišić, Nušinović & Roje 
2009). Yet, this is still far from sufficient to ascertain accountability in PAM. There must be a 
full asset stewardship in terms of reliable performance measurement and effective decision 
making driven by a robust accounting system (Kaganova 2009). The applied accounting system 
as the body of rules and resources that manifest all practices of an organisation, becomes the 
system of accountability (Roberts & Scapens 1985) 
Asset performance measurement  
NPM seeks for greater efficiency by benchmarking with the private sector including taking into 
account the options of contracting out and outsourcing (Hood 1991; Poister, Aristigueta & Hall 
2015). Therefore the public sector requires a tool to measure its performance that can serve two 
interests: to establish accountability (Hatry 2006) and to adjust its strategy regarding performance 
betterment (Poister, Aristigueta & Hall 2015). Performance measurement basically is viewed as 
a set of key performance indicators which will be difficult to fulfil in an environment with no 
clarity of institutional objectives, low technical capabilities, and little stakeholder supports 





Until 1980, public assets were seen and treated as public goods which were taken for granted 
(Kaganova & Nayyar-Stone 2000). Despite the fact that the asset capital cost had been considered 
in decision making for years, in most countries, financial performance measurement of ongoing 
public assets  had never been taken into consideration until that period (Hanis, Trigunarsyah & 
Susilawati 2011). Research regarding performance measurement of asset management is still 
limited and even more so in public sector asset management. Despite that, the concept and 
framework of asset performance measurement are the same with other aspects of public sector 
management seeking understanding of how a public sector entity works. Performance is 
measured through analysing the process of how resources are utilised through effective and 
efficient activity to deliver outputs that support the predetermined outcome (Poister, Aristigueta 
& Hall 2015). 
The model was originally developed from the capability maturity model which was designed to 
assess project development software (Paulk et al. 1993) and currently has been widely utilised 
for a large range of business processes (Volker, Van der Lei & Ligtvoet 2011) from engineering, 
public administration to human resources (Chen & Wang 2018; Volker, Van der Lei & Ligtvoet 
2011). Employing this maturity model in PAM helps provide a different perspective (Mollentze 
2005; Volker, Van der Lei & Ligtvoet 2011). 
The measurement of PAM performance is closely related to the maturity level of the business 
process (Mollentze 2005). The more matured business process implies that more PAM 
performance indicators are achieved. The range of business process maturity can be divided into 
five levels that vary between a point of no business process at all (level 1) and a point where the 
business process has been integrated across functional and departmental boundaries (level 5). 
Level 2 of maturity is achieved if there is a business process, yet no documentation is prepared, 
no training is provided, and no improvement has been made from the previous year. At the next 
level, the policies and procedures have been documented and well communicated to the 
personnel in terms of availability and understandability. There is also proof that the organisation 
revised its last year business process. The higher level requires training in the business process 
and an appropriate application of personnel roles and responsibilities. At this level, the system 
supports around 80% of the business process. At the highest level, all elements of PAM 






NPM has influenced many governments around the world in many aspects of governance 
including PAM. The strategies, policies, and regulation of PAM have been reformed to enhance 
the quality of product or service delivery as well as the quality of the governance itself. 
Accountability, transparency, and the rule of law are reflected in PAM where asset life cycles 
become the basis of strategic asset management.  
The thesis takes government real property assets as its focus. PAM itself is seen as a decision-
making tool to support government agencies activities and as a basis for planning. A PAM 
framework established shows how six groups of PAM elements namely strategy and planning, 
decision making, life cycle delivery, asset information, organisation and people, and risk and 
review are included in a comprehensive organisational strategic plan to cope with demands from 
customers, regulations, investors, and the financial environment. Performance measurement and 
contractibility brought PAM to a new level that invites the private sector to manage public assets. 
Having discussed the research background, the practices of PAM and PPPs, in Chapter 1 and 2 
respectively, in this chapter, the literature review regarding PAM has established an 













   
Public Private Partnerships and Accountability Issues 
 Introduction 
The literature regarding NPM and PAM has been discussed in Chapter 3, and this chapter 
continues the discussion on the topics of PPPs and accountability.  
This chapter consists of six sections, including the introduction and the conclusion. The 
discussion regarding PPPs is presented in the following section. Then the third section 
investigates accountability literature as well as the accountability concerns on PPPs. Once the 
relationship between transparency and accountability has been discussed, the fourth section 
depicts the gap in the literature, taking into account the discussion from Chapter 3. Last, the 
concluding section summarises the discussion in this chapter. 
 Public Private Partnerships  
PPPs started to be popular around 30 years ago and became common in several western countries 
as a means for developing their public infrastructures. This trend was predictable as there was a 
public sector transformation in line with NPM movements in those countries. NPM encourages 
governments to mimic most private sector practices that lead to smaller organisations, contracting 
out, and a conception of the government role as a regulator not an active player (Coghill & 
Woodward 2005). Nevertheless, both perspectives welcome the idea that a government could 
invite private sector to deliver services for its people. 
In the beginning, PPP adoption was seen as a part of a liberalisation agenda of NPM (Grimsey 
& Lewis 2004). However, over the following years, the perception changed to assume PPPs not 
as privatisation as the government still has a role as a regulator and a supervisor (Ahadzi & 
Bowles 2004; The Private Sector Development Initiative 2008).  
 Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Development 
Concepts and principles 
In the spectrum of infrastructure funding, a PPP is located between government fully funded 
projects and complete privatisation and within PPPs themselves there are a range of models that 





they mostly share attributes regarding time, resources, and risk arrangement. A public-private 
partnership is defined as an organisational and financial arrangement for a specific time period 
between public and private sector in which they jointly develop product and services and share 
risks, costs, and resources which are related to these products and services (Hodge & Greve 2005; 
Van Ham & Koppenjan 2001).  
In determining types of infrastructure funding whether through the government budget or a PPP 
mechanism, a government conducts a public sector comparison (Yescombe 2007). The purpose 
of a public sector comparison is to provide the risk-considered cost of a project in the scenario 
where the project was funded, owned, and operated by the government (Chan et al. 2009). 
Another decision making method using PPP is the concept of value for money when a PPP project 
could lower its cost or deliver better services for the relatively same amount (Grimsey & Lewis 
2005). 
Besides the value for money concept, affordability and balance sheet treatment are also 
influencing governments to use a PPP scheme (Yescombe 2007). The capabilities of the service 
users are considered to determine the affordability of the service fees if the PPP scheme is 
selected. The government uses affordability to bargain with the private sector during the bidding 
process (Yescombe 2007). Another consideration is how the government presents the PPP 
projects on their annual balance sheet statement. As part of accountability, the government must 
follow public sector accounting standards in recording and presenting their PPP projects 
regarding the decision to (not) recognise the physical assets, financial assets, and liability as well 
as intangible assets (IPSASB 2012).  
A research finding has raised the importance of the twelve principles of an ideal partnership 
between public and private sector (Jeffares, Sullivan & Bovaird 2013). Those principles were 
established from eight partnership assessment toolkits as can be seen in Figure 4.1. The toolkits 
that consist of hundreds of performance evaluation questions are well known and widely utilised 
by many PPP practitioners but they are still considered to be partial (Jeffares, Sullivan & Bovaird 
2013). The research summarises those questions into twelve principles. The finding of those 
twelve principles has two significant implications: all twelve aspects of a partnership are required 
to be evaluated across all stakeholders and the result of that evaluation should score highly on all 





Figure 4.1 – Twelve PPP Principles 
 
Source: Jeffares, Sullivan and Bovaird (2013) 
The rationales 
In the broader context, the NPM movement provides theoretical as well as political foundations 
that encourage the PPPs adoption (Yescombe 2007). The principles of accountability, and 
transparency promote privatisation of public services, performance based measurement, 
decentralisation of governmental affairs and separation of public services responsibility between 
the purchaser and their provision (Yescombe 2007). Partnership is seen as a valuable means to 
achieve government effectiveness in a way that the partnership seeks for a value increase for 
stakeholders and the society, as well as representation and dispute resolution (Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff 2011). 
In a smaller perspective, actors of partnerships both from the public or private sector lay out their 
course on the basis of one or more of the following rationales (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 2011).  
First, the attributes of PPPs, where comparative advantages as well as resources are pooled and 
labour is rationally grouped into divisions, are believed to promote efficiency and effectiveness. 
Then, PPPs provide integrated resources and solutions to address the current infrastructure 
problems which become much more complex in their scope and nature. PPPs also give the chance 





part of the dispute resolution attribute of the partnership. Finally, PPPs also serve both normative 
and pragmatic perspectives regarding more extensive public good operationalisation. While the 
normative perspective looks for democratic process and representation, the latter emphasises 
sustainability.  
Although governments have several different motives for PPP adoption, the history of PPPs 
based on adoption motives, can be seen in three stages (Hodge & Greve 2005; Hodge & Greve 
2007; Yescombe 2007). In the 1980s, many governments implemented PPPs to increase 
borrowing capacity since PPPs provided off balance sheet funding. After that, there was a 
changing intention which was obtaining another benefit from PPPs in the form of efficiency as a 
result of risk sharing and the competitive tender process. Entering the 21st century, value for 
money has been the prime goal of a PPP (Hodge & Greve 2007).  
Even though a government has reasons to enter into PPPs, it should consider good practices to 
obtain the benefit of PPP projects and meet the expectation of the general interest (OECD 2008). 
The OECD has published ten good practices in the PPP process. Firstly, a PPP is viable if it 
satisfies the benchmark of affordability and value for money. It means the obligation from PPPs 
that the government should bear, is still its budget capacity. Then, the design of PPPs targets 
value for money as its primary goal by considering the quality, characteristic and cost. Third, the 
government is also obliged to apply its own fiscal rules and expenditure limits on its PPP projects. 
The PPP related obligations and assets should be recorded appropriately in the government 
accounting system. Fifth, risk is shared fairly between parties and the private sector partner 
chosen is the one who can carry risk at minimal cost. To ensure proper risk sharing, the sixth 
practice regarding competition and contestability must apply. After that, the government should 
publish its PPP related obligation in its budget documentation. It will present the long term 
consequences of PPP projects to the public. The next good practice is the government must 
prepare the regulatory framework and its institutional capacity as well as political supports. Last 
but not least, to ensure the achievement of value for money, a public sector comparator should 
be analysed in a go/no-go decision-making process. 
Types of partnerships 
PPP types can be divided into four quadrants based on the strength of the financial and the 
organisational relationship between the government and the private sector (Hodge & Greve 





projects are located in a quadrant where both their financial and organisational relationships are 
tight. In the opposite place, there is an issue-networks partnership where both financial and 
organisational relationships are loose. Meanwhile, Build Own Operate & Transfer (BOOT), 
Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) are examples of relationships whose financial relationship is 
strong but there is a loose organisational relationship. Last, a policy community partnership is 
located in an area where the organisational relationship is strong, but the financial relationship is 
weak. Figure 4.2 lays out the four quadrants of financial and organisational relationships. 
Figure 4.2 – A PPP Typology Based on Financial & Organisational Relationship 
 
Source: Hodge and Greve (2005) 
 
Another perspective classifies PPPs in a continuum of private sector involvement between purely 
public and purely private (Kwak, Chih & Ibbs 2009). In order of private sector involvement from 
low to high, some PPP types that can be named are as follows; Operating Maintenance (OM), 
Design-Build-Operate (DBO), Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT), Build-Own-Operate (BOO) (Kwak, Chih & Ibbs 2009). In an OM scheme, all aspects of 
operation and maintenance are the responsibility of the private sector while in the financing 
aspect, both parties may decide how far the  private sector could manage the capital and 
operational expenditures (World Bank 2007). Next, a DBO contract assigns the private sector to 
design, build, operate, and maintain a project during agreed upon periods and then hand it over 





the private sector is low. The private sector does not have responsibility for providing the 
financing of the project. 
Table 4.1 – Responsibility Matrix for Conventional Procurement and PPP Options 
 
Source: World Bank (2009) 
At the higher level of involvement, the private sector is required to provide the financing aspect 
of the project. That requirement applies in DBFO, BOT and BOO schemes. In a DBFO scheme, 
the private sector manages the aspects of financing, designing, constructing, operating, and 
maintaining the project while in most cases the project still belongs to the government (Abdel 
Aziz 2007; Iseki & Houtman 2012). In a BOT agreement, at the end of the contract, the asset is 
returned to the government frequently at no cost (Kumaraswamy, M & Zhang, X 2001). Different 





contract and the government is required to pay for the services generated from the project over a 
specified time (Chege & Rwelamila 2001). 
The government could prefer one model of PPPs over another by considering which party will 
design, build, operate, maintain, finance, and own the project (PPIAF 2009). Table 4.1 displays 
the responsibility matrix for conventional procurement and PPP options. Then the government, 
based on sector or project consideration, decides which responsibilities and risks will be 
transferred to the private sector (PPIAF 2009).  
In one example, the DBFO scheme along with other DB contracts is used extensively in 
developing highways in the U.S. where the government has developed policies and guidance to 
benefit the project delivery and to minimise the drawbacks of several models of this scheme 
(Federal Highway Administration 2006). Equally important, every model of a PPP contract has 
its own advantages as well as disadvantages (PPIAF 2009). The advantages of DB contracts 
include time and cost saving, and quality improvement, while their disadvantages are closely 
related to the large contract size, the interdependency of design and construction activities, and 
favouritism during the tender process (Federal Highway Administration 2006). 
Debates on PPPs 
The debates on the advantages and the downsides of PPP have been argued by several scholars 
(McQuaid 2000; Yescombe 2007). The advantages could be categorised into three groups: 
enlarging the resources of both organisations in terms of financial assets, abilities, knowledge 
and strength; promoting greater productivity through effective and efficient business processes; 
and last obtaining robust legitimacy by involving more stakeholders in the government decision-
making process (McQuaid 2000). PPPs are also seen as an encouraging factor for the reform of 
public sector management as they enhance transparency, accountability, procurement skill, and 
contestability (Yescombe 2007). From the perspective of private sectors, several benefits could 
be gained once they enter  PPP contracts (Chauhan & Marisetty 2019). First, their future cash 
flows are more certain since the government absorbs the risk of low demand on the services 
provided by the contracts. Next, the PPPs can be more transparent and attractive to external 
financial resources. As a result, private sectors can address their problem regarding information 






The nature of PPPs which involves private sector in public projects sets up controversies in the 
political process of decision making. Three issues over the involvement of private sector trigger 
the opposition to PPPs (Yescombe 2007). First, the private sector partners earn financial profit 
from PPP projects that in the end could overburden the public with a higher service or product 
price. The argumentation stands on the assumption of the cost comparison between public-fully-
funded and PPP-funded projects. This assumption is not the case because there will be no options 
between full publicly funded or PPP funded projects. The government simply cannot entirely 
finance the project (Yescombe 2007). Next, the PPP tender follows a long and high cost process 
which in the end probably still needs a substantial compromise and re-specification with the 
winning participant (Pollitt, M 2005). Last, the risk transfer from the government to its private 
counterpart is not substantially realised. This is because the private sector partner has taken into 
account all related risks in the prices it charges for the service or product delivered (Loxley & 
Loxley 2010). 
In the developing countries, there are also debates regarding prevalence, costs and benefits, 
preparation expenses, finance and investment, impacts on poverty alleviation, governance and 
transformational issues (Leigland 2018). Regarding the prevalence, 'PPPs work much better in 
middle income economies than they do in low-income countries (Leigland 2018, p. 107).’ For 
developing countries, PPPs’ role in their total public investment is below 15 percent (Philippe & 
Ian 2011). This is because not all projects will be better off using PPPs; most are more efficient 
if delivered by traditional mean of procurements. Then, by comparing the costs and benefits, 
PPPs have been blamed for being more costly than traditional procurement. Unreliable public 
sector comparator data used in a value for money assessment are seen as the cause of PPP’s 
miscalculated planning (Leigland 2018). Governments need to state their intention of entering 
PPP contracts and communicate transparently to the public. 
PPPs have been promoted as a tool in increasing investment from private sectors and at the same 
time improving service efficiency as well as capacity (Leigland 2018). However, this is not the 
case in many countries, where private investment does not increase in line with PPPs, yet private 
sector involvement in several studies of infrastructure projects succeeds in increasing efficiency 
(Gassner, Popov & Pushak 2008). However, the improved efficiency coming from lower 
production cost does not lead to a reduction of the service price, which means the majority of 
society do not benefit from PPPs. One study suggests that this could happen where either the 





the service price at all, or the private sectors manipulate the weakness of PPP regulation for their 
own benefits (Gassner, Popov & Pushak 2008).  
PPP development has also dealt with defective governance structure (Engel, Fischer & Galetovic 
2014) and partial approaches in facilitating more private investment (Eberhard, Kolker & 
Leigland 2014). The former leads to a poor standard of public work, mediocre design, ambiguous 
procurement processes and providing an opportunity for private sectors to unfairly increase their 
profits (Engel, Fischer & Galetovic 2014). The latter has brought a insignificant improvement in 
private investments as well as fair competition (Eberhard, Kolker & Leigland 2014). 
International organisations such as OECD, the UN and APEC, have recommended the 
establishment of a PPP unit for many countries whose role is to regulate the PPP process 
(Leigland 2018). Nevertheless, the unit should be equipped with the authority to require 
compliance from related parties and minimise direct preapproval by senior government officials. 
The latter ensures that every decision is made based on procedural regulations and followed by 
post audit reviews (Leigland 2018). 
Risk and performance management 
One of the prime goals in PPPs is to transfer risk to whichever party has better control of risk and 
its drivers that leads to the project’s real benefit in term of cost reduction (Nisar 2007; Van Ham 
& Koppenjan 2001). Risks in a partnership can be categorised in several ways but their sources 
are from both the public as well as the private sector (Van Ham & Koppenjan 2001). Seven risk 
factors have been identified: political, construction, operation, legal, market, economic and 
others (Ke et al. 2010). Political risk in PPPs arises when the government with its political 
superiority enters into a contract with the private sector (Van Ham & Koppenjan 2001).  
From top to lower levels, PPP risks also could be classified into macro, market, and project levels 
(Hastak & Shaked 2000). Some risk indicators in lower levels of risks are influenced by their 
upper levels. Therefore, at the project level, besides its own, its risk indicators are also affected 
by macro level and market level risks. At the macro or country level, PPP risks include 
operational, political, and financial risks. Operational risk comes from the host government, 
economic and financial, and administrative aspects. Meanwhile, three aspects that influence 
political risk are external causes which are from regional or international circumstances, internal 
or domestic causes and symptoms of instability. Last, the financial risk is influenced by the 





foreign debt assessment, and budget performance. At the market level, the sources of risks are 
related to technological advancement, contract and legal requirements, factors of production, 
financing, business cultural variation, and the market potential. At the lowest level, besides those 
aspects from higher levels that influence the risk at the project level, there are also force majeure 
events that could happen to the project such as natural disasters and human-caused damage.  
Here are some examples of PPP risk indicators and their factors discussed in the literature (Ke et 
al. 2010). The political risk factor includes risks of concession termination by the government, 
expropriation and nationalisation, law alteration, and governmental instability. In the 
construction factor, the risks are dealing with funding sources, design and quality imperfection, 
technological issues, and labour disputes. During the operation phase, the risks mostly coming 
from the private sector, include overrun cost, default, low quality, high maintenance 
expenditures, low productivity, and facility. Next, the market driven risks include lower than 
expected income streams, volatility of materials prices, and demand fluctuation. Then, inflation 
risk, interest rates and foreign exchange rates are considered as economic driven risks. Appendix 
H shows the perspectives from research on how to allocate all those above risks whether fully 
borne by the government, the private sector, or shared by both parties. 
What risks should be borne by which party are stated in the PPP contractual agreement, including 
the goals and targets that need to be fulfilled by the private parties. Then based on the contract, 
the parties act resulting in an output delivery either in forms of goods or services. Those outputs 
are expected to reach the targeted income. Those processes are called the policy domain of PPP 
development that become the basis of the performance conceptual framework (Wang & Zhao 
2018). There are five contractual factors that strongly influence the PPP performance namely 
private partner selection, financial arrangement, role division, risk sharing, and project 
characteristics (Wang & Zhao 2018).  
Two criteria are considered in selecting the private sector partner, it has resources or expertise 
that the government needs but they do not own, and it has credibility in the eye of the public 
sector (Das & Teng 2001; Dyer & Singh 1998). A trustworthy private partner will reduce 
partnership transaction cost  (Wang & Zhao 2018). Regarding financial arrangements, it is 
decided by both parties how to make sure the project is financially viable in terms of the initial 
outlay and its financial return. The main issue in the financial aspect is to keep the project cost 
of capital manageable due to the use of private financing (De Bettignies & Ross 2004). Next, the 





government increases the chance of a successful partnership (Graddy 2009). Furthermore, the 
fairness of risk allocation is realised where: the risks are allocated to parties which have better 
capacity to manage and there are some returns to cover the risks they bear (Abednego & 
Ogunlana 2006; Akintoye & Beck 2009). Last, the project attributes must be clearly stated. It 
should enhance PPP effectiveness and performance and also decrease the possibility of future 
disputes (Chou & Lin 2012).  
Key success factors 
Three fundamental factors, namely the market, the environment and the government, determine 
the success of PPP adoption, especially in developing countries (Yongheng, Yilin & Youqiang 
2013). The precondition of the private sector involvement is a working market without which 
governments are not able to invite private investment. Once the private sector enters the market, 
the existence of transparency and a well-structured regulatory framework will materialise 
benefits both for the government in terms of higher efficiency and for the private sector in terms 
of financial profitability. Last, capable governments with a credible private sector will ensure the 
effective collaboration between contracting parties (Kang et al. 2019). 
Furthermore, PPPs in developing countries are impeded by three existing conditions although 
these can be addressed with certain strategies (Kang et al. 2019). First, private sectors are not 
attracted to invest in the proposed projects due to a lack of appropriate incentives. To address 
this, governments could persuade them by outlining tangible benefits, promoting a transparent 
bidding process, and offering tax incentives or other concessions for low profit projects. Second, 
it is difficult to pursue market success while promoting public accountability and participation 
as parts of democratic principles. Public resistance frequently emerges after the projects have 
been launched because of low public participation in the early stages of the projects. An effective 
public relations strategy must be designed to educate the public about the project and to discuss 
their concerns from the planning stage. Last, there is a lack of cooperation amongst developing 
countries where they could share experiences, information, and best practices. The establishment 
of a knowledge centre and discussion forum is necessary to learn from other countries’ problems 





 PPP Adoption in Utilising Public Assets 
The portfolio of public assets consist of properties to serve the circumstances of PAM as the 
government core business, and surplus properties (Kaganova & Nayyar-Stone 2000). The surplus 
assets include those that are fully unused and underutilised or partly used. Yet those situations 
lead to inefficiency (Kaganova 1999). The options are limited for the government to address the 
problem of surplus assets either to dispose of them by selling to the private sector or to utilise 
them. The first option is limited by the country’s legal system and national interest protection 
(Kaganova & Polen 2006). The latter brings implications of significantly large funding 
requirements and lack of expertise in the government sector. PPPs  are seen as a viable solution 
in utilising public assets whether the assets are surplus, or underutilised, and need further 
development (Kaganova & Polen 2006). 
Some countries have obtained benefits from PPPs in managing either their central or local 
government properties. The UK and US have been known for implementing PPPs to increase the 
benefits of their properties (Kaganova & Polen 2006). Two cases of inviting private sector in 
utilising government assets are the UK PRIME Project and US Army Walter Reed Medical 
Centre (Kaganova & Polen 2006; The UK National Audit Office 1999; Wiener 2012). The first 
example shows how the Department of Social Security of the UK contracted the private sector 
to develop one of its properties in a 20-year deal. The private sector was obliged to: provide an 
upfront payment to the department; develop and maintain the premises; allocate some 
percentages of the facilities to the government; and share the profits they generate (Kaganova & 
Polen 2006; The UK National Audit Office 1999). 
The second case gives an example of how the US Government addressed the problem of its 
highly regulated military sites where demolition, privatisation, relocation and military 
construction funding were not legally possible (Kaganova & Polen 2006). An underdeveloped 
military medical facility was located in a historic region amidst the problem of growing patient 
numbers. A private developer was invited to renovate, operate, maintain, and manage the facility 
which was known as an ‘enhanced use lease’ (Kaganova & Polen 2006; Wiener 2012). Besides 
that, the developer also had the obligation to pay the government during its half decade contract. 
One clause of the contract stated the developer could propose another business plan on another 






The reasons why those governments contracted with the private sector in managing their 
properties can be explained in seven broad categories (Kaganova & Polen 2006). First, like other 
PPPs, the government expects fiscal and financial benefits from the development of public or 
commercial facilities without spending any public money, even in many cases receiving funding. 
Then, the risks can be transferred to the party to manage best. These risks include property 
development and management risks. Therefore, the government can focus on their core activities. 
The partnerships are also believed to bring more control over the delivery quality through output-
based specification, performance management, and incentives. Then, due to the long-term 
contract on those projects, the property’s values are secured, and the private investment is also 
protected from cyclical political situations. The long-term contract also makes cost reduction 
possible through life-cycle costing. Efficiency can also be increased through expertise and 
innovation brought by the private sector. Last, some countries avoid full privatisation of their 
properties. Hence, PPPs can increase their asset productivity while they retain the ownerships. 
 Accountability 
 Accountability Theory 
Concepts and definitions 
Accountability terminology can be traced to middle age Europe where it comes from the 
traditional book keeping function that then developed into accounting and the process of auditing 
(Boven 2005). The transformation of accounting into the accountability concept was then 
followed by other paradigm shifts: from compliance to performance, from internal to external 
accountability, from financial to public objectives, from vertical to horizontal accountability. In 
the wake of NPM, accountability became more popular both among academics and government 
practitioners as NPM shifted the perspective of the government from a bureaucratic ethos of 
office to a managerial system (Lægreid 2014).   
Several scholars developed different conceptions regarding accountability based on the context 
of their particular research areas as well as their multi-discipline backgrounds (Mulgan 2001; 
Sinclair 1995). Accountability is seen based on what branches of science or discipline the 
scholars have. A law academic put more emphasis on legal accountability. Likewise, an auditor 





example, from a socio-cultural perspective, accountability is viewed as a social psychological 
experience that falls within many contexts that bring social and cultural effects. 
The accountability concept also can be approached through some discourses: incentivisation, 
juridicisation or formalisation, mechanisation, and institutionalisation (Dubnick 2014). In the 
incentivisation discourse, performance measurement becomes the basis in assessing whether 
someone or a party is accountable. That people are positively responding to anything about their 
performance, is the basis of this discourse. The other three discourses promise justice, control, 
and democracy, respectively. Justice can be reached through legal formalisation to suppress 
undesirable behaviours. Then, control can be served properly when a set of mechanisms oversee 
and give directions for members of an organisation. Last, democracy is achieved by power 
restraining, answerability and management responsiveness (Dubnick 2014) 
Performance measurement as a basis for accountability has been debated for years. Performance 
measurement is one of three practices which encourage the incentivisation to achieve 
accountability. The other two are total quality management and performance management 
(Dubnick 2014). For the proponent of incentivisation, performance measurement has three 
factors in enhancing accountability (Martin & Kettner 1997). Firstly, it takes into consideration 
the main perspectives of governmental accountability which are effectiveness, efficiency and 
quality. Secondly, performance measurement requires the most appropriate unit of analysis 
within an organisation. By doing so, the performance of many aspects within the organisation 
can be compared. Finally, at all levels of government, performance measurement is well known 
and seen as having a positive impact on target achievements. 
Apart from accountability, performance measurement can also be a tool to improve performance 
or in other words performance measurement for performance (Halachmi 2002)  The first tries to 
make sure that all actions are conducted based on plans and standards and as a result those actions 
are justified in the eye of auditors. The latter emphasises learning process, exploration and 
benchmarking with industry best performers. All those processes have a perspective of 
achievement and provide room for discussion within organisations to decide their future 
objectives (Halachmi 2002). 
Yet, the use of performance measurement to promote accountability has never been flawless for 
some reasons (Halachmi 2002; Julnes 2006). The concept of performance measurement for 





discouraged from deviating from detailed plans to avoid difficulties in the audit process even 
when they realise that the deviation is for the public interest. In many cases, once management 
deviates, they are required to provide a justification and supporting documentation, and this 
becomes an obstacle in the form of unnecessary management distress (Julnes 2006). As a result, 
a required adaptation cannot be made in fast changing circumstances (Halachmi 2002).  
Despite that, performance measurement can still be beneficial for encouraging accountability 
through oversight and compliance, given preconditions (Julnes 2006; Scheirer & Newcomer 
2001). In the first place, the outcomes of the program are to be a direct result of the activities 
measured, which is called ’attributation’ (Scheirer & Newcomer 2001). Then, the goals and 
objectives must have been appropriately developed which indicates whether the program is 
conducted on the right track (Julnes 2006). Last, the product or service must be simple enough 
to be clearly monitored and evaluated to verify the outcomes (Julnes 2006). 
In the formalisation discourse, the narrative of accountability examines legal punishment 
processes within the organisation to protect it and its members from damaging behaviours 
(Dubnick 2014). In another perspective in this discourse, accountability is based on the 
relationship between a controlling external party and members of the organisation (Romzek & 
Dubnick 1987). That external party has the power to assess the behaviour of the members and 
deliver sanctions whenever they see fit based on the contractual obligations (Romzek & Dubnick 
1987). Accountability is a two dimensional concept made up of answerability and enforcement 
(Schedler 1999). Answerability deals with the obligation to explain either about the factual 
information or the reason behind those facts. Meanwhile, the enforcement dimension ensures that 
the relationship between the controlling and the controlled is respected by providing a legal base 
(Schedler 1999).  
As a mechanism, accountability is used to manage the activities and behaviour within an 
organisation through administrative control, procedures, a reporting system, and an auditing 
process (Dubnick 2014). In this view, the process is to answer to a superior/account 
holder/principle regarding the actions by an accountor/steward (Mulgan 2000). From this 
perspective, accountability can be explained as an actor and a forum relationship in which the 
first is obliged to justify their behaviour, and the latter can raise enquiries, draw a conclusion, 





In contrast, some scholars view accountability as a virtue as a result of the good behaviour of 
members of an organisation (Messner 2009; Roberts 1991).  Accountability is related to the 
positive attitudes of members of an organisation dealing with moral practice considerations 
(Messner 2009). This view consequently delivers the understanding that accountability plays a 
role as guidance in public sector organisations where they intrinsically have the ability to self-
control (Romzek 1996) and checks and balances (Michael 2005). 
In the institutionalisation, constraining power and fostering answerability as well as officers 
responsiveness are objectives of the accountability arrangement (Dubnick 2014). 
Institutionalised accountability is achieved by an established framework regardless of the quality 
of all players in the system of democratic and modern governance (Dubnick 2014). The 
framework can guarantee accountability because of the two main principles of self-responsibility 
and checks and balances installation (Michael 2005). Driven by self-responsibility, an institution 
creates accountability mechanisms and self monitoring. In a public sector, the management of an 
accountability promoting institution is advised to search for better methods of making the 
institution accountable to other agencies and to the public. The checks and balances principle 
gives incentives for self-monitoring and, if the self monitoring system has flaws, simultaneously 
plays a role as a second layer keeper. An example of relationships between three agencies is 
where each watches itself and the other two which means there are nine ‘watching relationships’ 
(Michael 2005). 
Principal agent theory 
Principal agent theory explains the social relationship between two players namely the principal 
and the agent (Guston 1996). The former represents the owner of resources who does not have 
either the opportunity or the ability to utilise them. The latter is needed to operationalise the 
resources for the best interest of the former (Guston 1996). Based on this circumstance, 
accountability can be defined as: 
Relationships in which principals have the ability to demand answers from agents to 
questions about their proposed or past behaviour, to discern that behaviour, and to 
impose sanctions on agents in the event that they regard the behaviour as unsatisfactory 





Figure 4.3 – Accountability 
 
Source: Steets (2010) 
Figure 4.3 presents four aspects of accountability conducted by the agent and the principal where 
the agent acts based on the interests of the principal, then reports for assessment purposes to the 
principal resulting in feedback in the form of rewards or sanctions (Steets 2010). The principal 
obtains information both from the agent or third parties such as auditors (Islam et al. 2010; Ittonen 
2010; White & Hollingsworth 1999). The role of auditors in enhancing accountability will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The relationship between principals and agents involves several dilemmas such as asymmetric 
information as agents usually hold more information than principals, and interest divergence 
when both parties have different agendas (Broadbent, Dietrich & Laughlin 1996; Leruth & Paul 
2008). Both players seek for their own personal interest and tend to be opportunistic. Those 
characteristics bring two collective action problems: moral hazard and adverse selection (Guston 
1996). From the very beginning, the principal has insufficient information regarding the 
capabilities and trustworthiness of potential agents which can lead to the adverse selection where 
the best candidate is not selected. Because the asymmetric information relationship exists, the 
principal does not have certain knowledge as to whether the agent is acting in their best interest. 
The asymmetric information leads to the problematic moral hazard where the agents have 






For developing countries which suffer institutional weaknesses, asymmetric information is a 
significant problem. In those countries, the public institutions have constrains in four areas, 
namely regulatory capacity, accountability, commitment and fiscal efficiency (Estache & Wren-
Lewis 2009; Laffont 1998). Those constraints arguably come from the following problems: 
agency limitation in acquiring skilled staff, higher frequency of corruption and collusion between 
related interest groups, numerous contract renegotiations, lower private sector investment, and 
limited fiscal revenues (Estache & Wren-Lewis 2009; Laffont 1998). Another study proposes 
that institutional and political weaknesses can lead to a more severe problem, a  higher level of 
state-constraining corruption (Khan & Gray 2006). 
The agency problems related to moral hazard and adverse selection as mentioned above can be 
addressed by ordinary solutions namely ex ante and ex post controls and sanctions (McCubbins, 
Noll & Weingast 1989; Moe 1984; Schillemans & Busuioc 2015). In the first place, both players 
settle on a remuneration system based on the performance of the agent and then the  principal 
sets up monitoring procedures and oversight agencies to verify the agreed performance targets 
(McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1989).  Besides the reward system, the contract between the 
principal and the agent must be able to minimise the negative effects of informational 
asymmetries (Moe 1984). The ex post actions taken by the principal include establishing 
monitoring procedures to ascertain that the agent acts based on the principal’s best interests and 
that the information provided is reliable (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1989). 
The principal agent theory is widely used to explain the accountability process due to its ability 
to descriptively, explanatorily, and predictively assist research findings in this domain 
(Schillemans & Busuioc 2015). However, contemporary research findings oppose several 
common expectations in accountability processes between principals and agents (Schillemans & 
Busuioc 2015). In a broader context, the principals and the agents are not just two parties. 
Accountability process involves an actor, who is obliged to answer to a forum (Bovens 2007). A 
forum is different to a principal, it could be the principal itself and other third parties who can 
seek answers from the actor. The first finding reveals that forums do not always pay attention to 
their delegated tasks to the actors. In some cases, the forums simply neglect the delegation 
process or even worse, they act to contravene their own established contracts. Instead of 
addressing agency problems, the forums drift away from the contractual agreements. 
Still from the same literature, principal agent theory sees that the source of problems is the agent’s 





where the actors or the agents are highly attached to their job description (Schillemans & Busuioc 
2015). The third finding is that the level of actors’ autonomy is much lower than expected. 
Despite task delegation, the actors are still highly influenced by the accountability forum in their 
actions taken. This is due to the fact that the actors are compelled to answer to a large number of 
bodies as well as their internal superiors. Next, contradicting the assumption that agents would 
try to deviate from their delegated tasks, in numerous projects, the actors seek accountability and 
inform their forum, and even design their own accountability mechanisms.  
Principals are also assumed to pay considerable attention to the information provided by the 
agents. The findings once again show a different situation where many members of the forum 
neglect the reports. In many cases, the forum requires comprehensive and more detailed 
information regarding the agents’ performance. But once the reports are in their hands, they seem 
to lose interest. Then, as the principals have the power to deliver sanctions to underperformed 
agents, it is expected that they will exercise the power to boost the performance. Yet, some 
findings indicate that the forum is hesitant to do this. In some cases, the contract is extended 
given the actors failed to meet the targets. To sum up, all findings could move the central issue 
in the accountability process from agency problems to forum activation in enhancing their 
accountability roles (Schillemans & Busuioc 2015). 
Classification of accountability 
In practice, accountability can be differentiated into several types: internal and external 
accountability; political and bureaucratic; communal, contractual, managerial and parliamentary; 
legal and professional (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 2004; Halligan 2007; Romzek & Dubnick 
1987). Those classifications overlap each other where some types of accountability actually could 
be included in other types. Contractual and managerial accountability could be considered as part 





Figure 4.4 – Types of Accountability 
 
Source: Demirag, Dubnick and Khadaroo (2004),  Halligan (2007), Romzek and Dubnick (1987)   
Internal and external accountability are also known as vertical and horizontal accountability 
respectively (Halligan 2007). In the public sector, internal accountability represents a 
bureaucratic hierarchy where the minister at the top of the pyramid are responsible to the 
parliament. The relationship between the ministers and the parliament is external accountability 
but also can be referred to as parliamentary or political accountability (Demirag, Dubnick & 
Khadaroo 2004; Romzek & Dubnick 1987). Another classification is arranged not only based on 
the source of agency control, internal or external, but also by how strong the control is over the 
agency. Bureaucratic and legal accountability have a higher degree of agency control than  the 
professional and political (Romzek & Dubnick 1987). 
In relation to the process of government projects, accountability can be divided on the basis of 
project phases: communal, contractual, managerial, and parliamentary (Demirag, Dubnick & 
Khadaroo 2004). Communal accountability takes place prior to the project selection. It aims to 
seek community involvement through public consultation and to incorporate their voices in the 
decision-making process. Once a project is planned to be developed and an agent has been 
appointed through a tender process, a contract is signed by both the agent and the principal. The 
contract clearly displays the set of performance standards in specific enforceable terms and 
conditions. This process is called contractual accountability. The next stage is managerial 
accountability when the actors are asked to be accountable for the production process or service 
delivery and the utilisation of allocated resources (Sinclair 1995). In the end, in parliamentary 





conducted policies. In a democratic country, parliamentary accountability requires an audit report 
to investigate how the project was planned, operationalised, and reported (Demirag, Dubnick & 
Khadaroo 2004).  
In a democratic environment, a government organisation is held accountable not just for finance, 
but also for fairness and for performance (Behn & Brookings 2001). Financial accountability 
refers to how an accountability holdee answers to an accountability holder regarding financial 
resources or any resources that can be monetised under their stewardship. In this type of 
accountability, the government is held accountable to be fair to all its stakeholders including 
employees, clients, and ultimately their citizens. Not just for the resources they manage and for 
their attitudes toward  other parties, the government also must answer questions regarding their 
achievement or performance (Behn & Brookings 2001). 
Roles of audit  
In the relationship between the principal and the agent, there are four conditions that require an 
auditing process, namely potential or actual conflict of interest, errors consequences, complexity 
and remoteness (Ittonen 2010). Firstly, the agent or the management who prepares the 
information, mostly financial, as the answer to what they are accounted for, has a conflict of 
interest on the report submitted. The management can deliberately or unintentionally deliver 
biased information regarding their performance. The former is due to the incentive they could 
obtain, and the latter is due to selecting accounting principles and methods favourable to some 
stakeholders yet unfavourable for others.  
Secondly, the management report is an input for stakeholders in a decision-making process. They 
need reliable and complete information. The consequence of errors is enormous. The accounting 
process and financial statement preparation are highly complex as is the process of interpretation 
of information. Most financial statement users do not have sufficient knowledge therefore they 
need auditors to give opinions regarding the quality of the financial statement. Even if the users 
have accounting and auditing knowledge, in most circumstances, they cannot directly access the 
accounting details nor audit the financial statement. Legal and institutional impediments prevent 






Table 4.2 – The Financial Statement Assertions 
Assertions 




for the year  
Assets, liability 
& equity at the 
end of the year 
Occurrence ✓  The transaction occurs 
Completeness ✓ ✓ All transactions and accounts are 
completely recorded 
Accuracy ✓ ✓ The amounts are accurate based on 
proper valuation and/or allocation 
Cut off ✓  The records are in the appropriate 
period 
Classification ✓ ✓ The records are in the correct 
account 
Presentation ✓ ✓ Proper aggregation or 
disaggregation 
Existence  ✓ The accounts exist 
Rights and 
obligations 
 ✓ The entity has the right to it assets 
and obligations on its liabilities 
Source: Clikeman (2004), IAASB (2018) 
A financial statement is assertions of the management regarding the  recognition, measurement, 
and presentation of the entity’s transactions and an audit process is meant to verify those 
management assertions (IAASB 2018). Types of assertion vary yet there are five well known 
assertions namely existence or occurrence, completeness, valuation or allocation, rights and 
obligations, and presentation and disclosure (Clikeman 2004). The definition and type of the 
assertions are presented in Table 4.2.  
 Accountability Questions of PPPs 
In a government citizen relationship, society plays a role as the principal and the government as 
the agent (Behn & Brookings 2001). The agent’s duties are for the sake of the principal by 
providing obligatory services to ensure the state of welfare of its society. Moreover, in PPPs, one 
additional party joins in the principal-agent relationship which triggers a more complex challenge 
in designing the role of both parties (Forrer et al. 2010). The agency problem occurs in PPPs due 
to a compounded agency relationship where the private sector is an agent of the government; 
meanwhile, the government is an agent of the citizens (Trailer, Rechner & Hill 2004). The 
government is obliged to ascertain that its partner acts in the best interest of the citizens as service 





of PPP, including policy consulting, project advice and evaluation, and project investing, have 
raised the concerns about whether PPPs still position the public interest as their ultimate objective 
(Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton 2007). 
Five consequences of accountability problems have been identified namely goal deviation, 
budget windfall, moral hazard, unsound incentive payment system, and opportunistic parties 
(Elliott & Salamon 2002; Posner 2002). The utilisation of other parties to conduct the government 
project is called third party governance (Posner 2002).  The interests of the private sector can be 
different to those of the public sector as the former is profit driven and the latter is public delivery 
maximation. Different interests could lead to goal deviation from the partnership contractual 
agreement. Next, the utilisation of government budget in a partnership project can serve as a 
bonus for a non-targeted segment of the public. The public do not obtain the real benefit of the 
government expenditure. In many partnership contracts, governments provide guarantees to the 
private sector when circumstances are supportive for the projects. This is to encourage the private 
sector to take over several risks (Kumaraswamy, MM & Zhang, XQ 2001). Those guarantees can 
expose the private sector partner to moral hazard to act imprudently and worsen the risk and 
undermine the partnership objectives (Posner 2002). Moral hazard discourages the private sector 
attitude toward productivity and efficiency. Last, all previous consequences can trigger 
opportunistic actions by private sector to pursue their profit maximation regardless of achieving 
the objectives of the program (Posner 2002).  
Figure 4.5 – PPP Accountability Framework 
 





In order to identify and address accountability concerns, several approaches, such as measuring 
PPP elements and setting accountability standards, are proposed (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 
2004; Forrer et al. 2010; Steets 2010; Watson 2003). There is a framework of six elements 
namely: risk, costs and benefits, social and political effects, expertise, partnership collaboration, 
and performance measurement as can be seen in Figure 4.5 (Forrer et al. 2010). The framework 
is built on the basis of goodwill from both contracting sides which is implemented by determining 
proper responsibilities, compliance and a monitoring system (Milward & Provan 2006). 
Furthermore, financial resources, regulation compliance and products/services delivered, are 
factors the agent must be accountable for (Steets 2010). Those factors together with types of 
partnership are the basis for the development of the accountability standards. 
The allocation of various risks is the main reason for governments to enter PPPs to develop 
infrastructure projects. The risk allocation process determines which risks are retained by 
governments, solely borne by private parties, or shared together. The process requires risk 
identification and knowledge about parties’ expertise. The final decision is taken based on proper 
negotiation between parties (Abednego & Ogunlana 2006; Bing et al. 2005; Van Ham & 
Koppenjan 2001). Furthermore, risks could be associated with project stages: planning, 
construction, operation, and termination. In the early stages, most risks, such as political risks 
are retained by the government, while in the construction and operation phases, the private sector 
partner bears more risks. In the termination period, again the government has more roles in 
assuming certain risks, for example, force majeure and residual value risks (Yescombe 2007). 
Failures in appropriately allocating risk could bring damages to the partnership’s accountability. 
If the private sector partner is overburdened with risks within a PPP, it could lead to a situation 
where the partner behaves passively by not taking any necessary actions just because those 
particular actions are not prescribed on the contract (Forrer et al. 2010). In another circumstance, 
where the government bears more risk than it should the private sector partner will benefit from 
a supernormal return.  
The next element is a benefit-cost concept that is closely related to a value for money concept. 
Both concepts promote the idea that the benefits of PPPs must outweigh the related costs incurred 
and shed light on the opportunity costs and benefits of not entering a PPP in conducting public 
projects. In assessing value for money, governments have a range of different approaches from 
just relying on competing bids, analysing public sector comparators and the most comprehensive 





Public perception of the triumph of PPPs depends on the continuity of service delivery 
(Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy  2005) and positive social political 
impacts. As a consequence, the partnership should be able to manage social and political issues 
due to their dynamic development by gaining support, from social and political players in the 
society  (Forrer et al. 2010).  Compared to the public sector, the private sector are assumed to 
have a competitive advantage in the knowledge of their specific sector based on long experience. 
This knowledge could encourage higher efficiency, improve project management ability, and 
deliver a more innovative business process (Hodge & Greve 2005).  
The penultimate element of the framework is partnership collaboration. To be fruitful, 
collaboration requires some preconditions including a clear yet flexible contract, efficacious 
leadership, effective communication, operational project management, and a trustful relationship 
(Forrer et al. 2010).  Collaboration and control differ in many important aspects (Sundaramurthy 
& Lewis 2003). The collaboration’s theoretical basis is stewardship theory that promotes 
cooperation, self-actualisation, and communalities. Furthermore, the underlying motive for 
collaboration is high-value commitment to achieve growth and performance enhancement 
through goal alignment and trust building in a long-term relationship. 
Finally, the partners need to be cautious in the performance measurement as it is the basis for 
rewards as well as sanctions, especially for those that are imposed on the agents in implementing 
the contractual objectives of PPPs (Forrer et al. 2010). Both financial and quality performance 
could be internally and externally measured (Boston 1996). The financial performance includes 
business process efficiency and resource utilisation while quality performance incorporates 
service and process quality and customer satisfaction.  
Despite the above scepticism,  a PPP is still argued to amplify the accountability potential for 
four reasons: its output and performance orientation; the private sector’s willingness to share the 
risks; the societal, operational, and financial achievements; and efficiency enhancement and 
knowledge transfer from the private sector (Willems & Van Dooren 2011). Nevertheless, the 
same study also recognises that on one side, PPPs diffuse accountability from its traditional 
perception provided that the government loses some direct political control over PPP projects 











Value for Money 
Drivers 
Initiation Business needs establishment, 
options appraisal and business plan 
preparation 
Communal PPP is better than 
public sector 
comparator 
Set up Project team establishment until 




Contract management (new 
processes, systems, and management 
systems) are put in place 




Assessment by NAO and Audit 
Commissions and the results are 
delivered to the legislature 
Parliamentary Policy objective 
fulfilment 
Source: Demiraq et al. (2013) 
Accountability in PPPs has been seen in several perspectives. Besides six aspects of 
accountability (Forrer et al. 2010), another perspective mentions about four forms of 
accountability that are relevant within a PPP namely communal, contractual, managerial and 
parliamentary (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 2004). The latter perspective also takes into 
consideration the phases of PPP in relation to certain types of accountability. The friction 
between accountability and transparency on the one side, and efficiency and commerciality on 
the other side, generates four issues of accountability namely the disclosure diffusion, 
comprehensive government accountability, risk allocation and management, and confidentiality 
(Watson 2003).  
Table 4.3 depicts the relationship between four types of accountability and PPP phases (Demirag, 
Dubnick & Khadaroo 2004). First, communal accountability is defined as a less formal 
relationship between a principal and an agent. In contrast, within contractual accountability, the 
behaviour of an agent and information requested by a principal are explicitly depicted in a 
binding contract (Laughlin 1996). The communal and contractual accountabilities apply in the 
initiation phase and set up phase, respectively. In the initiation stage, communal accountability 
is applied during the process of consultation and discussion with stakeholders about their needs, 
ending with the decision whether a PPP is superior to its public sector comparators.  
Furthermore, the concept of managerial accountability is described as internal in comparison 





whether the agent satisfies the questions of used resources, agreed upon procedures, and the 
defined criteria of the outcome. Meanwhile, parliamentary accountability focuses on how the 
government, as a principal in a PPP, justifies their decisions (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 
2004; Mattei 2007). Once, a contractual agreement is agreed upon at the end of a selection 
process, then the relationship is solely based on contractual accountability. Next, the private 
sector constructs the PPP structures, delivers products and services, and the government assesses 
the performance of the private partner based on efficiency and effectiveness measures. This view 
is from a managerial perspective. Last, in external accountability, the government reports to the 
parliament through independent due diligence, through an autonomous institution such as a 
supreme audit board. 
As mentioned above, issues of the disclosure diffusion, whole of government accountability, risk 
allocation and management, and confidentiality, cloud the accountability practice in PPPs. In a 
PPP, three possible reporting statements can confuse the readers of accountability holders 
(Watson 2003). The reports in a PPP project come from the government agency, the private 
sector, and the partnership entity itself. Each entity has its own reporting standards and 
procedures to deliver confusing pieces of information. In a more complex PPP arrangement, there 
are two or more government agencies involved as well as the private sector where multi 
companies are involved. This brings more difficulties in tracking the accountability of all those 
contracting parties. The situation requires whole of government accountability under inter-
jurisdictional regulations (Watson 2003). After that, risk allocation, more appropriately risk 
transfer from the government to the private sector is the main attribute of PPPs. The PPP contract 
must arrange a risk-sharing agreement transparently and accountably. In fact, the PPP itself is 
complicated by its long-term contract in an uncertain environment that encourages not only the 
private sector but also the government to show their opportunistic behaviour, the behaviour that 
brings accountability concerns (Watson 2003). In regard to confidentiality, governments and 
private sector have different concepts of confidentiality. The private sector partners view their 
property information as classified since it provides them with competitive advantages. The 
accountability issue in this circumstance is to appropriately categorise which information is 
commercially confidential and which needs to be disclosed (Watson 2003). 
In a democratic country, the parliament holds the authority to assess how the government perform 
its duties accountably. In doing so, the parliament has or is helped by agencies such as auditors 





state governments, a Public Accounts Committee (PAC) assesses the accountability process of 
PPPs from the very beginning (Watson 2004). In the initiation stage, the PAC creates parameters 
by identifying the service required and assessing preliminary evidence. In this stage, they gather 
information about government understanding and articulation, the relationship between the PPP 
proposed contract and the required public services, and a comparison between the PPP proposal 
and other options. The result of this investigation will tell the PAC whether the PPP has met the 
value for money requirement through the best delivery mechanism (Quiggin 2003; Watson 2004) 
. In the second stage of PPPs, the PAC analyses the soundness of the business by assessing risk 
sharing and public sector comparators. Next, in the tender process, three qualifications have to 
be fulfilled: a competitive bidding process attracting independent companies to participate; the 
capable winner in terms of financial aspects and experiences; and appropriate risk sharing with 
specific private sector. In the monitoring phase, the PAC manages to obtain assurances about 
performance measurement, contract renegotiation, and favourable or unfavourable scenarios 
regarding windfall profits. The final assessment is of the whole project life. Has the project 
achieved a value for money outcome? Is there any room for improvement? Otherwise, what 
actions are needed to rectify the undesirable condition? (Watson 2004). 
 Transparency and Accountability 
The basic idea of transparency states that knowing they are being monitored; people behave 
appropriately. This idea comes from a common practice in a jail where the inmates are 
continuously watched by the guards (Meijer 2014). The modern concept of transparency states 
that it has five characteristics namely accessible, comprehensive, relevant, qualified, and reliable 
(Vishwanath & Kaufmann 2001). The accessibility of information could come from a legal basis 
or at least from the principle of reporting. Then, the relevant criteria make sure that the users 
obtain all relevant information in regard to their needs. The quality and reliability of information 
are measured based on a certain standard set by the organisation and constantly monitored by 
particular agencies such as auditors (Vishwanath & Kaufmann 2001).  
The relationship between transparency and accountability can be seen directly, indirectly, and 
inversely (Meijer 2014). The direct relationship between those concepts can be seen from the 
fact that horizontal accountability is facilitated by transparency. More transparent government 
provides better public accountability in the absence of formal formats and sanctions (Meijer 





transparency provides ‘a fire alarm’ if something goes wrong. The accountability forum / 
principal is warned by other parties when wrongdoing is indicated by the actor/agent (Meijer 
2014). Different to those direct and indirect relationships between transparency and 
accountability which show a positive correlation, there could be an inverse relation. 
Transparency in many cases reduces the need for a formal accountability mechanism because 
transparency and performance measurement merge into the idea of accountability (Erkkilä 2012). 
The necessity for debate between principals and agents fades as the transparent report already 
displays the full story (Meijer 2014). 
Some scholars view transparency as part of accountability with three other components namely 
answerability, compliance and enforcement (Ebrahim & Weisband 2007; Roberts 2009; Spicer 
2017).Within the public administration domain, transparency and accountability are frequently 
contrasted with efficiency and commerciality, which are the prime objectives of private sector, 
due to the trade-off between those two groups of concepts (Watson 2003). Though accountability 
is presumed to be spawned by transparency, this conjecture is not always the case (Fox 2007). In 
order to delineate the relationship between transparency and accountability, four issues need to 
be addressed, including: who are the targets of accountability whether an institution or individual; 
who controls the quality of information; what type of transparency whether clear or obscure; and 
leading to the question of what different type of accountability it is whether it is soft or hard (Fox 
2007). 
Firstly, it is necessary to understand two different accountability targets of transparency reform 
(Fox 2007). The former targets fraud eradication, the latter focuses on organisational 
performance. While the former tends to be more legalistic in addressing personal mistakes, the 
latter displays a wider perspective by emphasising systematic faults (Fox 2007). In PPPs, this 
issue becomes considerably more complicated due to the involvement of private parties in the 
production process.  
Next, an independent audit is important for the disclosures of organisations by assuring their 
quality (Fox 2007). There is no so-called a hundred per cent assurance of every audited report. 
Yet, there are possibly two extreme faults resulting from a performance audit (Power 1999). The 
first fault is where transparency is superficial and does not have any relationship with factual 
efficiency. In the second one, the transparency triggers excessive control resulting in defective 





The third issue differentiates between the characteristics of clear and obscure transparency. The 
former discloses reliable performance measurement and the latter misleads the readers of the 
report in their decision-making process (Fox 2007). The last issue lucidly portrays the connection 
between transparency and accountability. Fox (2007) classifies accountability into soft and hard, 
based on the existence of sanctions. The former embraces the idea of answerability to rationalise 
the policies and the latter recognises not only answerability but also the concept of punishment. 
To sum up, transparency and accountability could have either the same meaning as twins, sharing 
attributes or no relationship at all (Fox 2007; Hood 2010). 
 The Gap in the Literature 
In the beginning of the 21st century, the central issues of PPP research were: is the PPP a form 
of privatisation, how can value for money and risk transfer be realised, who regulates the PPPs, 
how are PPP decisions made, and overall, what are the benefits of PPPs? (Broadbent & Laughlin 
1999; Hodge & Greve 2018). Ten years later, the technicalities were still discussed, but new 
perspectives such as socio politics and governance had started to be debated (Hodge & Greve 
2018). The rationales for PPPs also altered where the adoption sought: private sector’s 
competitive advantages in efficiency, innovation, competition, and choice; performance 
orientation; economies of scale; lowering tax, risk sharing; and enhancing the values of public 
assets (McQuaid & Scherrer 2010). The value of public assets has been in the spotlight since then 
which means the adoption of PPPs in PAM has been on the research agenda. 
Meanwhile, the four areas discussed in this study are PAM, NPM, PPPs, and accountability. A 
significant volume of literature regarding the last three areas has been published in the academic 
world as shown in Appendix I. The studies regarding the first area are also still available even 
though the numbers are significantly lower than those of the other three topics. Governance with 
other four sub-fields namely organisational theory, ethics management, policy analysis, public 
budgeting and human resource management, is part of a larger field in the discipline of public 
administration (Shafritz & Hyde 2017). Accountability is part of the central concept of 
governance (Hood 1991, 1995). That taxonomy of public administration and accountability-
governance relationships is not similar for all scholars. Some see public policy not as part of 
public administration but as a separated field of discipline (Peters & Pierre 1998). 
NPM as a movement has been around for more than three decades and has been vigorously 





PAM is relatively small. Several studies have indicated that NPM concepts have changed how 
governments see public assets and conduct proper managerial actions in the best interests of the 
public (Conway 2006; Dow et al. 2006; Mahmood et al. 2014; McKellar 2006a). Some of the 
literature sheds light on how PAM changes the way assets are reported (Kaganova 2009, 2012; 
Roberts & Scapens 1985) as well as on how the change of  asset ownership encourages asset 
performance measurement (Hanis, Trigunarsyah & Susilawati 2011; Mollentze 2005).  
Despite that small amount of literature on PAM, the current studies have analysed certain aspects 
of PAM such as policies and guidelines (Mahmood et al. 2014) and frameworks and tools (Bizet 
2006; Dow et al. 2006; Hanis 2012; Kaganova 2012; McKellar 2006b, 2006a; Vanier 2001). 
Other specific issues related to PAM are also available including space management (Yusof et 
al. 2012). Most of those studies analyse the PAM in developed countries and only a few studies 
discuss PAM in developing countries. Therefore, this thesis can contribute to the discourse 
regarding PAM practices in developing countries. 
In the Indonesian context, only recently several PAM studies have been published but the 
frequency of publication is still low. Nevertheless the topics discussed are quite diverse from 
public asset management reform, performance measurement, good governance for both national 
or sub-national level, sub-national level practices, and the latest, a policy framework to mitigate 
the effect of climate changes (Hanis 2012; Hanis, Trigunarsyah & Susilawati 2011; Lukito 2018; 
Mardiasmo 2012; Mardiasmo, Barnes & Sampford 2012; Prayoga 2016). There is no study about 
the adoption of PPPs in addressing the problem of idle or underutilised public assets. As one of 
the areas this thesis studies is PPPs, the thesis will contribute to the literature of Indonesian PAM 
not just in quantity but also in variety as it delivers another perspective, the PPPs in the PAM 
context. 
In regard to PPPs, one of the earliest reasons for their adoption was to address the problem of 
government budget limitations as stated by the UK government official when the country 
announced its first version of private financial initiatives in 1992 (Broadbent & Laughlin 1999). 
Further studies revealed the dynamic circumstances of PPP adoption. Risk transfer, value for 
money, lower initial cost become the new aspirations of PPP practices in many countries 
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 2011; Chan et al. 2009; Greve & Hodge 2015; Grimsey & Lewis 
2005; Hodge 2005; Hodge & Greve 2007; Yescombe 2007). PPPs are also adopted to utilise the 





Figure 4.6 – Literature on PAM, PPPs, and Governance and Accountability 
 
Accountability in PPPs has raised concerns in several studies since the early 2000s and became 
more discussed after the global financial crisis triggered by the US subprime mortgage problem 
in 2007 (Andon 2012). What makes accountability interesting is that practitioners define 
accountability differently depending on their position (Demirag & Khadaroo 2008). Moreover, 
accountability has become one of three essential requirements in a PPP evaluation system 
(Demirag & Khadaroo 2008). Figure 4.6 presents some studies which are in the intersection area 
of the two sets namely accountability and PPPs (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 2004; Demirag 
& Khadaroo 2008; Forrer et al. 2010; Steets 2010; Watson 2003, 2004). The thesis gives new 
perspective as it studies PPPs and accountability in the context of PAM. 
The course of PPP research currently is directed by six themes: seeking for the substance of 
partnerships, critical explanations, internationalising knowledge, post procurement events, 
effects of the global crisis, and impact of policy and practice (Andon 2012). This thesis applies 





the financial calculation of PPP transactions and provide an explanation of the impact of PAM 
policies and practices. 
The shaded area in Figure 4.6 indicates the gap in the literature. The area is the intersection of 
three research sets, cross-cutting three themes of PAM, PPPs, and governance-accountability. As 
can be seen, all previous studies in this thesis are located in the areas either in: the PAM, PPPs, 
or governance-accountability sets; or in the intersection of PAM and PPPs, PAM and 
governance-accountability, or PPPs and governance-accountability. Until recently, no research 
has been found studying the shaded area. The thesis studies the shaded area to fill the gap in the 
literature. 
 Conclusion 
Like PAM, PPPs are also encouraged by NPM due to its nature in applying private sector 
principles to public affairs. Instead of the privatisation path, PPPs offer an alternative solution to 
address problems of the public sector. The reasons for PPP adoption are not static and changing 
over time from mostly to gain the private sector’s financial resources, to seeking for value for 
money for the government, and the transfer of risk to the party who can bear it the best. To serve 
the different motives of PPP adoption, there are a variety of partnership contracts to choose 
considering how tight the financial and organisational relationships are. PPP scenarios have been 
utilised to address the problem of idle or underutilised assets in many countries. A PPP gives 
flexibility for a government when disposing of those assets is difficult, if not impossible due to 
legal aspects.  
Accountability has different meanings depending on the context. It can be seen as a virtue or as 
a mechanism. It is also limiting power and fostering answerability. Principal agent theory as one 
of the approaches in explaining accountability, defines accountability as a relationship where the 
agent in regard to its behaviour, has to answer to the principal. The latter conducts an evaluation 
to decide whether sanctions are appropriate. Due to its nature, accountability can be classified in 
different ways. It can be internal versus external accountability; bureaucratic and political, legal 
and professional; communal, contractual, managerial, and parliamentary. Those classifications 
can overlap. 
No different from other PPPs, the involvement of private sector in PAM can raise accountability 
issues. Approaches to identify and mitigate concerns are available. One approach is by analysing 





collaboration, and performance measurement. Another is taking into consideration the stages of 
PPPs in identifying the accountability problems accordingly. 
Having discussed the research background, the practices as well as the literature of PAM and 












The first four chapters of this thesis present the research background and discuss the development 
of the theories and practice in PPPs and PAM. Chapter 2 describes the definition of public assets, 
analyses the adoption of NPM theories in PAM, and compares the implementation in several 
countries. That chapter also investigates the root causes of the surplus or underutilised assets 
problem and the policies that have been used to address this problem. PPPs are considered as one 
of the strategies for governments to utilise their surplus assets. The theories, development and 
challenges of PAM and PPPs have been discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.  
This chapter lays out the methodology employed including research questions, the approach, 
design, paradigm, case selection, the scope and unit of analysis, method, and data analysis. The 
research questions arise from studies of PAM and PPP adoption in the Indonesian context.  The 
research approach is designed to provide guidance from the very first stage, a preliminary 
literature review, to the final reporting stage. Then, the paradigm, how the research views and 
what it believes about the phenomena studied, is described. The research is developed based on 
the belief that there are realities that need to be interpreted, known as constructivism. Types of 
questions, as well as the research approach, determine the research design selected. In this 
research, a case study design is employed, and four case studies selected and analysed.  
The scope of analysis is PPP adoption in the Indonesian PAM context. The analysis includes the 
comparison of Indonesian PAM before and after the bureaucratic reform. To understand the 
problems, the researcher collects data in the forms of ideas, views and perceptions from the policy 
makers and policy implementers about PAM and PPP adoption in Indonesia. The chapter 
describes the use of semi structured interview and document analysis in collecting the data. 
Finally, this chapter explains how the data is thematically analysed. 
 Research Questions 
The thesis aims to study reasons and the process of adoption and practices of PPPs in the 
Indonesian PAM context. Thereby, the PAM development in Indonesia and several other 





reform on how the country views and manages its public real properties. The adoption of PPPs 
to address the problem of surplus or underutilised assets introduced accountability issues due to 
the involvement of private parties in the partnerships. The two issues above are addressed in two 
principal research questions: 
1. How and why have PPPs been adopted in the Indonesian PAM context? 
2. What are the accountability challenges of PPPs in Indonesia’s PAM? 
To address the questions, the research explores five investigative questions: 
1) What are the development and challenges of the Indonesian PAM?  
2) What are the rationales and challenges of PPP adoption? 
3) What are the characteristics of PPPs to be considered in PAM? 
4) What factors do influence accountability in PPPs?  
5) How does transparency affect accountability? 
The first three investigative questions explore the first research question and the last two explore 
the second research question. 
 Research Approach 
The research studies the key features and accountability of PPPs in the context of Indonesian 
PAM. The research depicts current views both from academics and practitioners regarding the 
principles and goals of managing public properties. The development of Indonesian PAM is 
firstly investigated to understand its success and failures in achieving the public-sector reform 
objectives. Then, the extent to which PPPs were adopted in Indonesian PAM is studied. The 
research also considers the accountability concern that arises when public and private sector 
collaborate and combine their resources in utilising public assets. 
 Ontological and Epistemological Stances 
Before answering the research questions, it is necessary to state the research paradigm: ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology. This paradigm is essential in determining approaches to the 
theory, strategy, and method of the research. Ontology concerns how the research views the 
nature of knowledge and reality; epistemology questions the relationship between the knower 






There are two ontological stances namely foundationalism or objectivism and anti-
foundationalism or constructivism (Bryman 2012; Marsh & Furlong 2002). The first stance 
believes that realities are independent of knowledge. The latter has the opposite view. 
Furthermore, the ontological stances indicate the epistemological positions or in other words an 
ontological stance determines an epistemological position. Three epistemological positions are 
derived from those two ontological stances: positivism, interpretivism, and realism (Bryman 
2012; Marsh & Furlong 2002). The first and the second positions reflect the ontological stances 
of foundationalism and anti-foundationalism, respectively. Last, realism, despite being classified 
as foundationalism in ontological terms, believes that not all social phenomena can be directly 
studied but are crucial for behavioural explanations (Marsh & Furlong 2002). 
The ontological stance of this research is constructivism. Being constructivist, the research 
follows the view that the social phenomena are constantly revised by humans through their social 
interactions (Bryman 2012). This research believes that the government, the private sector 
parties, and the society construct the phenomena of PPPs and their accountability issues which 
conform to the anti foundationalism or constructivism ontological term.  
The epistemological position follows its ontology where the reality is constructed by the social 
actors. Therefore, the research needs to interpret the reality to unearth the underlying meaning of 
phenomena. The reality of PPPs in the Indonesian PAM context is constructed by government 
officers and their private sector counterparts through their continuing collaboration. Furthermore, 
the research interpretation of the reality could differ with the actors themselves. Therefore, the 
relationship which exists between the research object confirms the epistemology position. Hence, 
the nature of social construction can be drawn by the interaction between the researcher and the 
participants (Guba & Lincoln 1994).  
Next, the ontology and epistemology stances inform how the research uncovers the knowledge 
behind the social phenomena. A semi structured interview is expected to satisfy the objective of 
the research as it could deliver the basis for subjective interpretation in gaining an in-depth 
understanding of the realities. Accordingly, the qualitative and inductive approaches apply in this 
research since the data gathered are qualitative and based on findings, a new theory is expected 






 Research Process 
There are three main stages of the research: literature reviews, data collection, and analysis and 
writing up (see Figure 5.1). The purpose of the literature review is to understand the nature of 
the research problem, the concepts and theories that have been discussed about the topic, and to 
identify the research position in the topic area (Bryman 2012). The last purpose of the literature 
review assures that the significance and contribution of the research identified in Chapter 1 are 
valid and the gap of knowledge identified in Chapter 4 has been filled. While conducting the 
literature review; the research questions, approach and methodology were developed and 
confirmed. 
Figure 5.1 – Research Process 
 
The next stage is data collection employing case study research design and conducting document 
analysis and semi-structured interviews. The selection of the case studies follows the need for 
understanding the process of how PPPs were adopted to address the problem of PAM. 
Meanwhile, the selection of participants is to obtain perspectives from government, private 






Last, all documents and interviews were analysed and reported. The participants’ views were 
categorised and analysed based on their thematic groups. Each case study was analysed 
individually and then compared to determine similarities and differences regarding patterns, 
ideas, and themes. 
 Research Design 
The research undertakes a multiple case study as its research design. A multiple case study 
enables an in-depth study of an individual unit of analysis, yet it can deliver an understanding of 
a greater group of a similar reality and even in a much more complex environment (Bryman 
2012; Gerring 2004). Those views suit the research objectives which seek an understanding of 
PPP adoption in the Indonesian PAM context. By gaining comprehension through the selected 
case studies, the research could generalise from the case studies to the whole phenomena. The 
generalisation, in this case, is not statistical yet theoretical (Yin 2014). 
The characteristics of a multiple case study benefit research in several circumstances (Bryman 
2012; Yin 2014). Firstly, the case study design fits research that has no control over the 
investigated phenomena. This research studies the PPP phenomena where the reality or the 
interpretation of the reality is constructed by the actors. Therefore, the research could not conduct 
any experimental designs to examine them. Next, a multiple case study could cater for a deeper 
explanation of phenomena. As can be seen in the previous section, the research questions starting 
with ‘how’ and ‘why’ require meaningful exploration, the case study design fits this research. 
Then, in a case study design, sets of various data are utilised. This benefit meets the 
circumstances of this research, where the documents and interviews are employed to gather the  
data. Finally, a multiple case study is considered more advantageous due to its potential for a 
broader analysis. This research employs four case studies which enable it to undertake 
comparison analysis.  
 Case selection 
The research seeks an understanding of personal and organisational perspectives of the PPP 
adoption in the Indonesian context to answer two research questions: how and why PPPs are 
adopted and what are the accountability challenges. Those personal and organisational 





case studies of the PPP practice. A set of selection criteria are employed to ensure that the selected 
cases could provide insight into all aspects of the studied phenomena.    
Purposive case selection is a widely accepted method in qualitative research (Bryman 2012; 
Patton 2002; Rapley 2014; Seawright & Gerring 2008). Unlike quantitative research which 
conducts proper randomisation in sample selection, qualitative research could not employ it due 
to insufficiencies of randomisation (Seawright & Gerring 2008). The rationale of the purposive 
techniques is robust as long as the techniques meet the objectives of case selection namely 
representativeness and beneficial variation on theoretical dimensions (Seawright & Gerring 
2008).  
Of seven techniques available (Seawright & Gerring 2008), the research utilised diverse and 
influential methods in selecting the case studies for the following considerations. The diverse 
method is believed to be more representative in depicting the underlying business of the PPP 
phenomena. A significant percentage of PPPs in Indonesian PAM operate in providing retail as 
well as office spaces. In addition, case variation is useful to conduct a comparative analysis that 
could lead to different findings. Likewise, the influential case is expected to deliver different 
facts due to its richness of information.  






Four cases are selected to serve the diverse and influential criteria namely CS-1, CS-2, CS-3 and 
CS-4. The first three cases serve the diverse criterion of case selection. CS-1 represents the 
utilisation of state-owned land by a private party in commercial activities providing office rent 
in a very strategic location of Central Jakarta. The next case showcases the reforms of the 
Indonesian military’s business by handing over the operations of their non-military assets to a 
civilian business entity. The last case depicts the utilisation of idle state assets for public 
infrastructure development which is an expansion of an international airport. To serve the latter 
criteria of an influential characteristic, one complex case (CS-3) is selected due to its highest 
property’s market value and its variation of assets and business sectors.  
Figure 5.2 shows the process of case and participant selection. In each case, three parties that are 
directly involved in PPPs, are interviewed for the sharing of views and experiences. They are 
from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) as the asset manager, other ministries as the asset users, and 
the private party as the asset developer. For greater perspectives, the research also gathered data 
from auditors and one Indonesian member of parliament (MP). All projects are located in Java 
island which is the most region of the country in terms of demography and economic 
development. Three projects are in the national capital, and one in the capital of the Central Java 
Province (Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3 – Locations of the Four Case Studies 
 
Participants are classified into two categories based their relationship with the case studies: non-
case related and case related. All participants from other ministries and the private parties have 
a direct relationship with the case. All participants from audit institutions and the parliament do 





related, and the rest are case-related. Due to their career paths or job rotations, some participants 
from the DGSAM have experience in the roles not only as policy implementers but also as policy 
makers. 
CS-1: An office building in Jakarta’s prime area  
Case study CS-1 is considered to be the most complicated in terms of the problem existing 
between the government and the private sector partner. The state asset user called ministry M1 
lacked office spaces to accommodate its growing workforce, but it failed to obtain funding to 
develop a new office tower next to the existing one. Located in the prime area of the national 
capital, ministry M1 did not find significant difficulties finding a company to develop its vacant 
land of around ten thousand square metres. Initiated in 1992, the project has met several 
obstacles, including the Indonesian economic crisis and policy changing. 
During 1997 and 1998, Indonesia experienced an economic and political crisis triggered by a 
monetary crisis. Soeharto’s regime which governed the country from 1966, fell in 1998. The 
USD-IDR exchange rate fluctuated significantly from only IDR2,500 for USD1 to around 
IDR20,000. Many companies including the partner of the project who owned liabilities 
denominated in USD could not afford to fulfil their obligations. These major events influenced 
the continuation of the project. The construction halted because the company faced severe 
financial difficulties. The partners have also been changed two times. 
To ease the financial distress, the government and its partner agreed to change the contract 
denomination from USD into IDR. In addition, the new partner was given more time for 
continuing the construction from 2004 until 2008. In the amended contract, the partner C1 gained 
more flexibility in terms of bank loan access and changing its financial structure by involving 
additional companies. Nevertheless, the construction was halted until 2011 and it was completed 
in 2013. 
The changing of related regulations added more complications to this case study. In 2006, the 
government issued a new government regulation, namely PP No. 6/2006, regarding state asset 
management. Under this new policy, stricter policies and procedures apply for partnerships 
between the government and private companies. Furthermore, they are applied to all contracts 
that have not been closed, including the CS-1 project. The CS-1 was still problematic as the 
project has not obtained definitive approval from the MoF. Under the new regulation, company 





and variable contributions to the state account. However, company C1 declines to comply with 
the requirements and asks the government to respect the 2008 contract. 
CS-2: A shopping centre partnership  
Due to the limitation of its military budget, in Soekarno’s era and even greater in Soeharto’s 32-
year time the military could conduct various business activities. Those activities were run directly 
by the military structures. As described in the previous chapter, the Ministry of Defence ranks 
number two in terms of its real property market value compared to all other government 
ministries/institutions. Almost all military business is based on the utilisation of its abundant 
surplus assets. 
A military institution had a large parcel of land in South Jakarta and there were still significant 
vacant areas. In the 1990s, South Jakarta did not have enough shopping centres to support its 
growing and vibrant population. On one hand, the government had a large area of vacant land, 
on the other hand, the private sector partner had resources to develop the land in order to meet 
the demand for a new shopping centre in the region. 
According to the contract, company C2 invested almost 80 billion rupiahs. It was a very large 
amount of money, especially when the rupiah still had a good exchange rate with the US dollar. 
That amount of money was used to construct a 42,904 M2 building, on an area of 15,000 M2. 
Currently, the shopping centre provides commercial areas for more than three hundred business 
entities that employ hundreds of job seekers and deliver services to thousands of people living in 
South Jakarta. 
An agreement was reached where the private sector (C2) not only built the shopping centre, but 
also constructed several buildings for the use of the institution (M2). Company c2 was given a 
30-year contract to utilise the building and then hand back both the land and the building to 
ministry M2. In addition, company C2 was also obliged to settle the legal aspect of the property 
ownership including the land certificate from the National Land Agency and the building permit 
from the local government. 
CS-3: The largest sporting complex in the country 
The sporting complex known as the Gelora Bung Karno (GBK) was inaugurated in 1962 when 
the Indonesian government in the Soekarno era hosted the fourth Asian Games. To provide the 





and constructed facilities for all sports contested. At that time, the foundation managed to take 
over almost three million square metres of land from the existing inhabitants. In addition to the 
sporting venues, the government also constructed several prestigious buildings to support the 
event as well as to show successful post-colonial nation building to the international community.  
In the beginning, the constructions were seen as white elephant projects, due to the circumstances 
of the Indonesian economic difficulties after decades of independence wars against the Dutch, 
and several armed rebellions. Hyperinflation, poverty, and ideological conflicts among political 
parties led to the end of Soekarno’ regime in 1967 replaced by Soeharto who was appointed by 
the people’s consultative assembly. Despite that, Soekarno’s ambitious projects were a blessing 
in disguise for Soeharto’s economy focusing policies. The areas of the GBK had an increasing 
role because of its strategic location in Jakarta’s growing economy. Therefore, in 1984 the 
government formed a special asset management unit to operate the complex. The legal status of 
this unit has changed many times in accordance with current government regulations and 
policies. It is now a designated public service agency known as the agency PSA3.  
The GBK has played a significant role in Indonesian national sports development. In 2018, the 
GBK with the Jakabaring Sports Centre in South Sumatra Province became the venues of the 
18th Asian Games. Besides that, for decades the main stadium of the GBK has seen many national 
political and cultural mass gatherings because it has the capacity to accommodate hundreds of 
thousands of people. For its historical contribution, the land and some buildings in the GBK have 
been named by a presidential decree as being of Indonesian national heritage since 2004 (2004).  





A. Government institutions 604 21.65% 
B. Managed by PSA3 and private sector:   
1. Under BOT schemes 839 30.08% 
2. Under joint operation schemes 70 2.51% 
3.  Under agreements with sport associations 91 3.27% 
4. Managed directly by PSA3 1,013 36.57% 
Source: GBK Supervisory Board (2016) 
The vast areas of the GBK, were developed further where some parts are operated by involving 
private sector and others are used solely for government activities including parliament buildings, 





local hospital. Table 5.1 presents the square metres and their percentages of lands occupied by 
those institutions as well as by the GBK authority. The total area of GBK is around 2.8 million 
square metres, 80% of it managed by the PSA3 either solely (37%) or involving other parties 
(36%). The table shows that most of the GBK areas especially under direct management of the 
agency PSA3 are designated for green regions where no or very limited buildings are allowed. 
Furthermore, the map of the GBK can be seen in Appendix J. 
Agency PSA3 was specially established to manage the GBK accounts to ministry M3. According 
to the regulation of public service agencies, ministry M3 has the authority to supervise the activity 
of the agency PSA3 (GoI 2005a). As a public service agency, the agency PSA3 has a vision: 
to manage the sporting complex based on the international standards while maintaining 
its national heritage status in a professional, transparent, and accountable way for the 
greatest benefit of the country and the society’ (GBK Supervisory Board 2016). 
As can be seen from its vision, agency PSA3’s businesses are not profit oriented especially for 
the GBK areas which are managed by the sport associations and directly the BLU itself. 
However, for the areas operated under BOT and joint operation schemes, profit and sustainability 
are the main consideration of the agency PSA3 in selecting appropriate partners from the private 
sector (P14).  
The nature of the GBK in Case Study 3 (CS-3) is different to other case studies. In the other case 
studies, the PPP consists of one contract between the related ministry and the private company. 
In CS-3, there is no direct involvement of the ministry in the contracts with the private sector, 
the BLU plays a role as the government vehicle in contracting and dealing with the partners 
(participant P32). The business model of the agency PSA3 in GBK is unique, no other ministry 
has a special vehicle to manage their real properties. Besides the agency PSA3, ministry M3 has 
another agency to manage another special complex in central Jakarta.  
In recent financial statements, around 40% of the agency PSA3 revenues come from PPP 
projects. Sixteen companies have PPP contracts with the agency PSA3, ten under BOT schemes, 
three under joint operation schemes, and three under land use rights. The agency PSA3 also gains 
revenues from sporting venues rents, land rents, advertising and parking. With total assets of 
almost 50 trillion rupiahs, its 200 billion net income is considered low. Nevertheless, not all 
assets are under the management of the agency PSA3 and most of them cannot be commercialised 





CS-4: A partnership that links PAM and infrastructure development 
A former military airport, the Ahmad Yani International airport (CS-4) was established in 1966. 
It has served civilian flights since its establishment. In 1995 due to the increase in economic 
activities in the region, a state-owned airport operator company was assigned to manage the 
airport. About fourteen years ago, the airport started providing services for international flights.  
The airport is located in Semarang, the capital city of Central Java Province which is inhabited 
by thirty-five million people. Its latest GDP and economic growth were 894 trillion rupiahs and 
5.27% respectively in 2017. The only public airport in the province, CS-4, before the 
development project could only accommodate fewer than one million passengers per year. The 
facility of the airport prior to the expansion had a less than 7,000 square metre terminal and 
29,000 square metre apron and taxiway. It could only serve six medium aircraft as large as a 
Boeing 737 and two ATRs. The airport expansion was essential to support the economic activities 
of the third most populous province in the country. 
The one trillion rupiah project managed to significantly increase the airport’s capacity. The 
terminal is six times larger so it can be used by four million people a year. The airport can also 
serve up to twelve wide body aircraft at a time. Even though there are two other international 
airports in close proximity to the CS-4 airport, the need for the expansion of the CS-4 airport was 
still high taking into account the huge population of the province and its economic activities.  
The project is a PPP of the central government, ministry M4 as the landowner and the company 
as the airport operator. All investment funds of 1.15 trillion rupiahs came from the company and 
the central government provided 89 hectares of land for the expansion. The market value of that 
land was around 220 billion rupiahs at the beginning of the project. The amount of each party’s 
contribution to the project determines the profit-sharing percentages. 
 The contractual agreement between the two parties includes the scheme of the partnership, the 
liabilities, and rights, as well as the contract period. The contract period is thirty years, and the 
company at the beginning of the period, constructed the airport expansion. There are two types 
of payment that need to be periodically transferred by the company. First, the fixed contribution, 
the contract obliges the company to pay around 1.3 billion rupiah annually regardless of the 
company’s financial conditions. The contribution increases by 4.14% per year to adjust to the 
property’s growth in value. In addition to that payment obligation, every year, the company is 





considers the company’s financial situation in terms of its operating and investing activities. At 
the end of the contract period, the buildings and all its facilities will be owned by the government.  
 Scope and unit of analysis 
The research explores the PPP in the public asset management context after the enactment of the 
2004 State Treasury Law. However, there is a comparison of conditions prior to and after the law 
being enforced to reveal the significant changes.  The PPP process is the unit of analysis of this 
research, in which the reasons for and stages of PPPs are examined to consider the accountability 
issues that might arise. The problems of PPPs in PAM could be identified during the initiation, 
set up, operation and termination. The problems, as well as their sources, are formulated based 
on the perceptions and experiences of government officers and private parties involved in PPPs 
both in policy making and in policy implementation. 
 Research method 
The research focuses on how and why PPPs are adopted in the Indonesian PAM context. For this 
reason, both primary and secondary data were collected from the parties involved in the 
phenomena. The primary data were obtained through semi-structured interviews with the 
government officers and their private counterparts, auditors, and a member of parliament. Prior 
to conducting the interviews, the research gathered data from official documents issued by the 
government, the private parties, and mainstream media. 
Document Analysis 
Analysing documentary materials is expected to deliver contextual data in the research field 
which can be developed more in arranging questions for the next steps of research (Bowen 2009). 
Document analysis offers benefits for the research process: it is efficient in the collecting process 
as it is already available in many institutions; it can be accessed at any time: and as written 
evidence, it has a non-reactive attribute (Bowen 2009; Creswell 2014).  
However, there are some disadvantageous characteristics of document analysis (Bowen 2009) 
that have to be taken into consideration. The documents collected could be vague and not 
sufficient enough to be deeply analysed. The presence of confidentiality becomes another issue 
in gathering relevant information. Then, the caution of government officers may prevent access 





selectivity  (Bowen 2009). Considering the confidential nature of the documents, the participants 
were given a guarantee that the documents were to be used for research purposes only and their 
confidentiality if required, was guaranteed.  
The documents to be analysed include but are not limited to government policies and regulations, 
project specific information such as the PPP proposals, correspondences, reports and publicly 
available materials from media coverage regarding the government policies and their 
implementation. The MoF is the main source of documents gathered in this research. The 
documents obtained are in the forms of regulations and policies at different levels including law, 
government law, ministerial laws; PPP proposals from other ministries; and PPP contractual 
agreements. Some documents are confidential, and not all documents are accessible. Yet, that 
obstacle is addressed by seeking important information through semi structured interviews with 
the participants. Several participants gave access to critical information by showing confidential 
information and allowing recording as well as note taking of that information. 
The MoF is an important resource in these phenomena because it is the focal point of PPPs in the 
Indonesian context. All stages of PPPs require approvals of the MoF or at least need to be 
reported to the MoF. In addition to that, the MoF holds the highest authority in the Indonesian 
PAM where all public-asset-related laws issued by the Indonesian central government, were 
discussed, and approved. As a result, the research conducted more interviews with MoF officers 
from different level positions and offices than from other institutions.  
Semi Structured Interviews 
The research conducted semi structured interviews to gather relevant information from the 
participants. Unlike the structured interview, the semi structured enables the researcher to explore 
the topic and the participants’ view within a predefined framework. This type of interview helps 
the researcher to target the topic while asking the participants directly, yet it is still insightful and 
has the flexibility to capture subjective meanings regarding personal views and experiences from 
the participants (Seidman 2013; Yin 2014).  
The research selected the participants purposefully. In qualitative research, statistical random 
sampling cannot be employed in selecting participants. The participants selection criteria, 
recruitment method, and practicalities are prerequisites for determining the participants (Galletta 
2012). The research employs formulated selection criteria that ensure that perspectives and 





phenomena. Next, in approaching the participants to be recruited, an invitation letter is sent to 
every potential participant establishing their willingness to participate. Once a participant has 
been interviewed, she or he is then asked to recommend other potential persons to be approached. 
Cost and time constraints limit the number of participants in the research, but the current number 
suffices all criteria.  
Figure 5.4 – The Participants 
 
Forty participants in this research come from five institutions or parties where more than a half 
of them are from the MoF-DGSAM. Furthermore, there are five high ranking officers from four 
ministries/ministerial-level institutions, seven from private sector and public service agencies 
(PSA), five auditors and one member of parliament. Figure 5.4 depicts the participants and their 
interaction in the Indonesian PAM context. The policy makers of the DGSAM issue policies 
guiding the DGSAM itself, asset users, private parties and auditors. Meanwhile, in operational 
activities for approval and monitoring, the policy implementers of the DGSAM collaborate with 
the asset users in all stages of PPPs, and to a much lesser extent, they also have a relationship 
with the private parties. 
Interview Questions 
The interview questions were constructed based on the need for the views and experiences of 
participants to fulfil the objective of the research. For this purpose, the questions could be placed 
into three sections: the introduction, the middle, and the concluding session (Galletta 2012). The 
research established a three-section interview protocol. In the first section, it creates a 
comfortable environment for the participants before it shifts to ask broader questions. Once broad 





detailed information or clarification of unclear statements. In this section, interesting answers 
were explored further, and once the participants got the encouraging nuance, they were asked to 
compare some facts or views regarding the phenomena. In the closing section, some 
contradictions were clarified with the participants. Their explanations could lead to important 
revelations. The interviews were closed by thanking the participants and asking their consent for 
possible clarification in the future. 
Figure 5.5 – Formulating Interview Questions 
 
Five different sets of questions are provided for five categories of participants accordingly (see 
Appendix E). Though the questions are different, the structures adapted from a general guidance 
(Bryman 2012), are similar. While formulating the interview questions, there was an ongoing 
revision process (see Figure 5.5). Once critical issues such as misleading questions have been 
found, the interview questions were revised.  
 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is one of the most crucial stages, or even the central one, in qualitative research. At 
this phase, the interpretation of data collected is materialised. ‘Qualitative data analysis is the 
classification and interpretation of linguistic (or visual) material to make statements about 
implicit and explicit dimensions and structures of meaning-making in the material and what is 
represented in it’ (Flick 2014, p. 5).  
Based on the aim, there are two main approaches to the analysis in a continuum of strategies 
(Flick 2014). First, the coding and classification approach is to simplify and reduce the amount 
of data from an enormous variety of different perspectives (Bryman 2012). In contrast, the second 





research follows the first approach, where the original text as well as verbatim transcriptions of 
the interview, were coded, classified, and analysed based on their thematic groups.  
Findings come from views and experience shared by participants. The similarities, differences, 
contradictions, and the uniqueness of ideas emerge from data analysis. The digital recordings are 
transcribed and processed using NVivo. The application helps the data analysis by; organising 
and keeping track of all digitalised data; providing fast access and answers to queries; presenting 
views and cases in the form of graphical images; and rendering the comprehensive reports of the 
established qualitative database (Bazeley & Jackson 2013).  
The research employs a mixed method design as both descriptive and thematic data analysis are 
used to extract information from the case studies. The use of qualitative and quantitative data 
analysis is considered as a mixed method (Bryman 2012; Creswell 2014), as is also the 
application of both qualitative approaches yet different methods can be assumed as a mixed 
method (Morse 2010). The objective of descriptive data analysis is to explain a phenomenon and 
its characteristics to obtain a deeper understanding of the participants’ experiences (Nassaji 
2015). 
Thematic analysis is employed because of the flexibility with which it can be applied across a 
range of theoretical and epistemological approaches. Thematic analysis is able to render 
complicated data in detail (Braun & Clarke 2006). The collected data set is identified, analysed 
and reported in the form of themes. The themes emerge, then are discussed through the lens of 
current literature on NPM, PAM, PPPs, and accountability. There are two types of data collected, 
namely documents and views of the participants. The latter are gathered from interviews with the 
participants. To sum up, thematic analysis provides guidance in coding vague statements and 
linking them to larger groups of themes systematically and as a result enables the research to 
exploit both inductive and deductive methods. 
The participants’ views regarding PAM and PPP adoption are deeply influenced by their lived 
experiences, the way they interact with PAM problems, their interest and the benefits they could 
derive from the PPP adoptions. Individuals could have different perceptions of the same issues 
even though they come from the same institutions. As individuals’ lived experiences shape the 
way they frame and react to issues. Hence, interpretive policy research is required to facilitate 
those framings and the reactions of its participants in order to withdraw, analyse, and discuss the 





A set of criteria is adopted to define which categories can be classified as themes (Bryman 2012). 
Firstly, the categories emerge from the data collected through the process of identification, 
classification, and validation. Next, there are relationships between those emerging categories 
with the research questions or at least with the focus. Thirdly, codes which are identified from 
the transcript or documents, construct those categories. Last, the categories lay the basis for a 
theoretical comprehension of the data that in the end, delivers a contribution to the knowledge in 
the research area. In technical terms, the research looks for eight characteristics from the data 
before they are classified as themes (Bryman 2012). Those characteristics include recurring 
topics, unfamiliar expressions, metaphors and analogies, topic transition, resemblances and 
variations among the data, causality relationships, missing information, and finally, last materials 
related to the theory.  
 Research Quality 
A social research design is obliged to meet the criteria of reliability, replicability, and validity 
(Bryman 2012). In qualitative research, replicability is assumed to be part of reliability due to the 
closeness of their attributes (Golafshani 2003). In another view, validity is considered as the only 
single criterion that is sufficient to describe qualitative research. This is because the validity is 
non-existent without reliability (Lincoln & Guba 1985). The reliability of the research design 
could be determined by testing it using the same procedure to see whether the research will 
deliver the same answer regardless of the researchers (Bryman 2012). Next, replicability in 
qualitative research is not as important as  in quantitative research (Bryman 2012). Finally, 
instead of the validity concept, terminologies namely quality, rigour, and trustworthiness are 
better to describe validity (Golafshani 2003). This research adopts the view that validity is the 
prime quality of qualitative research. 
There are several data validation methods, two of them are utilisation of multiple sources of 
evidence and minimisation of bias (Kapoor 2004; Yin 2014). Triangulation is the rationale 
behind using multiple sources. From four types of triangulation: data, investigator, theoretical, 
and methodological (Patton 2002), the research applies the first type of triangulation. The 
research gathered data from multiple sources including document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews, which enables it to conduct triangulation. The data from the interviews triangulate 
the results of the document analysis. In addition to that, there are five different parties of 





response from one participant could be used to reveal any inconsistencies from other participants 
either from the same or a different institution. 
Unlike data inconsistencies that come from the participants, the data bias could arise both from 
the researcher or the participants (Kapoor 2004). To minimise the bias triggered by the 
researcher’s subjectivity, the researcher adheres to some interviewing warnings (Fontana & Frey 
2000) by not giving any suggestions, agreement or disagreement, or interpretation to both the 
interview questions or interviewee’s responses. Furthermore, the researcher is aware of the 
likelihood that the participants self-justify while they share experiences and views about 
difficulties in this PPP phenomena. A strategy that requires a researcher to not provide any 
comparative information regarding questions to participants (Ang & Straub 1998), is adopted. 
For example, while interviewing a participant from a ministry about the challenges they faced 
and actions they undertook, the researcher did not provide them with information about similar 












The Challenges of Indonesian PAM 
 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of three chapters that discuss the findings of the thesis. In this chapter, 
the experience of Indonesian PAM from the perspectives of all actors is explored, analysed and 
summarised. Those perspectives indicate an understanding of the development and key 
challenges of Indonesian PAM which is built on the experiences of the participants from the 
MoF, the ministries/institutions, auditors both from government internal institutions and from the 
BPK, and a member of parliament (MP) from the House of Representatives. The chapter 
investigates and analyses the views of participants as well as the regulations and policies issued.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the foundation required in understanding the background 
to and reasons for the adoption of PPPs in the Indonesian PAM context. Specifically, this chapter 
aims to answer the first research sub questions of ‘What are the development and challenges of 
the Indonesian PAM?’ In answering the question, the chapter lays out the development of 
Indonesian PAM and analyses current practices as well as the key challenges. The participants 
share their different perspectives regarding the Indonesian PAM development. Accordingly, they 
also have different concerns about the challenges of the current PAM practices. In addition, the 
problems of human resources, institutional authorities and the relationship between the 
government and the parliament have complicated the situation for many years.  
The chapter focuses on the key challenges of the Indonesian PAM. The concluding discussion 
addresses the progress in addressing these challenges. This chapter also provides a basis for 
understanding the PPP analysis and discussion in the following two chapters.  
 Key Challenges in Current Indonesian PAM 
As described in Chapter 2, the Indonesian PAM reform has started since 2004. Then under a 
presidential decree (President of Indonesia 2007), a state arrangement program was kicked off, 
which was viewed by many PAM stakeholders as the second milestone in the Indonesian PAM 
reform. The state arrangement program was conducted in three stages:  state asset registration, 
valuation, and then legal certification for state lands. The program was massive due to the 





institutions were deeply influenced in many ways as to how they see what a PAM should be. The 
results of semi-structured interviews confirm that a variety of perspectives are expressed by the 
participants. Those perspectives come from their backgrounds and long-term experiences in 
managing public assets in their institutions. 
This section presents an overall view of emerging themes coming out of the participants semi-
structured interviews. Table 6.1 presents six emerging themes from the responses of the 
participants in regard to the questions about the nature and development of the PAM in Indonesia. 
Forty participants of five different roles in the Indonesian PAM (Appendix E) explained their 
experiences in semi structured interviews where twenty-five issues in the form of questions 
(Appendix F) were probed. Assisted by the NVivo software (Bazeley & Jackson 2013), the 
information of those interviews was then analysed both descriptively and thematically to gain 
understanding and discover relationships between them. As a result, there are six themes that 
emerge from the perspectives of the participants. 










1. Asset Registry - ✓ ✓ - - 
2. Asset Security ✓ ✓ ✓ - - 
3. Asset Utilisation ✓ - ✓ - - 
4. PAM regulations and policies ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 
5. Asset performance measurement ✓ - - - - 
6. Asset management skills ✓ - - - - 
  
The six emerging themes concern the asset registry, asset security, asset utilisation, regulation 
and policy, asset performance and asset management skills or human resources. Asset manager 
participants mention all those themes as current challenges for Indonesian PAM except the asset 
registry. This group of participants are the DGSAM officers. Meanwhile the asset user 
participants raise their concerns regarding the asset registry and asset security. Unlike the asset 
managers, the auditor participants, they do not pay as much attention to the issues of policies, 
regulations, and asset performance. Then as outsiders from the perspective of government 
officers, the private actors focus on issues that affect the way they run business with the 
government which includes PAM regulations and policies. Likewise, but for a different reason, 
the MP also spotlights how the MoF regulates asset management affairs. This is because of his 





Officers from the MoF/DGSAM who represent more than half of the participants pay 
considerable attention to almost all themes revealed by the interviews. The issue of idle and 
underutilised assets is most frequently mentioned by this group as almost 80% of participants 
raised it. This is due to the current policy of the MoF who states that the DGSAM is becoming 
one of the revenue centres to support the national government budget (mentioned by five 
participants}. The view of these participants is confirmed as the MoD states  ‘One of the missions 
of the DGSAM is to effectively manage state assets for state revenue optimisation and spending 
efficiency’ (MoF 2014b). Meanwhile, their attention to the issue of asset security is seen as their 
duty as assigned by the presidential decree in the state asset arrangement program (President of 
Indonesia 2007). The decree states that the program includes safeguarding state assets and state 
land certification. The next issue raised is dealing with regulations and policies. Six participants 
believe that the current policy regarding the division of authority between the state asset manager 
and the state asset users is not appropriate. The issue least mentioned by this group concerns asset 
reporting and staff’s skills, respectively.  
The asset registry and asset security are the main concerns of the asset users of other ministries. 
Three participants from three different ministries explained how difficult it was to obtain the 
unqualified opinion from the BPK auditors regarding the fixed asset section of their institutions’ 
financial statement. Their concerns about the asset registry and asset security are confirmed by a 
participant from the BPK. The auditor of the Supreme Audit Board also expresses his concern 
regarding asset security and the asset registry. Those two themes are two of five assertions in 
conducting a general audit on a financial statement. Besides those two issues, auditors from 
internal government bodies pay more attention to idle assets, especially with regard to the 
utilisation aspect. While auditors of the BPK conduct an annual general audit, the internal 
auditors perform different types of audit depending on their thematic audit focus.  
As mentioned, for the private sector, their ultimate and only concern is the assurance of their 
business with the government. Unsurprisingly, they monitor a particular policy regarding asset 
utilisation and investigate what kind of impacts it will have on the partnership between them and 
the government.  
A wider view is expressed by the MP. Assets could be used as a basis for the government to 
collect more funds from the public. The issuance of government Sukuk or Islamic bonds worth 
billions of rupiahs is one of the benefits which arises from state asset utilisation. In Islamic bond 





securities. The MP also expresses the importance of the DGSAM’s authority and the relationship 
between the government and the parliament. The tie is important in the decision-making process 
especially in discussing bills of PAM. The following sections of this chapter will analyse the 
seven themes and how they have been discussed by the literature.  
 Unregistered Assets and Uncertified Land 
In the early phase of the interviews, several participants argued that there were still problems 
with the asset registry and security. One of the participants mentioned that asset registration and 
security are the main problems of the Indonesian PAM. Considering her background as a high-
ranking officer in a ministry with offices available in every district in Indonesia, the answer is 
justified. She explains: 
Actually, in ministry M4, the main problem is closely related to asset security. As the 
nature of our assets, they are spread across the nation and some in remote areas. Many 
were not recorded, and some are illegally occupied or taken over by other parties (P27). 
Prior to the state asset arrangement program, thousands of fixed assets were not properly recorded 
or were even unrecorded in the government accounting system as published by a national 
newspaper agency (Lingga 2018; Rachmawati 2014). An asset registry is the initial stage when 
the attributes of an asset are entered into an accounting system. In many ministries, especially 
the ones with offices nationwide, there were a large number of unregistered assets. This problem 
was one of the main obstacles preventing their financial statements getting clear opinions from 
the auditor. 
In conducting a general audit on the government financial statement, participant P35 of the BPK 
explains that there are five audit assertions regarding the appropriateness of material elements of 
the financial statement: existence or occurrence, completeness, rights and obligation, valuation 
or allocation, and the last, presentation and disclosure. The understanding of those five audit 
assertions has already been discussed in Chapter 3, Literature Review. The failure to register all 
fixed assets by the government has failed the assertion of completeness and in the end, if the 
amount is material, it will influence the type of audit opinion on the financial statement. 
Based on document analysis, the problems of fixed assets found by the BPK in the 2017 central 
government financial statement persist including an incorrect asset registry, the unknown 
existence of assets, no legal asset ownership, illegally occupied assets, halted construction in 





the weaknesses of the Indonesian PAM regarding asset security: legal ownership and illegal 
occupation of government properties. 






1. Incorrect asset registration 240 26 
2. Unknown asset existence 1,636 33 
3. Unsupported by legal 
ownership 
1,366 20 
4. Illegal occupation or utilisation 
by other parties 
6,485 20 
5. Halted construction in progress 444 8 
6. Undisposed damaged assets 103 21 
7. Undefined usage status  17,555 2 
8. Unutilised asset 41 6 
9. Miscellaneous problems 3,064 47 
Source: BPK (2018) 
In the Ministry of Defence, for instance, the BPK’s view on that ministry’s financial statement 
shows that in the last five years, only in 2013, did their financial statement obtain an unqualified 
opinion (BPK 2018). The result of asset revaluation in this ministry increased its fixed asset value 
by more than 300 trillion rupiahs in 2017. It is one of the top three ranking ministries regarding 
asset value increases. According to a participant of MoF (P08), the state asset arrangement 
program has discovered thousands of unregistered assets mostly in large ministries. In total there 
is an increase of almost two quadrillion rupiahs of asset value as the result of a state asset 
arrangement program. Table 6.3 shows the top five ministries that have the largest land values 
based on the central government financial statement year 2017. 
Table 6.3 – Five Ministries with Highest Real Property Values in 2017 
No. Ministries 
  (IDR trillion) 
Land Buildings Revaluation Total 
1. Ministry of Defence 297    43 316 656 
2. Ministry of Public Works 292    18 419 729 
3. Ministry of State Secretariat   87      2 284 373 
4. Ministry of Transportation   76    20 95 191 
5. Ministry of Research and 
Higher Education 
  59    23 190 272 





The MP agrees with the statement that the Indonesian PAM has a problem dealing with asset 
security. He is concerned about the legal aspect of state asset ownership especially the assets that 
were acquired as the result of the Indonesian monetary crisis in 1998. At that time, a large number 
of assets from the banking industry were confiscated by the government. However, the 
government has still not been able to establish strong legal ownership of those assets, and this 
resembles a time bomb that could blow up in the future with possible legal disputes with other 
parties. In 2004, after being dissolved, the government received assets worth IDR172 trillion 
(AUD17.2 billion), yet until 2017 the government has only recovered IDR7.7 trillion (AUD.77 
billion) from selling those assets (Kurniawan 2017; Laucereno 2017). 
Unlike the state asset users, the participants of the state asset managers or those from the DGSAM 
have not paid much attention to the state asset registry. None of them mentions the registry 
problem in answering the question of the current challenges of the Indonesian PAM. However, 
some of them mention the public asset administration which is a much larger concept than the 
asset registry. The definition of the administration concept stated by participants of the DGSAM 
refers to the government regulation which is a series of activities including bookkeeping, 
inventory (physical checking), and reporting. In fact, participant P16 clearly stated that the asset 
registry problem had been overcome. The current problems are mostly dealing with asset 
productivity, he continues. 
Despite their disregard for the asset registry problem, eight DGSAM participants recognise the 
problem of asset security. In this case, they share this view with the participants from other 
ministries. Furthermore, one participant (P17) from the DGSAM regional office, gives a deeper 
understanding of asset security. He says, ‘There are three aspects to asset security: administrative, 
physical, and legal’. Administrative security means the existence of an asset is properly recorded 
in the accounting system. Next, physical security means the asset is safeguarded from illegal 
occupation as well as obsolescence. And legal security represents the existence of the legal 
ownership of the assets. These three types of asset security are already mentioned in the central 
government regulation (GoI 2014). 
 Idle and Underutilised Assets 
As mentioned above, most participants from the DGSAM prioritise state asset utilisation in the 
Indonesian PAM. The understanding of those participants departs from their experiences 





Two participants (P05 and P16) explicitly say that the problem of the asset registry is not 
significant anymore. Participant P16 says: 
Asset management cycle starts from the asset registry, use and ends in the asset disposal. 
The ultimate problem [of asset management] is how [efficient] we use the asset, how to 
evaluate whether an asset is productive or not, efficient or not. That is the point. Mostly 
on idle assets. 
Participant P05 adds: 
Are the assets provided [for those the institutions] adequate, oversupplied or even 
undersupplied? The cause of this problem because the DGSAM has not established a 
system to measure whether a ministry/institution has enough assets or not, [DGSAM] 
has not a tool to identify whether the asset… is productive or not. Now, the [the need 
for] the measurement of asset performance becomes urgent. 
Table 6.4. shows that in 2017, the BPK found only 41 billion rupiahs of unutilised assets. This 
amount is insignificant compared to the quadrillions of total fixed assets stated in the central 
government financial statement. Of those five items of unutilised assets, only one is a real 
property asset, another one is a unit of government’s officer housing. This finding is just the tip 
of an iceberg because it only presents the assets that are totally unused. The definition of idle 
assets used by the BPK is different from that used by the MoF. Based on MoF regulation, an 
asset can be categorised as idle when it meets one of the criteria: unused, or used but not in line 
with the duties and function of the ministry/institution which controls it (MoF 2016b).  





 1. Ministry of Transportation 16,339 Machinery and equipment 
 2. Ministry of Health 22,626 Machinery and equipment 
 3. Agency for the Assessment and 
Application of Technology 
NA An aircraft engine in 
Denmark 
 4. Agency for Geospatial Information 1.029 A government house 
 5. State Intelligence Agency 1,400 A computer software 
 
Source: BPK (2018) 
Besides the problem of the absence of asset performance measurement, the DGSAM currently is 
still striving to establish a reliable information system. Comprehensive data about the amount of 
funding the government receives from asset utilisation could not yet be found within the 
institution. The participant P06 explains that the supervision and control activities of the DGSAM 
on the asset utilisation operation in other ministries are weak. Once the asset utilisation proposal 





the revenue from the asset utilisation, the participant needs to collect information from the 
Directorate-General of Treasury. 
 In 2017, the government received a half trillion rupiahs from asset utilisation. The amount almost 
doubled the 2013 figure (Table 6.5). Indonesia used to rely on revenues from the oil and gas 
sector. Early in Soeharto’s era when the world experienced an oil boom, more than half of the 
state’s revenue came from this sector (Putrohari 2013). Then until recently, tax revenue has been 
the major source in government budgets. In the 2018 budget, tax revenue contributed 85% of the 
total central government budget (GoI 2018a). In spite of that, the MoF has encouraged its echelon 
I units to stimulate other ministries to quarry other types of revenues from their own domain and 
asset utilisation is seen to be the only source that almost every ministry can exploit (P02). 
Table 6.5 – Government Non-Tax Revenues Year 2013 – 2017 
No. Non Tax Revenues 
   (IDR billion) 
2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 
1. Natural Resources  111,791   64,902   100,972   240,848   226,406  
2. Long term investment  43,904   37,133   37,644   40,314   34,026  
3. From public service agencies  47,655   42,320   35,315   29,681   24,648  
4. Others:  108,144   117,995   81,697   87,747   69,672  
 a. Property management  703   485   468   430   481  
 1) Asset disposal  199   141   97   136   189  
 2) Asset utilisation  503   343   370   293   291  
 b. Miscellaneous  107,441   117,511   81,230   87,317   69,191  
 Total  311,494   262,350   255,628   398,591   354,752  
Source: Directorate-General of Treasury (2018) 
Meanwhile, Table 6.6 presents the top three contributors to state utilisation revenues namely the 
Ministry of Defence, the National Police, and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing which 
collected 91, 41, and 32 billion rupiahs, respectively. However, the contribution is insignificant 
if it is compared with the value of their real property assets.  
Table 6.6 – Assets Utilisation Revenues 2016-2017 
(IDR billion) 
No. Ministries/Institutions 2016 Ministries/Institutions 2017 
1. Ministry of Defence 91.07 Ministry of Defence 121.51 
2. National Police 41.45 National Police 50.24 
3. Ministry of Forestry & 
Environment 







No. Ministries/Institutions 2016 Ministries/Institutions 2017 
4. Ministry of Public Works & 
Housing 
24.24 Ministry of Finance 38.77 
5. Ministry of Finance 20.54 Ministry of Transportation 34.84 
6. Others 134.34 Others 218.44 
 Total 343.44 Total 503.19 
Source: Directorate-General of Treasury (2018) 
To address the problem of the idle asset, the MoF has issued a ministerial regulation (MoF 2016b) 
that defines the criteria of idle assets and gives authority to the MoF to issue a statement that an 
asset is classified as idle and take control over it from other ministries. To support its authority, 
the MoF is enabled to deliver sanctions to other ministries/institutions who fail to render their 
idle assets to the MoF. Despite the power of the MoF to take over the idle assets and to punish 
the breaching ministries/institutions, this regulation is still ineffective in increasing the asset 
efficiency by reducing the number of idle assets. 
The MoF policy regarding idle assets has several fundamental weaknesses according to the views 
of some participants (P22, P39). Firstly, the definition of an idle asset only targets unused assets 
and assets that are used but not in line with the duties and functions of the ministries/institutions. 
It means that only assets that are totally unutilised are included but it excludes the under-utilised 
assets which are partially used (P39). Moreover, to target the assets used outside their duties and 
functions is also not easy, if not impossible (P22). The latest report on idle state assets taken over 
by the  MoF/DGSAM shows less than ten parcels of real properties worth around 50 billion 
rupiahs (DGSAM 2017). 
One comprehensive illustration based on real life experience was given by participant P22. This 
is to explain how a set of the current policies addresses idle assets problems. A taskforce of the 
DGSAM conducts a supervision and control activity on Ministry A. A parcel of land owned by 
the state is found by a task force from the MoF. If the parcel has been vacant for years, it could 
be an indication that the parcel is an idle asset. By law, the MoF through some procedures could 
take over that parcel from Ministry A. However, this action could be challenged by the Ministry, 
simply by stating that there is a plan to utilise that parcel in the coming years. In another scenario, 
an identified party utilises that piece of land and the utilisation is not in line with the duties and 
function of a ministry. By law, in this circumstance, the land can be defined as an idle asset. 
Rather than follow the ministerial decree No. 71, the ministry could choose another way around 





continue using that asset even though the business activities have nothing to do with the duties 
and function of the ministry. 
The problem of idle assets uncovers other challenges of the Indonesian PAM namely the absence 
of asset performance measurement and the weakness in the regulation for defining the roles of 
the asset manager and the asset user.  
 Regulations and Policies  
While many participants express concerns on practical problems in Indonesian PAM, some vow 
there are more fundamental issues on how the government regulates public asset affairs. As 
explained in Chapter 2, PPPs and PAM Practices, the policy framework in the Indonesian PAM 
consists of four levels of regulations. From the highest to the lowest, the four levels of PAM 
policies in Indonesia are the laws which are enacted by the government with the approval of the 
parliament, central government regulations, ministerial regulations, (in this case, the MoF) and 
technical regulations issued by the DGSAM. All the regulations become guidance for the PAM 
in regard to the asset life cycle starting from planning and ending with the assets disposal. In 
addition to that, the government accounting standards also shape the Indonesian PAM. 
There are four issues regarding PAM policies in Indonesia as presented in Table 6.7 namely 
inflexible business processes, ineffective sanctions, inappropriate authority delegation, and the 
burden of the past. Those issues are parts of the theme of PAM regulations and policies which 
have been raised by participants from the asset managers, private sector and the member of 
parliament (see Table 6.1). In the first place, the flexibility problem is expressed the most by 
many participants from the DGSAM. The policies could not address certain problems because of 
the rigidity in regulating some aspects of PAM.  
The following issues, as the state asset manager, MoF/DGSAM is equipped with an ability to 
render sanctions to other ministries/institutions whenever they fail to fulfil their obligations. 
However, some participants confirm that the sanctions are not imposable without creating 
negative consequences for other processes of asset management. After that, the role of the MoF 
as the asset manager has a significant authority from policy making, to the operational level 
which is providing (dis)approval on technical public asset transactions. Participants have 
different perspectives on how the DGSAM as the proxy of the MoF, exercises its authority. 
Finally, the current complications of asset utilisation are mostly inherited from previous 





been discussed by high level officials. This is to make a clear cut between past regime mistakes 
and the current challenges of Indonesian PAM. 
Table 6.7 – The Problems of the Current PAM Policies 
No. Problems Participants 
1. Inflexibility a. Alteration of asset use P08, P11, P15, P18 
  b. Payment scheme in asset utilisation 
  c. Requirements for asset utilisation 
2. Ineffective sanctions  P17, P22 
3. Inappropriate authority delegation among the actors P06, P07, P40 
4. The burden of the past P01, P10, P21 
Inflexibility 
Participant P18, with decades of experience in PAM and holding the highest position in an asset 
management unit, says: 
As the director … I can innovate new ways or issue much more flexible policies because 
of my institution as an independent unit. It has flexibility in managing its assets 
[portfolio]. Meanwhile, the DGSAM has different circumstances. There is a large 
opportunity in asset optimisation. However, the current regulation is very rigid and 
frequently inapplicable. It is simple to determine the applicability of a regulation. Just 
test it [with the current situation] and see whether it works. Even if we say that this is 
already very flexible [a claim by other DGSAM officers], the market still cannot absorb. 
In the first place, she explains that the current set of policies is considered to be successful in 
addressing the problems with regard to administration such as recording and valuation. At the 
same time, the policies do not encourage the optimisation of the assets especially the real property 
ones. The current system has not yet accommodated the changes in the function of government 
owned properties based on their highest and best use. The payment system in one of the asset 
utilisation schemes is very rigid in that the private sector are required to pay up front for the five-
year-long rental agreement. Those are two examples provided by the participant.  
Several participants from the headquarters and the regional office of the DGSAM also echo the 
problem of flexibility in PAM regulations. The requirements for the utilisation of several assets 
are set too high which makes them difficult for the ministries/institutions to fulfil (P08, P11, 
P15). This condition exists when the ministries/institutions want to utilise their assets under the 
scheme of utilisation cooperation. The participant also mentioned paradoxical regulations in the 
preparation of asset utilisation involving private sector (P15). The ministries/institutions are 





complex types of projects, this requirement cannot be conducted by the ministries/institutions 
due to lack of human resources with the relevant analytical skills. Without the assistance of the 
potential private company partners, the ministries/institutions cannot afford to provide such a 
complex proposal which is time and money consuming to prepare. Meanwhile, by law, the 
involvement of potential private partners only arises when prospective projects obtain approval 
from the MoF and are ready for a tender process. 
Ineffective sanctions 
Regarding the sanctions imposable on other ministries/institutions who fail to meet their 
obligations, two participants from the regional office state that the authority held by the DGSAM 
is not effective enough to force other ministries to fulfil their obligations (P17 and P22). Even if 
the sanction is imposed on a ministry/institution, it could backfire on the DGSAM by disturbing 
other processes of asset management (P17). Based on article 22 and 23, Government Regulation 
No. 27/2014, the state asset users must submit their idle assets to the MoF, otherwise the MoF 
could impose one of these two alternative sanctions: freezing the maintenance cost for the related 
assets and/or holding the process of utilisation, transfer, and disposal of the asset proposed from 
the ministries/institutions.  
The participant explains further that his office never proposes that the headquarters impose those 
kinds of sanctions. Recently, he formed and assigned several taskforces to investigate illegal state 
asset utilisation in his area of jurisdiction. The taskforces found some infringements. Instead of 
invoking the sanctions, the participant chose more persuasive approaches. As stated by the 
regulation, the first alternative for sanctions freezing their maintenance budget is not significant 
because they could maintain the asset from income generated by the properties. The second 
alternative is even worse because it could affect the performance of his office. The approach he 
took was requesting the breaching units to propose the asset utilisation and processing the 
proposal accordingly. Further he says, ‘We are better to be forward looking and take persuasive 
actions in the first place. This is to avoid complexities and a bad relationship between us and the 
state users’. 
Inappropriate authority delegation between the actors  
The next concern in the PAM policies is the authority of the main actors. As explained Chapter 
2, the MoF has the authority of the asset manager and other ministries/institutions of the asset 





at every step of the asset life cycle including planning, procurement, using, valuation, transfer, 
and disposal. Meanwhile, the other ministries implement the rules of the game set by the MoF. 
Some participants from the DGSAM criticise some aspects of these role divisions (P06 and P07). 
Participant P07 argues,  
For non-real property assets, the role of the state users should be enlarged. On the other 
hand, for real property assets especially the utilisation of idle or underutilised real 
property, their roles should be minimised. The human resources of the state users have 
limited asset management skills especially in the field of real property management. 
One interesting fact in regard to how appropriately the DGSAM exercises its authority in real 
property asset utilisation, is there are two contrasting views. The first one has been mentioned 
above, those two participants asked the DGSAM to take more active approaches and become 
more deeply involved in the whole process of asset utilisation. This argument comes from middle 
and lower-level management of the MoF. However, one participant (P01) holds the contra 
position. She thinks that the role of the MoF or the DGSAM in the future should be limited to 
the regulator, not the executor. The state asset users must be given more room and flexibility in 
managing the assets under their custody.  
The authority of the asset manager should not be an issue, is a statement from the participant of 
the House of Representatives (P40). He states that the laws regarding the state treasury and state 
finance have given the MoF a powerful authority to regulate the PAM. If there are obstacles the 
MoF have in addressing problems, the MoF can revise their own policies to adjust to the current 
circumstances. 
The burden of the past 
Realising the complex nature of the Indonesian PAM problems, one participant from the 
DGSAM headquarters proposes the idea of a public asset amnesty (P01). This idea is inspired by 
the tax amnesty program which was launched by the government in mid-2017. She further says: 
Asset amnesty in general terms is defined as the government recognised all previous 
property contracts between government institutions and private sector partners even 
though the contracts had no approvals from the MoF. However, once the contractual 
periods end, the contracts cannot be extended, and the assets will be taken over by the 
government (P01). 
Most current contractual problems of asset utilisation are inherited from the previous regime. In 





Her view on this issue is based on the reality of the large numbers of illegal state asset utilisation 
cases inherited from the era of Soeharto’s regime. Those utilisations were conducted without 
approval from the Mof. As a result, the process and the contracts do not meet the criteria of the 
current policy. She mentions that the government has issued two ministerial regulations to 
address the problems in national military and police institutions. However, the progress of these 
policies has satisfied neither the MoF nor its counterparts. Only a handful of cases could follow 
through the special treatment program. Almost all of them could not proceed because they could 
not meet the requirements of the regulations. As long as the cases are not resolved, every year 
the BPK gives notes on the central government financial statements regarding this problem.  
The idea of an asset amnesty is supported by participants coming from the lower managerial level 
(P10 and P21). In several ongoing BOT projects which have not been approved by the MoF, the 
private sector has already paid money and invested in the projects in the form of buildings or 
facilities. In conducting business valuations of several BOT proposals, the valuation teams 
several times found difficulties in separating the investment already made by the private sector 
from the assets owned by the government (P21). The legal complications of the past contracts 
also make decision making more difficult as the assets are physically occupied by the private 
sector. Once the government recognises and respects the ‘illegal’ contracts, the operation can be 
continued until the terminal period which is mostly short as the contracts were signed decades 
ago. 
 Lack of Asset Performance Measurement 
Awareness about asset performance has been rising across management levels in the DGSAM. 
They have realised that even as public goods, the assets must be utilised at their optimal level. 
This can be seen from participants’ answers on what the challenges of the Indonesian PAM are. 
The idle or underutilised assets issue is mentioned by almost a third of the participants from this 
institution.  However, when asked to further drill down their ideas about performing and not 
performing assets, their answers are relatively normative. Effectiveness and efficiency are the 
preconditions for the asset to be labelled performing (P09, P19, and P05). 
Notwithstanding, an interesting perspective is articulated by one participant regarding 
performance measurement in PAM. He says: 
The current framework … has classified assets into two categories which are under the 
custody of the asset manager or the asset user. The asset manager by law is able to take 





defined as completely unused. For asset that is being used, the government cannot 
measure how it performs because currently we still do not have a measurement system. 
Nevertheless, our institution has published a presidential level regulation which tries to 
standardise the government office size and facilities based on the staff ranks and 
number. Therefore, the term efficiency in office area now can be quantified (P05). 
The presidential regulation which is referred to by the participant above is 2003 Presidential 
Decree regarding the construction of government office buildings. The decree provides standard 
office areas for different levels of government offices. However, this regulation has not answered 
the questions about performance indicators of an asset as further said by participant P05.  
Asset performance is different to asset management performance. Asset performance refers to a 
valuation of how an individual asset performs in fulfilling the needs of the organisation. 
Meanwhile asset management performance talks about the achievement of the asset management 
as a whole (P05). The current framework of the Indonesian PAM has not provided any concepts 
of asset performance. In government regulation No. 27/2014, the word ‘kinerja’ (the Indonesian 
word for performance) is mentioned only once and the regulation does not mention anything 
about its definition and its criteria. It just says that the determination of performance indicators 
is conducted by the state asset users.  
 Lack of skilled staff in the state asset users 
In managing public assets, the skills of property management and valuation are essential for staff 
both in the custodian ministries and even more importantly in the asset managing body (P08). 
According to P08, a DGSAM employees have acquired those skills sufficiently from continuing 
professional development and field assignments. However, this participant doubts that the asset 
user institutions have adequate human resources to manage their properties properly. This is 
plausible as every ministry has its own main function and certainly property management is not 
their top priority. Furthermore, the participant says: 
The current policy has put too much pressure for the state asset users. For example, in 
a BOT arrangement, the unit is required to prepare a feasibility study taking into account 
a 30-year projected cashflow. You can imagine, if that unit is a national police office. 
How much efforts and resources they have to allocate for something that is not their 
main function. Therefore, I strongly recommend our organisation to take over the jobs 
from A to Z [the entire process], in complex asset management projects (P08). 
The original claim of this participant about skilful DGSAM staff is valid and can be verified in 
two ways. First, property management is the ultimate function of this organisation therefore in 





educational background said a director of the DGSAM who once led a personnel division (P13). 
This institution also has both internal and external continuing professional development for its 
staff. The institution has a significant amount of budget committed for human resources 
development by sending them to further formal studies in domestic universities or even abroad. 
It is also supported by MoF’s Education and Training Agency (MoF 2012b). 
 Auditors’ perspectives 
Meanwhile, from the perspective of government internal auditors, there are three general 
problems in PAM in most ministries. First, participant P37 finds that some officers in PAM are 
lacking prudence in conducting their actions. He gives one example when one state asset was 
sold, but the selling price determination did not follow the regulation. In addition, some 
fraudulent activities have been discovered by special audit activities of significant state asset 
transactions. Those frauds occurred during the auction of ex-Indonesian Banking Restructuring 
Agency (IBRA) assets. IBRA was founded after the 1998 Indonesian monetary crisis. One of its 
jobs is to take over the collateral assets of non-performing loans from several Indonesian banks. 
Years later the property assets were handed over to the DGSAM for either sale through auction 
or use by government agencies.  
The critical points in the PAM process based on an auditor’s perspective are in the procurement 
process including the tender process when selecting the private companies of an asset utilisation 
partnership, and in asset disposal including the valuation and auction process. Last, the internal 
control in PAM is still considered not strong enough to safeguard state assets, to ensure the 
reliability of the asset reports, and to promote efficiency and effectiveness. 
A auditor participant sheds light on the purpose of state asset valuation and the completeness 
aspect of assets presented in the financial statement (P36). He greatly appreciates the state 
arrangement program conducted by the government. The direct outcome of that program is the 
improvement in the central government financial statement especially in the fixed asset 
presentation.  
From 2004 until 2008, the BPK disclaimed giving an opinion on the central government financial 
statement due to the problem of lack of internal control and other material accounting problems 
(Kompas 2009). The state arrangement program was launched in 2006 and the result of that 
program has been in the national asset database since 2008. That program enhanced the quality 





the first time, the BPK delivered a qualified opinion. The state asset arrangement program was 
claimed to be one of the major factors in the increased quality of the central government financial 
statement (Budianto 2014).  
 The Progress of Indonesian PAM under the DGSAM 
The DGSAM was established in 2006 as part of an internal reorganisation of the MoF (President 
of Indonesia 2006). The objectives of that new echelon I were to address fundamental problems 
in the Indonesian PAM and PP No. 6 Year 2006 was this newly established unit (GoI 2006a). 
Three years after its establishment, the DGSAM launched its ambitious program to arrange the 
state assets across the nation (President of Indonesia 2007). Despite many weaknesses during the 
implementation, the program was enormously successful in establishing the first value-based 
government asset database (P04, P38). This database is priceless for any future decision making, 
and policy formulation (P38). 
The further stage of the state asset arrangement is a land certification program which has been 
conducted since 2009. This is a joint program between the MoF-DGSAM with the National Land 
Agency (BPN) that targets all tens of thousands of undocumented government-owned lands 
being legally certified by 2022 (DGSAM 2019). This program seems effectively to answer the 
concern of many state asset users regarding their asset security (P23, P25, and P27). 
During Hadiyanto’s tenure, the DGSAM has adopted good governance principles in its PAM 
framework including openness and transparency, accountability, rule of law, professionalism and 
competency, efficiency and effectiveness, responsiveness, private sector partnership (Hadiyanto 
2009). He was the first Director-General of the DJKN, who held the position for almost a decade 
from 2006 (DGSAM 2015). He mentions further that the organisation has experienced a shift of 
paradigm from just being a state asset administrator into a state asset manager. Three changes 
have been argued as evidence of that paradigm shift in Indonesian PAM namely the adoption of 
the asset life-cycle concept in the PAM framework, the adherence of good governance principles 
in the PAM policy and law reform, and the integration of asset and budget planning as a part of 
public accountability both at national and sub national level. (Hadiyanto 2009).  
The above progress is justified by the perspectives of internal and external actors of the 
Indonesian PAM. Internally, both high and middle level officers of the DGSAM are confident 
that their institution has stepped up a higher level of governance, yet they recognise some room 





the increasing quality of audit opinions issued by the BPK shows that the DGSAM has 
successfully increased its accountability through reliable asset disclosure in the central 
government financial statement (P35).  
 Conclusion 
The findings discussed in this chapter come from the experiences and views of the participants 
in the Indonesian PAM. Those views were also compared with the results of document analysis. 
As the perspectives come from five different groups of participants, the findings are also 
discussed based on their groups of origin to establish the perspective of each group. However, 
this does not mean that participants from similar groups shared the same views and vice versa. 
In this section, how the participants from different backgrounds view their PAM experiences and 
the summary of the challenges are discussed accordingly. 
The participants from the asset manager group are highly concerned with six themes namely asset 
security, asset utilisation, regulation and policies, performance measurement, public asset 
reporting, and asset management skills. The participants with an asset manager background vow 
more issues because asset management is their daily task and domain. Yet, some views from this 
group are contradictory as it depends on how they interact with the circumstances. 
The views of asset users are influenced by their organisational objectives in regard to public 
assets under their custody. As assets make up a major part of their financial statement, their asset 
presentation considerably influences the audit opinion. Therefore, they rate the asset registry and 
asset security as high priority problems.  
The auditors’ role is to verify that auditees, both the asset manager and the asset user, behave in 
accordance with the regulations and policies. Internal and external auditors have different audit 
agenda. External auditors of the BPK focus on a general audit of a government financial 
statement but in some circumstances, they can conduct different types of audit. Meanwhile 
internal auditors, in this study coming from the MoF Inspectorate-General and the BPKP, focus 
on helping the auditee with finding their problems and offering them alternative solutions.  
The private sector interviewed in this research come from parties who have contracts with the 
government in utilising public assets. Their only concern is about consistency with every policy 
issued. Unlike the private sector, the MP participant can provide a bird’s eye view as he has been 





In general, the problems of idle or underutilised assets, the asset registry, and asset security are 
viewed as the main challenges of the Indonesian PAM. First, idle or underutilised assets which 
are also known as surplus assets are the ultimate problem of the Indonesian PAM because there 
is a complication of other underlying problems namely the lack of asset performance 
measurement and the weakness of the related policy. The former limits the government’s 
capability to properly figure out its surplus assets and the latter fails to deliver effective sanctions 
to the asset users who fail. Several more complications will be revealed in the following chapter 
regarding how the past and current policy has dealt with the idle asset problem. 
The following problems regarding the asset registry and asset security are experienced by large 
ministries due to a large number of assets under their custody that are located nationwide. 
Numbers of assets located in remote areas are still unregistered and not supported by legal 
documentation. The circumstances increase the possibility of losing the assets, or their being 
taken over by other parties. These problems were also the major concern of the DGSAM before 
the new asset database was employed and the asset arrangement program completed. However, 
the problem of uncertified land still exists despite the land certification program recently 
conducted by the government. 
In regard to the PAM regulation, the problems of inflexibility, ineffective sanctions, 
inappropriate authority delegation and the burden of the past are revealed. The current regulation 
is not flexible enough to accommodate the changing environment of the private sector. In order 
to force the asset users to transfer their surplus assets, the asset manager can drop sanctions, yet 
the sanctions are not effective and even backfire. Furthermore, the asset manager should take on 
more roles, especially in managing the surplus assets. This is to enable the institution to address 
the obstacles in asset utilisation. Last, the unsound practice of the past contracts impedes the 
effort of the government to enforce the current regulation.  
The findings from the experience of PAM are important to guide the research to move on to the 
next subtopic which is PPP’s practice. These findings do not only answer the first research 
question about the development and challenges of Indonesian PAMs, but also give an 
understanding to why the government adopts PPPs in solving their problem of idle or 
underutilised assets. Having gained an understanding of the challenges of Indonesian PAM, the 
thesis analyses findings regarding PPP adoption in the following chapter. Those findings come 












PPPs in the Indonesian PAM: Motives and Challenges 
 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the discussion of the development and challenges of the Indonesian PAM 
leads to the answer to the first research sub question. Likewise, in this chapter, the views and 
perspectives of the participants regarding PPP adoption from the four case studies are discussed 
in order to identify and analyse the findings. The findings build the narrative and discussion to 
answer the following research sub questions ‘What are the rationales and challenges of PPPs 
adoption?’ and ‘What are the characteristics of PPPs to be considered in PAM?’. 
This chapter is organised into six sections including the introduction and the conclusion. The 
second section especially discusses the motives and development of the PPP adoption, the 
following two sections discuss the background of four case studies and the emerging themes from 
semi-structured interviews. After that, the PPP characteristics are analysed, and the chapter is 
concluded. 
 Motives for Adopting PPP in Managing Public Assets 
Prior to the enactment of the 2003 State Finance law, and the 2004 State Treasury law, the 
Indonesian government has already partnered with the private sector in utilising their surplus, 
idle or underutilised assets. The partnerships were contractual, long term in nature and mostly 
utilising the built-operate-transfer scheme. The Ministry of Defence and the National Police had 
the most numbers of these property-based partnerships contracts (P01). Some were not registered 
and recognised by the MoF. 
Prior to bureaucratic reform in 2004 and political reform in 1997, government practices did not 
recognise the principles of good governance such as professionalism, transparency and 
accountability. Likewise, in managing public assets, although the Directorate-General of 
Treasury had the authority to manage public assets, it was not as powerful as that of the DGSAM. 
Even though there was the MoF regulation, several government institutions did not comply with 





This problem became the main obstacle as those assets were still under the private sector’s 
control.  
The typical BOT partnership contract was where the government offered vacant lands to the 
private sector because the agencies did not have any plan to utilise the assets in the foreseeable 
future. The private company invested a large amount of money not only to develop the land by 
constructing income producing properties but also in most cases to provide facilities for the 
agencies such as housing and vehicles. This kind of information was revealed from the 
partnership contracts signed by both parties prior to the establishment of the DGSAM in 2006. 
There are three alternatives to address the problem of surplus assets but inviting the private sector 
is the only option available if the asset users choose to maintain their control on their surplus 
assets. One participant of the DGSAM (P14) explains further: 
They can either sell the asset, hand it over (to the MoF), or utilise it by inviting private 
sector investors. Option 1 and 2 are not attractive at all for the ministries. The proceeds 
of asset disposal will go to the state account. Transferring the asset will make their 
institution look not important and not developing. They realise that the government 
budget is strictly limited, and they do not have either expertise or time to develop the 
asset by themselves. Therefore, the only viable choice is to form a partnership to develop 
the asset. 
Access to external funding and private sector’s expertise 
The property market in Indonesia mostly in the megapolitan city of Jakarta has been thriving for 
decades. Prior to the 1998 economic crisis, Indonesian economic growth had been growing 
steadily between 5 and 10% annually (BPS 2018). For that reason, together with South Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand, Indonesia was considered as one of the Asian Tigers. The demand for 
office space in Jakarta was soaring, but the supply was limited. At the same time, ministry M1 
required more spaces to accommodate its expanding organisation. Two interests met and decided 
to form a partnership that could serve both their objectives. In the circumstances, the private 
sector approached and offered what Ministry M1 looked for.  
Before searching for external funding, ministry M1 (case study CS-1) approached the MoF for 
capital expenditure to build one office tower next to its existing one, but their proposal was not 
approved. Building an office was not a government priority. At that time, ministry M1 had only 
one office tower on a spacious land area. Its expanding functions required additional office space 
for hundreds of its newly recruited employees. However, the ministry could not afford to erect 





Budget was not successful. The MoF said that the government at that time [1990] prioritised its 
public infrastructure program’ (P23).  
The property of ministry M1 is located in prime areas, near Jakarta’s central business district, 
and surrounded by commercial centres such as malls and hotels. Vacant lands in Jakarta were 
scarce, and the property developers kept searching for landowners who would like to sell or to 
develop their properties. Two interests met and decided to form a partnership that could serve 
both their objectives. In the circumstances, the private sector approached and offered what 
ministry M1 looked for. They provided not only the funds required to establish a new office 
tower but also the expertise both in building construction and operation. 
Before the establishment of the DGSAM, public asset management was conducted by the DGT, 
both are under the MoF. One participant from the DGSAM (P14) with decades of experience in 
the Directorate-General of Treasury (DGT) explained the adoption of PPPs in managing public 
assets in Indonesia from the perspective of the asset manager as follows: 
Since the asset management affairs were under the DGT [before 2006], the asset users 
have already realised that the government will not have sufficient funds to support their 
proposed project and therefore a BOT scheme is the only way left. The types of the 
projects varied depends on site locations. Several hotels have been erected on 
government’s properties in the island of Bali. The [private sector] partners invited 
several international big brands to manage the property once the construction 
completed. 
Participants from the ministries M2, M3 and M4 also realised that their projects (CS-2, CS-3 and 
CS-4) could not be self-funded by the government. Unlike CS-1 project where the development 
was to support the function of ministry M1, projects in the other case studies have nothing to do 
with the main function of the ministries. In addition, they also do not have the expertise to run 
the projects by themselves. 
A ministerial level regulation regarding state asset utilisation existed (MoF 1994) which 
mentioned the requirements for the private sector to become partners in BOT projects. They had 
to have reliable financial resources and expertise in the business of the project. The current 
regulation has set higher requirements in that the private sector partners are obliged to not only 
have sufficient financial resources but also have skills, experience, technical and managerial 





Safeguarding the assets from illegal occupation 
A participant from ministry M4 further explains that putting aside case study CS-4, most 
partnerships in her ministry are to safeguard the assets (P27). The property of CS-4 is located in 
a big city and occupied by her branch office, so there is no risk of it being taken over by other 
parties. She explains further,  
Our military installations are usually surrounded by large vacant lands. If we do not 
utilise them, local people possibly will occupy. After years of occupation, it will be very 
difficult to drive them away. As precautionary actions, we invite the private sector to 
develop the site given two requirements. The [private sector] partner has to obtain the 
legal ownership of the vacant land by registering those lands to the National Land 
Agency. They also must recruit local people as their employees. (P27). 
Gaining additional fixed assets 
In addition, the investment from the private sector is seen as an opportunity for many government 
officers to obtain facilities such as housing and vehicles, that if requested through a normal 
budget process will be difficult to obtain (P08). This information can be verified through the 
contracts obtained from the participants. In CS-2, the contract between ministry M2 and company 
C2 mentions the obligations of the company. Besides constructing the shopping centre, they were 
also required to build offices, classrooms, official residences, sporting facilities, and provide 
vehicles. However, participant P08 considers that transaction was still acceptable as the facilities 
were meant to mainly support the institution not the individual officers. He also mentions at that 
time, the internal control and governance were very weak. There were still possibilities that the 
assets were utilised for individual interest especially the movable properties.  
Other motives  
The state asset users have another motivation to increase the revenue from their state asset 
utilisation. The current regulation regarding non tax revenue allows the ministries/institutions to 
propose an additional budget resulting from the non tax revenue they have paid (GoI 2018b).  
Yet, the MoF holds the authority to approve or reject the proposals from the state asset users. 
Currently, the DGSAM and the Directorate-General of Budget are discussing the idea of giving 
more flexibility for the state asset users in utilising the revenue coming from the asset utilisation 
projects (P07). The DGSAM intends to encourage the state asset users to manage their assets 





The suspicion of a kickback to related officers was raised by two participants (P08 and P28) who 
said that some money is channelled to his institution from the operation of the partnership. 
However, the money is used mostly to support social activities of his institution such as 
donations, mass health service and national independence celebrations (P24). Those kinds of 
activities are not funded by the state budget. ‘his practice does not go unnoticed’ said one 
participant from the DGSAM (P08). The participant believes that as the regulation and 
governance improve, the practice will diminish eventually. He also added, the strict due diligence 
prior to the project approval, will reduce the possibility of kick back transactions. 
Table 7.1 – Rationales for PPP Adoption in the Indonesian PAM 
No. Rationales Sources 
1. To obtain external funding due to the limitation of government 
budget. 
Regulation, DGSAM, 
M1, M2, M3, M4 
2. To gain the private sector’s expertise as the government officers 




3. To safeguard the idle assets from illegal occupation M4, DGSAM 
4. To acquire additional fixed assets for the custodian agencies Contracts, DGSAM 
5. To fund unbudgeted organisational activities and additional 
income for the officers 
M2, DGSAM 
6. To get additional budget allocation from the nontax revenues. Regulation, DGSAM 
Table 7.1 presents the rationales of PPP adoptions in the Indonesian PAM context. The main 
reason for adopting PPPs in managing public assets is to access private sector funding as the 
government budget is limited. The second reason is to obtain expertise and experiences from the 
private sector as the government has limited human resources to manage projects by itself. For 
large ministries having problems safeguarding their assets, PPPs help them to prevent illegal 
occupation by third parties. The nontax revenue collected from the projects can lever the 
bargaining position of the state asset users with the Directorate-General of Budget, the ministry 
can ask for an additional budget allocation due to a large amount of funds contributed from the 
projects. Nevertheless, the participants still recognised the existence of unsound practices 
regarding kickback from the partnerships to several related officers. 
The attempts of officials from the state asset custodian to exploit public assets as items to leverage 
in budget games, have no challenges from the MoF. On the contrary, the current regulation on 





 The Challenges and Impact of PPP Adoption 
Table 7.2 presents sixteen themes related to the four case studies which emerge from the data set of 
the semi structured interviews. More detailed information regarding each case study is extracted from 
the later parts of the interviews. The participants are asked to discuss their experiences and express 
their perspectives regarding the case study more deeply. The data set are then organised and extracted 
to discover the emerging themes from each case study and the different backgrounds of the 
participants. Both similarities and differences of ideas from every case study are sorted, collated, and 
coded in order to search for more conceptual arguments. The validity of the arguments is tested with 
other arguments from different participants as well as with the document analysis. 
There are sixteen themes classified into regulations and policies, contracting parties, and the impact 
of partnerships. Furthermore, the issue of inflexibility becomes the concern of all private sector 
participants from the four case studies as well as from the auditors and a participant from the public 
sector agency. As expected, lack of flexibility regarding government regulations and partnership 
contracts is reasonably common in several countries. 
Table 7.2 – Emerging Themes: The Challenges and Impacts   
No. Themes CS-1 CS-2 CS-3 CS-4 Others 
A. Regulations and Policies      
1. Uncertainty from policy changing M1 C2   Auditors 
2. Narrow room for discussion given to the 
private sector 
C1     
3. Multi-interpreted regulations M1 M2  M4 DGSAM 
4. Inflexibility of government regulations and 
contracts 
C1 C2 PSA3, 
C3 
C4 Auditors 
5. Inappropriate organisational structure   PSA3   
6. Lack of harmonious policies and 
coordination between central, provincial and 
local governments  
   C4 Auditors 
7. Intervention during the tender process   PSA3, 
C3, M3 
  
8. Lack of a dispute settlement mechanism M1    DGSAM 
9. Infrastructure projects should be privileged 
with lower payments and longer contract 
periods 
   C4 DGSAM 
B.  Contracting Parties      
10. Lack of transparency by the private sector 
partner 
    DGSAM 





No. Themes CS-1 CS-2 CS-3 CS-4 Others 
12. Lack of expertise in drafting partnership 
contracts 
  PSA3  DGSAM 
13. Lack of expertise in preparing feasibility 
studies 
 M2   DGSAM 
14. The roles of a public service unit in 
addressing government inflexibility 
  PSA3  DGSAM 
C. Impacts of the Partnerships      
15. Significant support for national sport 
activities 
  M3   




 C4  
 Regulations and Policies  
Uncertainty from policy changing  
The CS-1 has a long and complicated background involving the private sector partner changing 
several times and passing through some important turning points in Indonesian history both 
politically and economically. In the CS-1, the parties involved are ministry M1 and company 
C1). One participant the ministry describes how problematic the CS-1 project is, he said: 
The Project [CS-1] was initiated in 1992 … At that time, one dollar [USD] was only 
around IDR 2,000 (now USD1 is equal to IDR 15,000). Our minister sought for an 
approval from the MoF for a proposed BOT project involving a private sector partner. 
The partner had already been appointed without any tender process. Along the time, the 
partner several times transferred its right on the contract to its affiliate. Likewise, the 
land area of the project had also been reduced to only around 6,000 square metres. The 
monetary crisis in 1998 caused the project construction halted for years before it was 
completed in 2012. The changing of regulations and the findings from the BPK had 
complicated the situation as the contract signed by all parties, seemed not comply 
anymore. (P23). 






Figure 7.1 presents the milestones of the project from 1992 until now. The first milestone of the 
project was when ministry M1 sent an official letter to the MoF in 1992. It sought for an approval 
of its proposed partnership with its partner using the scheme of build, operate, and transfer 
(BOT). This letter was fruitful as could be seen by a preliminary approval issued by the MoF in 
only two months. In the preliminary approval, the MoF asked ministry M1 to establish an inter-
ministerial committee to conduct all administrative procedures and a feasibility study regarding 
the proposed BOT project. In case study CS-1, the private sector partner changed two times due 
to the previous partners were not able to pursue the construction. 
As the CS-1 project had started prior to the asset management reform, the regulation that applied 
at that time was just a MoF decree. The process of state utilisation under the decree at that time 
was actually much simpler than the current policy. There was no property valuation required. 
Once the preliminary approval from the MoF was issued, the joint team consisting of officers 
from the proposing ministry and the MoF analysed the project proposal and decided several key 
points of the contract. The points discussed included the detailed contribution from both parties, 
the length of the contract, the payment, and the termination mechanism.  
The contract between ministry M1 and company C1 had significantly changed over time to 
comply with the Indonesian economic situation as well as PAM policy reform. In the beginning, 
the contract used the American dollar as its denomination. Then due to the fluctuation of the 
Indonesian rupiah against American dollar, the contract changed the denomination into rupiah. 
In the beginning, company C1 could operate the whole building until the end of the contract. 
Then under the government regulation, in a BOT contract, once the construction was completed, 
the private sector partner was compelled to submit at least 10% of the building space to the 
government. To illustrate how difficult their situation was, a participant of Company C1 
mentioned: 
In the first place, the government did not require the direct hand over of a certain 
percentage of the building to them. It will significantly alter our income forecast. We 
are open to discussing however, we expect the MoF and ministry M1 pay some respect 
to our initial contract (P31). 
To understand how the contract changed over time, Table 7.3 presents some important 
amendments to the contract and the request from the government. As can be seen, several changes 
were unilaterally decided by the MoF. The length of the contract is still 30 years but the MoF 
includes the construction period which is a 4-year reduction from the previous contract. Then, 





obligation was not written into the contract. In addition, the amount of annual contribution from 
company C1 is the only payment but the amount is significantly higher as the pre stated annual 
increase is more than double that of the current contract. 
 
Table 7.3 – The Contract Amendments between ministry M1 and company C1 
1993  
Land area More than 1 hectare 
Length of contract  30 years excluding the construction period 
1995 – Initial contract 
Land area Reduced by around 4,000 square metres 
Length of contract 30 years, construction period: 1995 – 1999 
Company obligation 1. The annual contribution to maintaining another building of Ministry M1 
of USD175 thousand with 2% increase per year 
2. The annual contribution to the government of USD50 thousand and 
subjected to 3-year review 
2004 – The first amendment 
Land area No changes 
Length of contract No changes, construction period: 2004 – 2008 
Company obligation 1. Annual contribution to maintaining another building of Ministry M1 of 
IDR1.5 billion with 2% increase per year 
2. Annual contribution to the government of IDR500 million and subjected 
to 3-year review 
Other 1. The company could use its rights from the contract as collateral to obtain 
a bank loan. 
2. The company could transfer its rights to another party (from PC1 to PC2) 
2008 – The second amendment 
Land area No changes 
Length of contract No changes, but the construction period was revised due to the delay 
Company obligation No changes 
Others Company c1 took over the rights and obligations of company PC2 
2013 – The proposed amendment from the MoF 
Land area No changes 
Length of contract 30 years but including the construction period. 
Company obligation 1. To hand over 10% of the building to ministry M1. 
2. The annual contribution of IDR2.7 billion with 5.66% increase per year 
Other 3. Company C1 could use its right from the contract as collateral to obtain a 
bank loan. 
4. Company C1 could transfer its rights to another party. 
The annual contribution requested by the MoF comes from a business valuation process 
conducted by government valuers. One participant of the DGSAM valuers realised that their 
calculation would alter company C1’s financial forecast (P15). The participant then clarified that 
their valuation was conducted based on current market prices and data from the property industry 





and the private sector partner. Therefore, company C1, according to them, should have no reason 
to reject the MoF request because it has the financial capability to meet it, 
In case study CS-2, the management of company C2 also declares his concern regarding changing 
regulations that negatively impact the company’s financial performance. He says, ‘…Our 
business is in decline recently … In the middle of this harsh situation, the government asked us 
to adjust our contribution based on a new regulation issued’ (P29). The participant also requests 
the government to consider types of business in determining the profit-sharing contract between 
the government and the private sector (P29). 
One of the auditor participants (P39) also criticises the inconsistent policies issued by the MoF. 
He refers to the MoF regulation No. 23 Year 2010 that has been revised several times, the latest 
is No. 54 Year 2015. There are two problems regarding this policy. First, it has been revised 
several times which creates confusion especially for the state asset users. Then, the MoF as the 
asset manager, seems not to consistently regulate the past problems of state asset utilisation in 
other ministries besides the Ministry of Defence and the National Police. He believes that a single 
policy that applies to all government agencies would be much more effective. 
Narrow room for discussion with the private sector 
The latest development of the contract between the government, in this case ministry M1 and 
company C1, was the new requests from the MoF. PP No.6/2006 is the regulation that applied at 
the time when the MoF requested the new terms for the BOT contract with company C1. The 
regulation stated that for a BOT contract between the government and the private sector, there 
must be a valuation both on the assets in the form of a property valuation and on the proposal in 
the form of a business valuation. The valuation itself is mostly conducted by the internal 
government valuers. However, in PP No. 6/2006 itself, there is a possibility that the valuation 
will be conducted by independent valuers. No different from any other cases, in CS-1. the joint 
team consisting of officers from the MoF and ministry M1 applied all the financial figures 
reported by the valuers as the basis to draft the contract with company C1. The financial figures 
refer to the annual contribution that has to be paid by company C1.  
The participant from the MoF, who is a member of an inter-ministerial team of asset utilisation 
said: 
PP No. 6/2006 regulates that in the process of asset utilisation adopting PPP whatever 





to us, most likely we take their financial figures for granted and they become the 
minimal amount we will ask from private sector during a tender process. Likewise, in 
CS-1, we used the figures from the valuation report as a basis for requesting new terms 
to company C1. We do not have the capacity to challenge or amend those valuation 
figures (P09). 
As can be seen in Figure 7.1, in 2013 the government requested an increase in the annual 
contribution by five times of the existing contract between ministry M1 and company C1. 
Company C1 is resistant to any changes requested by the government which will significantly 
reduce their current and future income streams. The participant from company C1 explained: 
In the time of an economic crisis, we tried to continue the construction process by 
inviting other investors. In doing so, we financially engineered our capital structure. … 
Moreover, we believe that based on our legal system, the contractual agreement between 
us [company C1 and ministry M1] is binding and must be respected by both sides. We 
respect the government position, but we are against the new terms from them. However, 
to show our goodwill that we still respect the contract, we keep paying our obligation 
on time (P31).  
A different perspective comes from the participant of the government valuers. To begin with, 
P15 began by explaining the process of due diligence on proposals of PPP in asset utilisation and 
then the roles of valuers, asset managers and the inter-ministerial team. He argued: 
In our existing regulation [PP No.6/2006], the roles of the inter-ministerial team are 
very important in decision making. The team has a discretion to discuss and negotiate 
the financial obligation with the private companies. They could consider non-financial 
factors that might be omitted by the valuers. … Given the circumstances, the team could 
exercise their authority to reach a compromise agreement with company C1. The 
hesitation of the asset manager [the joint team] in making decisions, in many cases, 
make us [the valuers] have to redo the valuation because the values we issued are no 
longer valid by law or by property circumstances (P15). 
The hesitation of the asset manager to deviate from the valuation reports comes with some 
justification. The asset managers will face more questions from auditors both from internal 
government and the BPK. Once they deviate from the valuation figures in deciding the obligation 
of the private sector. PPPs in public asset utilisation, in the past, became one of the sources of 
corruption as stated by one participant who is an auditor (P39). The auditors perform due 
diligence on every aspect of PPPs starting from the very beginning process where proposals are 
sent by a ministry to the MoF asking permission for asset utilisation. Another auditor-background 
participant (P36) emphasises the importance of putting the government interests as their top 
priority. He argued that both the valuers and the asset managers must choose the option that will 
result in the highest income for the government. Asked about his opinion regarding the many 





valuation standards depending on circumstances, the auditor participant said that the valuer 
should choose the method that will result in the highest value of the government property. 
Otherwise, he will scrutinise further to satisfy his suspicion (P36). 
Multi-interpreted regulation 
Two participants from two ministries (P23 and P27) state the problem of multi-interpretation 
regarding current regulations in state asset utilisation involving partnerships with private sector. 
The participant from ministry M1 describes further: 
PP No. 6/2006 states that is in a BOT contract, the government is entitled to use it 
straight away once the building construction is completed for at least 10% of the 
building constructed. According to company C1, the government could occupy 10% of 
the building but the government is still obliged to pay rent and service charges similar 
to any other tenants. The government just has the priority to occupy one-tenth of the 
building (P23).  
To address the dispute between ministry M1 and company C1, the government aske the BPK to 
conduct a compliance audit on case study CS-1. The audit result presented several findings in 
terms of the project compliance under PP No.6/2006. the BPK mentioned that ministry M1 had 
not periodically reported the project development to the MoF. It was also found that the project 
had not gained the MoF approval concerning the contribution payment. The most significant 
finding was that in the current contract, there was no clause about the obligation from the partner 
C1 to surrender at least 10% of the building to ministry M1 once the construction was completed.  
PP No. 6/2006 was issued by the central government to regulate not only assets owned by the 
central government but also those owned by provincial and local governments. Regarding state 
asset utilisation, PP No. 6/2006 is detailed further by a ministerial level regulation namely PMK 
No. 78/2004. Document analysis reveals the government’s direct entitlement to the 10% of the 
building. A participant from the DGSAM (P09) explains that the main reason company C1 
refused to allocate 10% of the building to the government was because this allocation was not 
stated in the agreement between company C1 and ministry M1. The participant said that there is 
no statement that the government can use that allocated space without any obligation.  
Meanwhile, a participant with a valuer background offers a different interpretation (P22). The 
government does not have to pay the rental charge, but it is still required to pay the service charge. 
It is common practice that tenants have to pay for facilities and services they obtain from the 





In regard to another state asset utilisation, the current regulations state that there are four types 
of state asset utilisation namely lease, usage borrowing, utilisation cooperation with a third party 
(KSP), BOT/BTO, and utilisation cooperation with a third party for infrastructure projects 
(Infrastructure KSP) (GoI 2014; MoF 2014a). The first type, lease, is a short to medium contract 
of five years at most, between the government with private sector. The second and third are 
basically similar. KSP is a BOT contract where the private sector construct buildings, use them 
during the agreed period, and hand them over at the end of the contract. There are two difference 
between KSP and BOT. First, in term of methods of payment, KSP requires two types of 
payments from the private sector namely a fixed contribution and profit sharing. The former is a 
certain amount of money paid annually, and the latter, the amount is determined by a certain 
percentage of the profit resulting from the operation. Meanwhile in BOT, there is only one 
payment called contributions. The second difference is, in BOT the government is entitled to use 
a minimum of 10% of the building once the construction has been completed. In KSP, this type 
of arrangement is not available. The government can only use the assets once the contract expires. 
The other source of multi-interpretation is the definition of profit sharing. It is not clearly defined 
when the profit is shared whether in the first year, or after the partnerships pass the payback 
period. The participant from the DGSAM said, the project must pay the profit sharing whenever 
their annual accounting record shows profit (P15). It means, there is no ‘profit sharing holiday’ 
while the project has not surpassed its payback period. 
 One participant from ministry M2 comments regarding the profit-sharing definition: 
Some potential investors have come and expressed their interest. We told them that by 
law, once the partnerships established, they do not pay any contribution until they have 
reached the point of profit which is after all their initial investment is recovered (P29). 
Another source of different understanding is, that the regulation does not mention from what 
element of income statement the profit sharing is calculated, whether on revenues, gross incomes, 
or earning before tax. One participant with a legal background said that profit sharing calculation 
must take into account revenues and all related costs (P21). This argument is refuted by another 
participant. ‘It is common in the private sector to use revenues as the basis of a profit-sharing 
calculation’, he said (P16). To bridge those different understandings, the DGSAM has issued a 






Inflexibility of government regulations and contracts 
The flexibility issue becomes the concern of all the companies in all four case studies as well as 
the agency PSA3 and one auditor participant. The sources of inflexibility from the current 
regulations come from: the tedious process of PPPs (P25, P30, P31). the determination of profit-
sharing calculations (P31), the requirement especially to obtain the early agreement (P32), and 
the number of government institutions involved (P28). In regard to the contract, several 
participants believe the terms and conditions of the contract could be made more flexible 
especially dealing with payment schedules (P30).   
As stated in the MoF regulation No. 78/2014, the typical procedure in utilising state assets using 
a KSP scheme is as follows. It is started by the representative state asset user (KPB) preparing 
an application equipped by a feasibility study. The KPB sends the application to its own ministry 
known as the state asset user (PB). The PB verifies the application, once the officer in the PB 
agrees, the PB forwards the application to the DGSAM as the state asset manager. In the 
DGSAM, they conduct three lots of analysis regarding the application namely a property 
valuation, a business valuation, and the asset utilisation analysis. All these activities are 
conducted by three different teams and the asset utilisation team uses reports from valuation 
teams as its tool in verifying the proposal. Once the asset utilisation team completes the analysis, 
the team gives a recommendation to the state asset manager who is the director-general of the 
DGSAM. The approval from the DGSAM comes with the predetermined minimum fixed 
contribution and the percentage of the profit sharing. The KPB follows up the approval by 
preparing the tender process. Once the winner is announced, the project is ready for the ground-
breaking. 
The above process is time and energy consuming for both the state asset user and the DGSAM 
said participant P08. Asset management is the main function of the DGSAM but not for the state 
asset users. The participant P25 describes as follow: 
The human resources for managing state assets in our institution are very limited both 
in quantity and quality. … The BOT analysis requires knowledge in property and capital 
budgeting. And we do not have that kind of resources. Therefore, we asked the potential 
partner to prepare the study for us. 
The statement of P25 above is in line with the statement of P07 as discussed in the previous 






The long process as outlined shows that the KPB is required to prepare massive documentation 
and analyse both legal and financial aspects. The KPB also deals with its own superior institution, 
which is the PB, and three different teams from the DGSAM namely the property valuation, 
business valuation, and the asset utilisation teams. 
Inappropriate organisational structure 
One participant believes that her organisation would be more effective in conducting its asset 
management function if supervised by a more appropriate government agency which is the 
DGSAM (P34). One of the challenges for her institution is to report to a ministry whose main 
function is not asset management. The ministry is the Ministry of State Secretariat whose main 
function is providing protocol and domesticity services to the President and the Vice President 
(Ministry of State Secretariate 2015). In the past, the ministry and the Jakarta provincial 
government fought over the ownership and management rights of the sporting complex 
(Sulistiono 2003). 
The idea of institutional reform in the Indonesian PAM by pooling all strategic assets under one 
institution is not novel and is appreciated by some high-level officials of the DGSAM. However 
a high level officer of the DGSAM has a different point of view. Participant P01 emphasis how 
the DGSAM should focus on collaboration with other ministries instead of arguing over the 
stewardship of strategic assets. The cost of conflict will be high not only for the DGSAM but 
also for the MoF in conducting its other function. All participants of the DGSAM have realised 
the weaknesses of the state asset users as they have dealt with officers of other ministries in 
managing PPPs. Several of them support the idea that the DGSAM should have more authority 
regarding this issue yet participant P01 views the possible resistances of the state asset users. 
Nevertheless, PP No. 6/2006 which has assigned a special role for the DGSAM, faces almost no 
significant resistance from the other ministries. Likewise, the intention of strategic asset pooling 
under the DGSAM could be realised in the near future. 
Lack of harmonious policies and coordination between central and provincial government 
The participant of company C4 is concerned about the different treatment they get from the 
central and local governments. The location of the CS-4 project is on areas partially owned by 
the central, provincial, and local governments. Company c4 has to deal with those governments 





the practices of PPPs for infrastructure development where there is centralised regulation and 
management.  
To understand the tedious process, P39 explains briefly as follows: 
Regarding the BMN (central government properties), we deal with two ministries, the 
MoF, and the Ministry of Defence. Within the MoF, we have prepared paperwork to 
serve two teams, the asset management team and the appraisers. Furthermore, with the 
Ministry of Defense, we have built good relationships not only with local officers but 
also with the people from the Jakarta office. 
Then for the BMD, company C4 must obtain approvals from both the local and provincial 
government. The process is much simpler than dealing with the central government (P39). 
Although there is an umbrella regulation (Government Regulation No. 27/2014 regarding state 
asset management), in the implementation policies, there are two different rules, the MoF rule 
for the central government assets, and the rule issued by the Ministry of Domestic Affairs. The 
MoF regulation No. 78/2017 regarding central government asset utilisation designs the 
procedures by which the central government utilises its assets by involving the private sector. 
The roles of the MoF as the asset manager and the other ministries as the asset users are defined 
in assessing the governance of the process and achieving optimal objectives of the state asset 
management (MoF, MoF 2014). 
In dealing with the local and provincial governments, the private sector in CS-4 must adhere to 
the regulation issued by the Ministry of Domestic Affairs (MDA) (GoI 2014). In the 2016 MDA 
regulation regarding the utilisation guide for local/provincial government assets, there are also 
state asset manager and state asset user in the local context. The governor, the regent and the city 
major hold the highest authority for the state assets, the government secretary plays a role as the 
asset manager, meanwhile the heads of functional offices such as the local health and education 
office hold the role of the asset users (MoDA 2016).  
As explained above, both regulations issued by the MoF and the MDA are the technical policies 
of their umbrella regulation which is Government Regulation No. 27/2014 regarding state asset 
management. The procedures are typical but there are different authorities that need to be 
approached by the private sector to seek their approvals prior to the project being delivered. ‘We 
expect that in the future, there will be no more redundancy in the PPP process involving the 





Intervention during the tender process 
In some cases, individuals who have political power or access to political power in the parliament 
or to high level officials in the government intervene in the tender process (P34). In the past, the 
intervention was frequent, and the effect has been disastrous due to the nature of long-term 
contracts. Participant P34 explains how severely his institution suffers financially by losing 
business opportunities: 
We used to be assertive to that kind of intervention considering the going concern of 
our institution as we heavily relied on their approval in many important business 
transactions. It was caused by improper tender process resulting incompetent winners. 
For example, two companies failed to develop the contracted assets and left them 
abandoned. The problems were multidimensional as at that time our legal team was not 
capable enough to draft a fair legal contract. 
Participant P34 comes from institution PSA3 in case study CS-3. The intervention she mentioned 
could be caused by the following factors: the high market value of the properties, the location 
near the parliament building, and the form of the institution as a public service agency. A public 
sector agency is an autonomous body allowed to manage its income and expenses independently. 
This autonomy could be attractive for rent seekers. 
Lack of dispute settlement mechanism 
Referring to the first emerging theme regarding the uncertainty caused by policy changing, 
another issue is a matter of high concern to both participants of ministry M1 and company C1. 
They both believe in an internal dispute settlement mechanism set up by members of the 
partnerships which are the government and the private sector (P23 and P31). P23 sees the 
importance of the DGSAM’s role as the asset manager who has discretion in regard to special 
and complicated circumstances as in case study CS-1. Meanwhile, P31 wants the government 
side to respect previous contracts whatsoever the regulation says.  
In the original contract between ministry M1 and the company PC1, there are two articles related 
to dispute settlements which are Article 9 and Article 10. Under Article 9, all possible future 
disputes are to be settled through deliberation and consensus. In the case where consensus is 
achieved, both parties agree to bring the dispute to the Central Jakarta Court. Legal domicile in 






A DGSAM participant states that their policies are legally bound by the current regulation (the 
MoF regulation No. 78/2014), there is no chance of deviating from the rule (P09). The MoF 
establishes two dispute mechanisms prior to bringing the case to the court (MoF 2014a). First, 
for tender related disputes among private sector candidates, the selection committee has the 
authority to address the disputes. Then, for disputes between contracting parties, which are the 
government and the private sector partner, the dispute resolution in the partnership contract 
becomes the main reference for the disputing parties.  
Different rules for infrastructure  
During the initial stage of the project, under the government regulation (PP) No. 6 year 2006, 
there were no policies for partnerships utilising state assets for infrastructure projects. The 
company is required to provide two contribution payments to the government, the fixed 
contribution and the profit sharing paid annually. A participant gave his view regarding this 
indiscriminate policy as follows:  
The business in the airport operator industry is not as profitable as many people might 
think. … Moreover, in the beginning of the project, we still need to manage to pay the 
interest plus instalment of our loan. I expect the government should take into account 
all mentioned circumstances [the business sector condition] and provide more attractive 
policies, especially for infrastructure projects like we did (P30). 
In the CS-4 project, the capital structure of the company is 70% from long term loans and only 
30% from their own equity. The overall cost of capital for the project is 10.63%. The 700 billion 
loan for a 1.1 trillion-rupiah project requires a long-term contract to enable the company to cover 
the loan as well as the operating and capital expenses. For other infrastructure projects outside 
public asset management, the length of the contract could be as long as fifty years.  
The concerns were heard and responded to properly by the government. In 2015, the MoF 
amended PP No. 6/2006 where for infrastructure projects, special conditions are offered. The 
type of contribution payment to the government was reduced from two into only one clawback 
payment. In some cases, the government could ask for zero clawback. Likewise, the length of 
partnership contracts for infrastructure projects could reach the maximum of fifty years and be 
extended. Nevertheless, not all infrastructure projects could benefit from this policy. There are 
only a few sectors that are allowed to gain the advantages of low clawback payments and longer 
contract periods. These sectors are transportation, water resources, waste treatment, 





 Contracting Parties  
Lack of transparency of the private sector partner 
By law, both the state asset manager and the state asset users are obliged to conduct guidance, 
supervision, and control of all state asset utilisation including partnerships with private sector 
(MoF 2014a).  The government can assign either its internal auditors or independent auditors to 
perform audits on the partnership’s financial reports. The audit focuses on the initial investment, 
periodical financial statements, and assets prior to the end of the contract. It is also stated that the 
partners have to respond to the audit recommendation. 
A government auditor expresses his concern regarding the transparency of the private sector 
partner. Some partnerships seem to not fully disclose all material elements of their financial 
statement mostly in the cost section of the income statement. It is important for the auditor to 
verify the validity of all material expenses they present in the income statement as it will 
determine the amount of their profit as the basis for the profit sharing (P36). The auditor explains 
further that it is essential for them to understand the industrial norms regarding the business 
operation of the partnerships. This way, they can see the fairness of both revenues and costs 
presented in the financial statement.  
As the auditor is also expected to investigate the buildings both in the early stages and at the end 
of the contract, they must have sufficient skills regarding building assessment (P02). The result 
of the audit on the initial investment will influence the percentage of profit sharing. If the value 
of the building is lower than the budget, the government could ask the partnerships to renegotiate 
the profit-sharing calculation.  
On the other hand, a participant from the private sector expresses their belief that the company 
has the right to keep their detailed cost structure undisclosed (P31). Their production process and 
related cost structure are considered to be confidential as they are the sources of its competitive 
advantage. Due to that consideration, the participant said, 
We prefer revenues as the basis of profit-sharing calculation for two reasons. First, 
revenues are not part of our sensitive information. They are easily traced by verifying 
the invoices, checking bank accounts and cash registers. Secondly, the auditors do not 





Lack of commitment from partnerships actors 
The long and tedious processes of asset utilisation PPPs arise not only from complex regulations 
and policies but also from a lack of commitment shown by both actors in the government and the 
private sector. Participants P02 and P07 recognised that from the government sides, the officers 
both from the MoF as well as other ministries seem not to show commitment to accelerating the 
process. Yet there are different reasons involved. On the MoF side, once the PPP contract is 
approved, P02 says, ‘…the officers realise the risk they should bear in the long period of time’. 
Yet, some of them see no direct benefits for the institutions (the MoF) as the income received 
will not be recorded as the achievement of their office (P07).  
However, several non-MoF actors show their lack of enthusiasm regarding asset-based PPPs. 
The new set of policies in state asset utilisation washes away most chances to conduct fraud and 
irregularities by not channelling the money from the project to the state account (P33). ‘… in the 
past, many BOT contracts were signed by some local officers and only a small percentage of the 
money was deposited to the state account. … The contracts lasted for decades, and some contracts 
are still valid now’, said participant P33. 
On the other side, the participants from the private sector indicate that their company in the 
beginning was enthusiastic to have the PPP contracts with the government because they can see 
the potential revenues could be generated from the idle assets they had observed (P38). Soon 
after they realised the process of getting the contract and expecting costs they should bear, some 
of actors pull back gradually. ‘… We understand that we still have to provide some unofficial 
payments before and after the contract is signed’, said participant P39. ‘But if the project still can 
give more revenues than the cost, we continue the process…’, P39 explains further. 
Lack of expertise  
Participants P32, P33, and P34 share their concerns about lack of legal expertise in their 
institution’s human resources. P34 names two properties in their area which were improperly 
managed by the companies and her institution suffered legal battles against those two companies. 
Her institution has realised the importance of a legal drafting team in their squad and has acted 






At the state asset user, the agency is obliged to prepare feasibility studies as a requirement for 
either a KSP or BOT schemes (MoF 2014a). The feasibility study has to provide information and 
analysis regarding property, projected cash flows, the proposed fixed contribution as well as the 
profit sharing arrangement (DGSAM 2014a). Three participants, two from the ministries and one 
from the DGSAM, have identified this problem of the state asset users human resources (P07, 
P23 and P27). They say that the staff in the state asset users do not have the skills to conduct 
feasibility studies. 
‘A feasibility study of the complicated nature of PPP is beyond the capabilities of the state asset 
users’, said participant P07. The focus of their ministries is to conduct their core function such 
as national defence for the Ministry of Finance, or tourism development for the Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism (P23 and P27). To address the problem, the ministry asks the potential 
company to prepare the study. As a result, the company has an advantage during the tender 
process as they have been involved from the very beginning of the process. 
The roles of a public service unit in addressing government inflexibility 
As in all the other case studies, the government officers directly involved in the PPP processes 
face a dilemma as to whether to follow the regulations rigidly that lead to a slow decision-making 
process or to be more flexible and have to provide more explanations for the future audit process. 
This dilemma can be avoided by establishing a special vehicle in the form of a BLU (P12, P26, 
P55, P32). The BLU could involve every stage of the PPP. 
Government regulation no. 23/2015 provides the BLUs with more authority in conducting their 
activities. In CS-3 the flexibility includes the selection of the partner companies, arranging the 
contracts, and establishing the profit sharing rates. These authorities enable the agency PSA3 to 
shorten the PPP process significantly compared to its counterparts in other ministries. They do 
not need to obtain approval from the MoF, and also the valuation process either of property or a 
business valuation is conducted by public appraisers. Then based on the reports of the appraisers, 
the management of the agency PSA3 makes the decision. Meanwhile in other ministries, despite 
the regulation allowing the ministries to hire public appraisers, due to funding limitations, the 
valuations are conducted by the government valuers of the MoF. Then, to decide whether the 
project should proceed or not, the approval of the MoF is essential.  
In addition, the management of the agency PSA3 operates mostly in the same way as the private 





The agency PSA3 is an independent agency under ministry M1. Here, most of the 
employees were recruited from professional backgrounds not from government 
institutions. The culture in our organisations in many ways are supportive of transparent 
and accountable business processes. The decisions must be taken immediately, or we 
will lose the opportunity and in the end we will not be able to pay our own salaries. The 
flexibility provided by the regulation gives us enough room for doing business 
manoeuvres to adapt to fast changing in the industry. 
 Impacts of the Projects 
Significant support for national sport activities 
Every year the PPGBK is obliged to contribute to the state budget. In 2016, it contributed around 
15 billion rupiahs, and the amount tends to increase gradually (GBK Supervisory Board 2016). 
In reality, the largest contribution of the agency PSA3 is not its annual fund contribution but the 
maintenance of and capital investment in the GBK sporting complex. In 2016, the PPGBK spent 
around 50 billion rupiahs for operational and capital expenditure to make sure that the sporting 
complex still complies with international standards (GBK Supervisory Board 2016).  
As the largest sporting complex in the nation, GBK becomes the mainstay venue for both national 
and international sporting events. The latest largest event was the 18th Asian Games co-hosted 
by two cities, Jakarta and Palembang.  The success of the 18th Asian Games in Jakarta in 2018 
was one of the newest proofs of the role of GBK (Inasgoc 2017; Saputra 2018). ‘I cannot imagine 
if we do not have GBK or if the complex is not well maintained, there will be stain on our country 
reputation’, said participant P26.  
The positive effects for national and local economic growth 
Central Java is the third largest province in terms of the population, the fourth in gross domestic 
product in the country. Its economic activities require reliable infrastructure including in the 
transportation sector in land, sea and air. Prior to the development of the CS-4, air transportation 
in the province was able to serve up to 1.25 million passengers annually. Currently, the airport 
can accommodate around 4.5 million passengers where one-tenth of them are international 
passengers. The number of flights increased significantly, from fewer than thirteen thousand 
commercial flights per year into around forty-five thousand after the project was completed. In 






A participant from the private sector, explained the strategic location of this airport that supports 
both local and national economic activities, 
The city of Semarang [which hosts the airport] is located in the middle between the two 
biggest cities in Indonesia, Jakarta and Surabaya. Previously, goods and traffics between 
the capital and Semarang, must transit in Surabaya … This city also plays a role as the 
connection between two major islands, Java and Kalimantan. Transportation is like the 
blood of a country, which delivers people and goods around the clock (P31). 
The data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, in the early period after the airport has been 
extended, shows a significant increase of both passengers and cargo traffic in and out of the 
Province (BPS 2016). In 2016, when phase I of the project was just completed, the number of 
domestic passengers was more than four million (BPS 2016; Kodam IV Diponegoro 2014). This 
means that the maximum capacity of the extended airport of 4.5 million passengers, will be 
reached in the near future.  
Likewise, participants from CS-2 (P24 and P29) claim that the project has significantly 
contributed to local economic growth by providing hundreds of jobs and serving thousands of its 
customers. The impact of the airport development on the regional gross domestic product of the 
province can be seen from its direct and indirect influence on the regional economic growth. 
Based on the direct and indirect influence, it was found that the CS-2 project influenced the 
regional GDP for around 0.5% (Harjanto & Woyanti 2019). 
 The Influential Characteristics of PPPs 
From the above discussion, PPPs in the PAM context have unique attributes that can be seen 
from five different aspects namely motives, types of projects, payment flows, risk and the profit 





Table 7.4 – Comparison of the PPP Attributes 
Aspects PPPs for infrastructure development PPPs in Indonesian PAM 
context 
Motives Financial resources, experience & 
expertise, efficiency, and value for 
money 
The same and additional 
specific motives (See Table 
6.1) 
Projects Economic and social infrastructure 
such as toll roads, ports, hospitals, 
schools 
Mostly commercial, such as 
shopping centre, hotels, 
offices. 
Flows of payments From government to private sector The other way around 
Risks Political, construction, operation, legal, 
market, economic, etc 
 Considerably similar 
Government orientation Not for profit (in most cases) Profit (in most cases) 
As discussed in Chapter 2, governments have different rationales for adopting PPPs and those 
rationales have changed from time to time. Briefly, in developing the infrastructure, the 
governments look for resources from other parties, efficiency, risk sharing scenarios, and the 
latest, value for money as the prime goal (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 2011; Hodge & Greve 2005; 
Hodge & Greve 2007; Yescombe 2007). The motives of PPPs in the PAM context can be seen 
in Table 7.1 Those additional motives are specially related to Indonesian PAM practices 
including the negative effects regarding kickbacks for some officers. 
On one side, the benefits in forms of safeguarding their idle assets, obtaining additional fixed 
assets and budget allocation, have encouraged the asset users to actively propose PPPs for their 
surplus assets. On the other side, those circumstances also divert the focus of the institutions by 
allocating their time and resources to manage the surplus assets, a task which is actually not the 
function of their institutions (P08 & P26). That kind of task will be performed much better if it 
is conducted by the DGSAM as it has the resources, expertise and focus to manage assets. ‘The 
DGSAM should be more progressive in taking over surplus assets from the assets custodians as 
it has both the legal instrument and resources to do so.’, (P26). Yet, P08 proposes that: 
The current policies by providing such sweeteners to the asset custodians are the best 
way to attract the officers of asset custodian institutions to propose PPPs for their surplus 
assets. Otherwise, it is really difficult to identify assets which are idle under the 
ministries’ custody… In the future, once the PPP contracts end, the DGSAM could take 





 Conclusion  
The chapter has mapped and discussed the motives and development of PPP adoption in the 
Indonesian PAM as well as the emerging themes from four case studies. Different motives have 
been expressed by the participants, the ultimate one is to obtain external sources of funding to 
develop state idle assets. In addition to that, the private sector partners are considered more 
capable of operating business projects as they have expertise and experience. For some parties, 
PPPs in asset utilisation are the opportunity to acquire or to fund off budget institutional facilities 
or an organisation’s unofficial activities. The last motive is to get an additional budget allocation 
or at least to increase the bargaining position of the ministries in discussing budget allocations 
with the MoF. 
The thesis also finds thirteen challenges and three opportunities for the PPP adoption in the 
Indonesian PAM. Those sixteen themes can be grouped into three namely regulations and 
policies, contracting parties, and the impact of the partnerships. Now the thesis can answer the 
second and third research investigative questions ‘What are the rationales and challenges of the 
PPP adoption?’ and ‘What are the influential characteristics of PPPs to be considered in PAM?’. 
In all cases, lack of government funds is the main reason why the private sector is invited to 
develop the idle or underutilised assets. This is true but the participants from the state asset users 
offer more detailed and interesting motives regarding the choice of the PPP model and business 
types. In the same way, besides the benefit in the form of cash inflows to government accounts, 
those participants also see other specific benefits that help them reduce some potential problems 
arising from idle assets. Above all, the participants also realise the challenges and risks that they 
currently face. The influential characteristics of PPP adoption in PAM are drawn from the 











PPPs in The Indonesian PAM: The Accountability Concerns  
 Introduction 
In the previous chapters the findings regarding the development and challenges of Indonesian 
PAM and the PPP adoption have been discussed. This chapter analyses the views and 
perspectives of the participants regarding the accountability practices. The chapter aims to 
address the second research question, ‘What are the accountability challenges of PPPs in the 
Indonesian PAM context’. In order to answer that question, the chapter examines its two 
investigating questions: ‘What aspects influence accountability in PPPs?’ and ‘How does 
transparency affect accountability?’. 
After a short introduction, the six factors influencing PPPs are discussed based on the 
perspectives of the participants. In section three the types of accountability and its practices 
regarding four stages of PPPs and its monitoring system are discussed. In the same section, the 
six factors from section two are revisited and discussed based on PPP stages. In section four, the 
relationship between transparency and accountability is discussed from the experiences of the 
participant. 
 Factors Influencing Accountability 
Accountability is seen differently by the participants based on their perspectives and influenced 
by their experiences. It was essential to know the participants’ understanding of accountability, 
prior to asking them further about their perspectives on accountability concerns in PPPs. It was 
found that on being asked the meaning of accountability, not all participants were able to answer 
in complete sentences. However, all could mention and explain several key words with which 
accountability is precepted. 
The participants were asked about accountability in Bahasa Indonesia as ‘akuntabilitas’. 
Responsibility, transparency, legal compliance, audit, and resources are most mentioned in 
defining accountability. Two participants mention ‘principal’ and ’agent’ to describe their 
perceptions. Other words associated with accountability were reporting, audit, public, process, 
and contract. The participant’s perceptions are influenced by their experiences regarding 





from the DGSAM who have a law background or whose main duties are drafting policies or 
regulations, cite legal compliance as one of accountability’s attributes. 
Once the participants are clear about accountability, then they are asked about how important the 
accountability of PPP is. The utilisation of public assets by the private sector becomes the main 
concern of the participants. In the beginning, those assets are fully controlled by the government 
but once the contract is signed, the government transfers its rights and authority over the assets 
to its counterpart, said one participant of the DGSAM (P03). He further explains that those assets 
are still recorded in the government’s balance sheet and it is still held accountable for whatever 
happens to the assets. Most participants agree that PPPs bring accountability complications due 
to the involvement of other parties. Participant P05 says the government is obliged to make sure 
that the private sector acts according to the contractual agreement. ‘One thing that makes this 
issue complicated, the private sector is an independent entity with its own rules and cultures, the 
way government institutions deal with it is obviously different to how they deal with other 
government entities’, said participant P05. 
Based on the PPP accountability framework (Forrer et al. 2010), every participant was given six 
cards showing factors that can influence PPP accountability. On every card, the explanation of 
each factor is provided to ensure that the participant has the same perception about the 
terminology. Then, they were asked to put those cards in order based on how important they 
believe each influence was. Those cards are risk allocation, cost and benefits, social and political 
impact, expertise, partnership collaboration, and performance measurement. The result can be 
seen in Table 8.1. Each cell indicates the number of participants who put a factor in a specific 
rank. 













1st 19 10 10 1 0 0 
2nd 14 11 10 3 2 0 
3rd 7 11 8 3 0 11 
4th 0 5 5 18 8 4 
5th 0 1 3 9 16 11 
6th 0 2 4 6 14 14 






From the above table, it can be seen that almost half of the participants believe that risk allocation 
is the most important factor in assessing accountability. Expertise and cost and benefit are also 
considered as the most important factors according to 10 participants each. The second most 
important factors look similar to the first rank which are risk allocation, cost and benefit, and 
expertise. Risk allocation is placed either in the first, second or third rank by all participants.  In 
contrast, fourteen people view the social and political impact as the least important factor which 
is similar to the ranking of collaboration.  
The purpose of this ranking is to understand how the participants perceive the key success factors 
of PPP accountability and individually discuss how each factor influences the policy and practice 
of PPPs in the nation. Risk allocation, cost and benefit, and expertise are influential in the view 
of the participants. This result is reasonably expected as those rankings are consistent with the 
keywords articulated by the participants in defining accountability. First, risk allocation is 
perceived as the most important factor by the participants. Several participants highly emphasis 
the aspect of legal compliance in defining accountability. For them, risk allocation between the 
government and the private sector should be the most critical aspect of a PPP since it could be 
viewed significantly from the legal aspect. 
Next, regarding the factor of cost and benefit, the rationale could be seen from the underlying 
problem of the Indonesian PAM, namely surplus and underutilised assets. Most participants from 
the DGSAM consider that by providing proper cost benefit analysis, PPPs could be promoted 
further in asset management practices. Last, the expertise factor is also essential because the 
participants realise the government has no skilled staff both in terms of quality and quantity to 
utilise the assets. The following sections will discuss findings regarding each accountability 
factor from the perspectives of the participants. 
Risk allocation 
The current technical guidance for the DGSAM’s business valuers in assessing proposals for 
state asset utilisation partnerships also puts risk borne by the private sector as one of the most 
significant (DGSAM 2014b). The guidance states that in determining the amount of money the 
private sector partner needs to pay the government, the valuer must take into account both 
financial and business risks carried by the private sector partner. The valuers benchmark those 





Business risk arises from the ability of the private sector partner in generating revenues to cover 
all expenses plus to pay their obligation to the government (P15). The participant P15 argues 
further: 
Business risks can be lowered by selecting experienced private sector partners. 
Meanwhile, all risks related to the capital structure of the project funding is categorised 
as financial risk. The government must evaluate the financial resources of the bidders 
… to make sure that they will not heavily rely on debt in financing the project. 
It is mentioned in the MoF regulation that once the government can identify risks borne by the 
potential partners, through a feasibility study conducted by an assigned team of valuers, the 
government then issues the fixed contribution and the percentage of profit sharing for KSP type 
partnerships. In the case of a BOT partnership, the valuation team recommends the annual 
contribution as well as the percentage of the building and facilities that the government can use 
at the beginning of the contract. Both the certain amount of money and percentages are the 
minimal figure asked for by the government. In the tender process, the bidders will increase their 
offers in their acceptable price range and therefore the maximum offer is expected to occur and 
benefit both the government as well as the winning party. 
Besides the risk borne by the private sector partner, in determining the benefits for the 
government in the form of cash payments or facilities, the government considers the investment 
value from the partner as its contribution to the partnership and compares it with the value of the 
asset as the government’s contribution (MoF 2014a). In the more technical regulation of the 
DGSAM, thereby, the government assesses the competitive rate of return for the private sector 
partner by considering their investment value, risks borne, and industrial practices. Regarding 
this concern, participant P15 gives an example, if the partnership operates in an office rental 
industry, the rate of return in the industry becomes the benchmark for the government’s valuers 
in calculating the partner’s expected return from the project. In short, there is a balance between 
the contribution asked by the government and the expected return of the partner (P15). 
Even though in both the MoF and the DGSAM regulation, force majeure is not mentioned, it is 
clearly stated in some contracts obtained during the research. In circumstances of force majeure, 
both parties are released from their responsibility on the failure to fulfil their obligations. A 
drastic change in government policy can be categorised as force majeure. 
The failure to provide a fair risk allocation between the private sector partners and the 
government will reduce the accountability of the partnerships in several ways. The same 





should be, adverse results can occur in every stage of the partnership. In the set-up process, the 
number of companies interested in the tender process will decrease. As experienced companies 
refuse to apply, the only companies competing will be the mediocre ones. The worst is yet to 
come, as participant P15 explains: 
In the construction stage, to minimise its capital expenditure, the partner will lower the 
material quality… It means, the government will suffer the consequences of having to 
renovate or reconstruct the building. …In the implementation or operating phase, as the 
partner is required to pay a contribution that is more than they can afford, they 
eventually will manipulate the report for example by understating the revenue and 
overstating the expenses. 
Cost and benefit 
The cost and benefit and the expertise factors have the same number of supporters as the most 
influential elements of PPP accountability. Ten participants believe that cost and benefit analysis 
builds a strong foundation of all PPP projects without which the projects do not have the viability 
to continue under the partnership arrangement (P06). Another participant(P23) thinks that even 
though the benefits of PPPs are apparent by providing facilities the government could not afford 
the cost, especially as the complicated relationship with the private sector partner, can be 
significant and may overcome the benefits. The government should exercise other options to 
fulfil its need to support facilities by developing its idle assets (P36). A short-term solution for 
an agency requiring office space is by renting until the circumstances become more favourable 
for PPP projects (P06).  
However, in asset-based partnerships, the understanding of cost and benefit analysis deviates 
from that of infrastructure partnerships. The benefits of PPP projects have been identified in 
Chapter 6. In the existing PAM practice, the cost analysis of entering a PPP contract differs from 
one project to another. However, in general, the cost can be categorised as an agency related cost 
and a broader cost as the national interest. If the projects are directly related to the main function 
of a government agency such as in CS-1 and CS-3, the cost analysis includes opportunity cost if 
the agency chooses alternatives beside PPPs. 
In CS-1, ministry M1 desperately needed additional office space, as the government added more 
duties and personnel. The opportunity cost, if the ministry rents office spaces somewhere else 
instead of constructing a new building through a PPP arrangement, includes renting cost and 
coordination difficulty as the location of the rented office is not nearby (P36). In the short run, 





ministry’s budget, said P36. The cost of PPPs is dynamic as can be seen in CS-1. Due to the 
government changing policy and contract complication problems, ministry M1 has not fully 
earned the benefit of PPPs (P36).  
In CS-3, the agency PSA3 is an independently funded unit that works for the government as the 
intermediary between the government (ministry M3) and the private sector, participant P33 
explains. The main source of its revenues is PPP projects. At the end of the contract, the building 
will be transferred to the agency PSA3 and it can be developed to generate more revenue. 
Learning from experience, the agency PSA3 spends more to strengthen the contract to make it 
favourable to their interests and this is considered a significant cost. However, the benefit, 
according to P34, goes far beyond the cost. 
In CS-2 and CS-4, the core businesses of the partnership projects are not related to the main 
function of the asset custodians. The projects become of national interest or at least regional 
interest for economic development. Most benefits from these two projects go to the society, 
neither ministry M2 nor the M4. Yet, both ministries M2 and M4 have invested their human 
resources considerably to make sure that the projects run well (P27 & P24). Therefore, it is 
believed to be fair that there are some benefits to the agencies in the form of additional assets 
and financial support provided by the private sector partner to the government. Participant P24 
states: 
The partnerships project must give us (his institution) support because the budget 
provided by the government is far from sufficient …. The supports could be in forms of 
fixed assets or funding depends on our situations. We have supported the projects by 
letting go our assets for a very long period and take care of the administrative process 
dealing with other parties. 
The statement of participant P24 is confirmed by participant P29 who is from the private sector 
partner as he says that the relationship is mutually beneficial for the continuity of his company’s 
business. All related expenses could be categorised as company social responsibilities as most of 
them support the social activities of the government agency such as the national independence 
day celebration and free medical treatment for the poor, he added. 
The relation between cost and benefit analysis and PPP accountability can be seen in the initiation 
and implementation phases. From a much broader national perspective, the utilisation of public 
assets is expected to bring more benefits than costs but the asset custodian sometimes has their 
own interest (P01). When both national and agency interests are satisfied, accountability is 





the PPPs could be questioned (P09). The role of an asset custodian in a PPP is to supervise and 
monitor closely the private sector partner’s activities, to make sure that the partner sticks to the 
contract, she explains further.  
Expertise 
The expertise factor is perceived as the most and second most important in assessing PPP 
accountability by ten participants each. Participants P21 and P22 realise that the government does 
not have sufficient human resources in terms of quantity and quality (skills) to operate the 
projects by themselves without involving the private sector. Participant P21 says that besides 
access to financial sources, expertise is the second factor the government most expects from the 
private sector partner. 
In relation to accountability, participant P34 emphasises that expertise is required not only from 
the private sector partner but also from the government officials. The latter must have sufficient 
knowledge of both legal and business aspects of the partnerships. This is crucial to make sure 
that the private sector do not have the upper hand due to the government’s lack of knowledge of 
PPP legal contracting, said participant P34 as she referred to her institution’s experience in 
contract drafting. When both parties have expertise, the monitoring function can be effectively 
conducted (P34). 
Current regulations already set up the criteria for potential private sector partners who want to 
enter the competition in the bidding process (MoF 2014a). The regulation requires the potential 
private sector partners to fulfil two criteria which are administrative and technical requirements. 
The administrative requirements are that the applicant is an incorporated company with a valid 
recommendation from the tax office, and it has to provide a bidding document with all supporting 
documentation. Meanwhile, the technical requirements say that the applicant has to be legally 
competent, not been included on the government blacklisted companies, has a valid and 
permanent address; skills, experience, managerial and technical abilities, and human resources, 
capital, equipment, and the other facilities required in conducting the project. 
The requirement set by the regulation is sufficient as the first filter to make sure that only formally 
qualified companies can apply (P21). However, the next process of administrative and technical 
verification is more important. Several PPP tenders in the past were conducted by a procurement 
team without sufficient knowledge of the characteristics of partnership contract or the business 





conducted by a procurement team established by the state asset user and can include other parties 
who have competency on the project being tendered.  
An interesting fact comes from participant P07 that many DGSAM staff including himself avoid 
involvement further once the approval has been issued by their institution. This is because they 
do not wish to take any unnecessary risks. Prior to the tender process, the DGSAM handed over 
its approval altogether with the minimum payment required by the government both for KSP or 
BOT projects. For KSP projects, the state asset user has full authority to conduct the tender 
without involving the state asset manager even though by law, they can invite expertise from any 
parties including the staff from the state asset manager institution. Participant P07 explains: 
The DGSAM as the state asset manager must fully involve in all PPPs utilising high 
value assets or having complex business operations. As the DGSAM has skilled 
personnel, it should conduct a highest and best used (HBU) analysis to all surplus or 
idle assets. The HBU analysis delivers the most appropriate project to be developed. 
The relationship between expertise and PPP accountability is explained by an auditor participant 
(P39). Private sector partners with high expertise will most likely increase the quality of building 
construction in the early phase of the contract, and during the operational phase, they are expected 
to generate more revenues or to reduce the expenses. The participant P39 says, ‘the probability 
of success will be higher with proper supervision and monitoring as it can prevent them using 
their expertise to cheat the government’.  
Performance measurement 
Although only one participant (P03) picked performance measurement as the most influential 
accountability factor, there are still six participants who believe that this factor deserves to rank 
2 or 3. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the government currently does not have an asset performance 
measurement system. In public asset utilisation using PPP schemes, there two main concerns of 
the government: the contribution payment from the private sector partners and asset maintenance 
(P03). Therefore, ‘the performance measurement should target those two government interests’, 
said participant P03.  
The current policy requires private sector partners to prepare three types of reporting, two are 
one off, one periodical (MoF 2014a). The first one is at the beginning of the contract just after 
they complete the construction. The objective of this report is to indicate the factual investment 
expenditure for which an audit will be conducted. The difference between planned and factual 





statement which is used to determine the amount of profit sharing for the year. The last report is 
prepared two years prior to the asset handover to the government. This report presents the current 
condition of the assets which the auditors will verify and give some recommendations to make 
sure the asset is still worthy at the end of the contract. Those audit processes can be perceived as 
the government’s effort to measure the performance of the private sector.   
Participant P03 says that in the operational or implementation phase, the DGSAM do not conduct 
direct monitoring of the PPP projects but receive reports from the projects through the state asset 
users not in an individually detailed report. Although the report is audited by the government 
internal auditors, participant P03 is still not convinced by the audit’s independence as the auditors 
come from the same ministry as the custodian agency. His doubt about independence is in line 
with the view of participants P38 and P36. Participant P38 says: 
There could be a better alternative to involve the government auditors from the BPKP 
or the MoF in auditing partnerships projects. It is expected, the auditor will have broader 
perspective to audit a range of business types of state asset utilisation’. 
Raising the idea, participant P03 would require the MoF to establish a performance measurement 
system that could show projects effectiveness and efficiency. The results should be comparable 
both with its own past performance or with other projects.  
Collaboration 
No one thought that this factor was the most important of the other five yet two participants view 
collaboration as the second most influential factor in accountability (P25 and P27). That the 
inflexible regulations require good relationships between partners to address obstacles is the 
reason given by participant P25. As the asset custodian, it is the duty of participant P25 to 
communicate with the private sector partner in conducting supervision and controlling as 
required by law. Therefore, collaboration is very important. 
Most routine problems can be solved internally within the asset management division in ministry 
M2 but for more complicated situations, the problems are raised to the higher level.  ‘We have a 
forum to discuss complicated issues related to our assets including the asset utilisation’, said 
participant P25. The forum consists of the representative of the private sector partner, asset 
management staff of ministry M2 and its legal staff. When the problem is not clearly regulated 
by the current policy, there will be tripartite discussion: the state asset user, the DGSAM, and the 





Most complicated problems happen in the initiation and set up phases … because at 
those phases we construct feasibility studies, verifying applicants, select the winner, and 
monitor the construction process. At that time, the role of the DGSAM is required more 
than ever. 
Figure 8.1 – The Communication among the Actors 
 
Source: (MoF 2014a) 
The communication flows between actors during the implementation phase of the partnerships 
can be seen in Figure 8.1. In almost all KSP schemes, the assets are under the control of the state 
asset users, and in this circumstance, there is no direct communication between the private sector 
partner and the state asset manager or the DGSAM. Therefore, the state asset user has the role as 
the centre of communications, meanwhile the DGSAM provides advice whenever necessary 
(P10). If new problems arise and are not regulated yet in the current regulation, the DGSAM will 
issue new policies to address the issues. 
To see the relationship between collaboration and PPP accountability, participant P25 says that 
he maintains effective communications with all stakeholders to build trust between the partners 
and as a result, is able to see the problems clearer. ‘We will address the issue as soon as possible 
before it gets worse’, said participant P25. 
Social and economic impact 
Even though the factor of social and political impact could be seen as the least important 
compared to other factors, it does not mean that this factor is not relevant to PPP accountability. 
Several views show that PPPs in the PAM context also have significant impacts on the social and 
political aspects of the country. However, instead of voting for the social and political impact 
factor, participants from CS-2, CS-3 and CS-4 explain the social and economic impacts of the 





Participant P26 who is from CS-3 describes how the project influences the social aspect of the 
society both locally and nationally. He says: 
Both international, regional, and national sporting events have been held there (in the 
GBK). … The public give their opinions about our facilities, from the structures … to 
small things such as toilet facilities…are under the spotlight. The way we manage the 
GBK complex will determine the quality not only the sporting facilities but also the 
office and business areas in the complex.  
Another participant from CS-3 adds her perspective that the football stadium with the seating 
capacity of 78,000 is often used for major political campaigns as in the last 2014 presidential 
election (P32). It means that all top political leaders and government officials are users of the 
GBK complex. ‘It makes us more excited on the one side, but feeling under pressure on the other 
side’, said participant P32. 
The CS-3 also has a large impact on the economic activities of the province.  The total employees 
of the agency PSA3 itself are more than three hundred as found in its annual report. Around thirty 
large companies have various business contracts including BOT, land lease, facility lease, joint 
operation, and advertisement spaces. ‘It means thousands of people work in this complex to make 
a living’, said participant P32. Types of properties in BOT contracts are also diverse from hotels, 
shopping malls, offices, and leisure, sport, and recreation centres. The performance of the 
PPGBK will impact the quality of all those business venues. 
Likewise, as the CS-4 is the only commercial airport in the province, its service delivery has a 
high social impact. Participant P30 says that the public has expected more since the airport 
extension project has been partially operating but that is not a really big pressure for the company. 
This is because the company has established standardised service operations for all airports under 
its management (P30). ‘Yet public service awareness is another important measure to control our 
service delivery’, participant P30 recognises. 
Another example of social and economic impacts is shown in CS-2. The mall was the pioneer in 
the region. In the beginning of its operation in 1998, the CS-2 encouraged local economic 
activities. It changed how the local people shopped from traditional markets into a modernised 
shopping centre, as mentioned by participant P29. At that time, the local people came from 
middle to lower classes in terms of income per capita. Therefore, as part of its company is social 





The high social and economic contributions of partnerships projects have positive impacts on the 
way the private sector partners operate and increase the quality of their service delivery. The 
public pay more attention to both physical and service quality from the facilities whether in the 
form of a sporting complex, a shopping centre, or an international airport. 
 Accountability Concerns in PPP Stages 
In this section, the participants’ views regarding PPP accountability are discussed further by 
including one additional circumstance in which accountability forms as well as factors are being 
analysed and ranked accordingly. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are different types of 
accountability forms based on different contexts. For the purpose of matching different 
accountability forms to different levels of PPP phases, in every phase the participants were asked 
from their experiences and knowledge what activities they conduct and to whom for what the 
actors must account.   
Figure 8.2 – The Stages of Property Based PPPs 
 





There are five stages of PPPs analysed namely initiation, set up, implementation, termination, 
and internal and external monitoring as can be seen in Figure 8.2 (GoI 2014).  The initiation stage 
is conducted by the asset custodian. In all four case studies, the asset custodians are the state asset 
users. Once the asset custodian has submitted the proposal, the state asset manager conducts 
valuations, and joint analysis. If the proposal is approved, the asset custodian holds a tender 
process to select the winning party. That is the end of the set-up stage. At this point, the private 
sector partner takes over the responsibility. They start construction, running the business until 
the end of the contract. 
The internal and external monitoring is conducted through all stages. In each stage, the practices 
of actors are analysed through the lens of various accountability forms such as legal, communal, 
contractual, managerial, and parliamentary accountability (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 
2004).  Then, the six accountability factors as discussed in the previous section are taken into 
consideration in the analysis. This is to understand what factors affect accountability in every 
stage of PPPs. 
 The Initiation Stage 
The types of projects are determined in the initiation stage. Officially, the main actor in this stage 
is the state asset custodian who could be the state asset users or the state asset manager. According 
to the regulation, the asset custodian alone decides what type of business they will develop on 
their idle properties. However, in real life experience, the asset custodian involves potential 
private sector partners to conduct feasibility studies. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
state asset user does not have the personnel, skills or financial resources to conduct such 
comprehensive studies. 
Legal and communal meets professional accountability 
In the very beginning, the trigger of asset utilisation in general and PPPs in particular is the 
existence of either surplus or idle assets or underutilised assets (GoI 2014). Those assets could 
be under the custody of either the MoF as the asset manager or other ministries as the asset users. 
The other ministers have two options regarding their idle assets: hand them over to the MoF or 
utilise them.   
As stated by the regulation, in the initiation stage, the state asset custodian is required to conduct 





the most suitable business type to develop on the site by considering the needs of its own 
organisation, the surrounding society, financial feasibility, legal permissibility, and the 
availability of potential investors (P03, P18, P23 and P27).  
In the case study CS-2 for instance, participant P29 explains further the consideration of choosing 
to build a shopping centre on the site.  
At that time, in the area, there was no modern shopping centre. And from the projected 
business cashflows, the potential investors saw the project was prospective in the long 
term and they believed that the investment would be fruitful. The potential return would 
be enough to cover their initial investments and some profit margins.  
On the other words, the legal consideration of the state asset users meets with the profit motive 
of the potential investors. Nevertheless, the legal aspect is not the only consideration of the state 
asset users. As discussed in the previous chapter, the officials of those institutions had other 
motives. There was no proof that they got personal kickbacks, but their institutions obtained 
assets from off budget sources which, sector partner as can be seen from the contract.  
The current regulation has set up guidance for both the asset custodian and the asset manager as 
follows. In the initiation stage, the asset custodian conducts a feasibility study to analyse what 
type of project will be developed, how many years the project will last, and what benefits and 
costs the institution will incur. In addition, the asset custodian is required to propose the 
contribution paid by the private sector partner to the government. The amount and percentage of 
the contribution is determined to reach a situation where the government is fairly compensated 
for the use of its asset, and the private sector partner gains a normal profit to return its investment 
to the project. 
Risk and cost and benefit 
Once the asset custodian decides that they will invite private sector partners to utilise their idle 
asset, the first analysis they conduct is the cost and benefit analysis, said participant P27 of the 
state asset user institution. ‘The benefits will go to the nation and also for the institution of the 
asset custodian. The benefit for the nation is in forms of revenues and economic activities …’ 
said participant P27. The benefit that becomes the motive for the asset custodian has been 
discussed in Chapter 6. Once they find that the benefit is larger than the cost, the profit sharing 
or the contribution for the government is calculated with one concern that the private sector 





According to participant P06 who comes from the DGSAM, in conducting the feasibility study, 
the asset custodian comes to a decision whether the benefit of a partnership overcomes the cost. 
Once it is considered that the project is feasible for government interests, the study analyses the 
risks that will be borne by the private sector partner and calculates the appropriate return for them 
to fairly cover their risks.  
Expertise 
Skill, knowledge and experience are essential for the asset custodian if they want to prepare a 
good feasibility study which is supported by valid historical and current data, strong assumptions 
and convincing projected cash flows (P21). Otherwise, the study will not provide useful 
information as to whether to continue or to stop the project initiation. Participant P21 continues 
his story: 
I strongly doubt the asset users have all the requirements to construct a reliable 
feasibility study. … I give you two extreme examples. A ministry sent us a very 
comprehensive feasibility study of an oil and gas project to utilise its asset. And the 
same ministry also supplied us the worst feasibility study I have ever seen. 
In the first example, the ministry hired an oil and gas consultant from a well-known university 
who was obviously not paid by them and the second one indicated the real quality of their human 
resources, said participant P21. The argument of participant P21 is justified by a story told by 
participant P24 who blamed the current regulation requiring his institution to prepare such a 
complex study. ‘We are trained to go to war, not to prepare an economic analysis report’, he 
added. 
 The Set-up Stage 
The second stage of PPPs is mainly the domain of the DGSAM as the state asset manager with a 
proposal of a feasibility study as the input and the approval or rejection as the output, followed 
by a tender process held by the asset custodian to select the most capable and trusted company 
as the private sector partner (see Figure 7.2). For analysing all the information, there are three 
teams established by the DGSAM to conduct the property valuation, business analysis, and a 
comprehensive analysis. The output of the first team is the market value of the government 
properties to be used in the partnership project. The second team, based on the input of the first 
team, analyse the financial and the business aspect of the feasibility study from the asset 





project is feasible and a recommendation regarding the contribution payment to the government 
if the project is feasible. 
The final analysis is conducted by the joint team consisting of both the state asset custodian and 
the state asset manager. The team analyses and compares information about the property market 
value, the business analysis, and the feasibility study from the asset custodian. This team has 
much greater authority than the other two teams, as it can reject the recommendation from the 
business valuation. The joint team has never disapproved such a recommendation, but the team 
can change the amount and percentage of the contribution payment (P16). The output of this team 
is a recommendation to the chief of the DGSAM to approve or to reject the asset utilisation 
proposal, with the minimum amount and percentage of the contribution payment attached.  
Participant P16 describes the obstacles in this set up stage as follows: 
If all required documents are complete, both property and business valuation report will 
be ready in less than three weeks. Then the joint team can finish its job in one or two 
weeks. The situation will be much different if the documents are not fully provided, the 
valuation team do not get access to property, and the members of the joint team do not 
reach consensus in making a decision.  
For a sensitive asset utilisation proposal, the chief of the DGSAM usually requires a considerable 
amount of time to make a decision (P16). He gave a case as an example, due to the decision not 
being made for more than six months, the property market value provided by the valuation team 
expired. The valuation had to be redone, not only the property valuation but also the business 
valuation. Changing the property value information changed some aspects of the business 
valuation. Finally, after three property valuations, the proposal was approved so then the asset 
custodian could arrange a tender to select the winner.  
Managerial and contractual accountability 
The processing times for CS-1, CS-2, CS-3, and the CS-4 were no different to the sample case 
provided by participant P16. This indicates that there could be issues regarding managerial 
accountability within the DGSAM internal decision-making process. Participant P16 thinks the 
role of the DGSAM in the set up is not as crucial as many actors believe. He further says: 
The DGSAM gives a go/no go decision to answer the proposal from the asset custodian, 
however, once an approval is rendered, the asset custodian takes back the control for 
almost all of the next process. It is the asset custodian who engages in the risky and 
tedious tender process. They are also the party who signs the contract as the 





The process in the DGSAM looks complicated because it involves three levels of chains, starting 
from the property valuation, business analysis and joint team analysis before it comes up with 
the last decisions. The output of one team becomes the input of the following team yet the joint 
team seems to have the ultimate recommendation given to the chief of the DGSAM. Any 
problems in any of those chain processes will obstruct the entire process of decision making 
(P16). 
From the perspective of the asset custodian, the critical point in the set-up process is to select the 
appropriate bidder, then to sign the contract. The contract becomes the reference for targets, 
processes, obligations and rights for the government represented by the asset custodian agency 
and the private sector partner. Both parties are accountable to what the contract says. Participant 
P27 confirms the finding by saying, ‘The objective of all processes starting from the feasibility 
study and obtaining the approval from the DGSAM is the contract signing’.  
To sum up, there are three parties involved in the set-up stage: the DGSAM, the asset custodian, 
and the private sector partner. The accountability practice in the DGSAM is managerial 
accountability where all processes involve only government officials, but they come from 
different divisions with different responsibilities. Meanwhile, for the asset custodian and the 
private sector partner, the relationship between those two parties is contractual accountability as 
it is written on the contract. 
Expertise and collaboration 
In the DGSAM, the three internal processes as can be seen in Figure 7.2, require highly skilled 
staff with experience in order to deliver valid and reliable outputs. The skill of property appraisal 
is needed by the first team, meanwhile expertise on financial and business projection is essential 
for the second team. The last team must excel in analysing information from different sources 
namely property market values and business valuations, and then put them together in the context 
of asset utilisation. It is clear that expertise is the influencing PPP accountability factor for the 
DGSAM in the set-up stage. 
It may be true that the DGSAM staff is skilled and expert in valuation and property management, 
but its role looks limited in stage two of the PPP process. In addition, the DGSAM as the asset 
manager has the authority to have more participation in PPPs by utilising its resources from the 
very beginning of the process which is the feasibility study. This phenomenon will be discussed 





From the perspective of the asset custodian, the longevity of their asset utilisation depends on 
how the DGSAM responds to the proposed feasibility study (MoF 2014a). Both participants P25 
and P27 say that they spend significant time and human resources dealing with the DGSAM 
procedures to respond to their proposal. Participant P27 says: 
We must be able to convince all those three DGSAM-established teams by providing 
any documents required. Even though they conduct the same procedure over and over 
again (repeating valuation process), we still need to cooperate with them.  
The analysis above shows that collaboration is the influencing factor for the asset custodian. The 
DGSAM and the asset custodian are required to collaborate to increase their accountability in 
second stage of the PPP process. 
 Implementation Stage 
 Once the contract is signed, the partner can start the construction and then begin the operation 
or production. Communication flows between the private sector partner, the asset custodian, and 
the state asset manager as has been shown by Figure 8.1 and described in Section 8.2. The 
implementation stage represents the longest time frame of the whole contract period which is the 
most crucial in the perspective of the partner as it is where all revenue streams occur. 
Managerial and contractual accountability 
The duty of the partnership, especially the private sector partner as they are the ones who control 
the asset, is to utilise the resources to deliver products or services and get the revenues. From the 
perspective of the private sector partner, the challenge is to effectively and efficiently manage 
the resources so that they can maximise the return (P28).  
Participant P02 believes that even though the implementation stage has the longest time frame 
compared to the initiation, set up and termination stages, the accountability practice is not as 
complex as in other stages especially from the perspective of the DGSAM. ‘The asset custodian 
has more of a role to conduct coaching, supervision, and controlling of the private sector partner’s 
activities. While the DGSAM gets the report from the asset custodian’, says participant P02. 
The PAM law requires an audit conducted soon after the construction is completed (MoF 2014a). 
The purpose of that audit is to verify the conformity between the erected building with the 
specifications as promised on the contract by the private sector partner. Another building audit 





sure that if some structural damage is found, the partner still has enough time to renovate it and 
then hand over the building in pristine condition.  
As discussed above, it is clear that in this stage, the accountability practised by the private sector 
partner is mainly managerial as they exercise their managerial skills to achieve a pre-set rate of 
return. Meanwhile, the state asset custodian emphasises the contractual accountability practice 
because their main concern is to make sure that the construction quality complies with the 
contract. Besides the annual contribution, the private sector partner expects the building they will 
receive at the termination, still has a lengthy useful and economic life. 
Risk, expertise, and social and economic impact 
From the perspective of the private sector partner, the risk, expertise, and social and economic 
impacts influence their accountability practices in the following ways. Fair risk allocation 
provides situations conducive to the partner obtaining a normal return on their investment. 
Participant P28 believes that fair risk allocation means that the contribution paid by the partner 
is appropriate not overstated nor understated. ‘Trust will grow in the relationship between those 
partners as the sound business practice is encouraged’, he explains the reason further. 
Nevertheless, if the private partner does not have expertise, they are still not able to generate 
revenues. The question whether the tender process has selected a qualified winner is answered in 
this stage. In case study CS-3, participant P33 shares her critical experience of selecting an 
underqualified private sector partner and the problem got worse due to lack of legal expertise in 
her institution.  
Likewise, the social and economic impact of a project is important in this implementation stage 
as can be seen in case study CS-2. In the early period when the competition was not high, case 
study CS-2 delivered significant social and economic impact to the local society and in return 
the profitability of case study CS-2 was positively influenced (P29). The accountability practice 
also gets better when the local society as the project external stakeholder pays attention to the 
service delivery of the project.  
Collaboration 
As can be seen in Figure 7.1, the state asset custodian is centred between the private sector partner 
as the source of information, and the state asset manager as the user of the information.  





asset custodian (P27). ‘We hold a routine forum inviting the private sector partners and the 
DGSAM representative even when there were no urgent problems, the forum is still held to build 
a rapport among us’, said participant P27. 
 Termination stage 
Most PPP contracts have a 30-year period, effective after the contract is signed. As mentioned, 
two years prior to when the contract ends, a facility audit is conducted  as required by law (MoF 
2014a). Under the same regulation, it is stated if the government does not alter the use of the 
property for other purposes, the partnership contract can be extended for the same partner. It is 
not explicitly mentioned whether the terms and condition change but given that both land and 
the buildings belong to the government after the asset transfer, the amount and percentage of the 
contribution must be adjusted, as a valuer participant said (P15). 
Managerial accountability 
As the DGSAM is a relatively new organisation established in 2006, until recently no information 
was to hand about PPP contracts reaching the termination period nor information about the 
procedures regarding assets being handed over without disrupting the operation of the business. 
When this happens there will be a problematic situation as the existing private partner still 
operates the asset. 
Given a scenario, a PPP project operating in the hotel industry has reached a terminal point. The 
government has no intention of extending the current partner contract for whatever reason, but it 
still wants to continue the business operation of the asset as a hotel. The hypothetical question is 
how does the government take over the assets without disrupting the operation of the hotel? The 
participants say that currently no policy has been set up nor even drafted to address such a 
situation. A valuer participant (P20) suggests that, a tender must be called for months or years 
before the existing contract ends. 
There is also the risk of getting a low-quality asset handed over by the private sector partner. The 
current policy has mitigated this risk by conducting a building audit two years before the terminal 
point (MoF 2014a). Once asset damages are found, the auditor will give some recommendations 
whether to just renovate for minor impairments, or even reconstruction for major deconstruction. 
The worst-case scenario is when the building has structural damage so total destruction is the 





The above findings demonstrate how the government manages two possible risks arising during 
the transition period of the termination stage. Lack of experience can be mitigated by analysing 
multiple scenarios and then managing the resources accordingly.  
Collaboration 
The termination stage is crucial to make sure that all contract-promised assets are handed over to 
the government. A long-established good relationship between the government and the private 
sector partner will be very useful. As mentioned above, in the case where the contract will not be 
extended, there will be a feeling of not wanting any more involvement in the transfer process 
(P26). One case of a not smooth asset transfer is mentioned by participant P26. He says, ‘When 
the contract ended, the private partner seemed not to want to share information regarding the 
asset to be transferred’.  
 Internal and External Monitoring  
The DGSAM as the state asset manager has a role to perform monitoring of and control over how 
other ministries as the state asset users manage the assets under their custody (MoF 2012a), The 
monitoring and control target both administrative and physical aspects of asset management in 
the ministries. The result of the monitoring and control can be followed up by placing sanctions 
on the faulty ministries/institutions. One type of sanction is by postponing all proposed state asset 
utilisation, asset transfer, and asset disposal (MoF 2012a). However, this type of sanction is not 
effective and can backfire on the sanctioning institution as discussed in Chapter 6 (P17).  
There are four audit institutions that by law can conduct audits on the PAM of a ministry. First, 
the inspectorate-general of each ministry has the authority to audit the public assets in their own 
ministry. Next, the Development and Finance Comptroller (the BPKP) is the Indonesian national 
internal auditors’ body. The BPKP conducts audits as requested by the MoF as part of monitoring 
and controlling activities. Third, the BPK, this high state institution is given the greatest authority 
to perform audits on all governmental bodies both in the national or sub-national governments 
(GoI 2006b). The last group is public accounting firms. The first and the second institutions can 
perform different types of audits such as compliance and performance audits, depending on the 
circumstances. Meanwhile, public accounting firms can conduct audits in state asset utilisation 





Another supervisory body is the House of Representatives (DPR). The DPR forms an asset 
standing committee for each ministry/Institution. The committee conducts monitoring and 
consultation regarding asset management in a ministry (P40). This is an ad hoc taskforce that is 
established for specific purposes. 
Figure 8.3 presents how both internal governmental bodies (Inspectorate-General of each 
ministry, the DGSAM, and the BPKP) and external (DPR and the BPK) conduct audits or 
monitoring on the PAM activities of a ministry. Internal accountability refers to the relationship 
between the ministry as the accountor and three agencies: the DGSAM and the BPKP as the 
account holder. Meanwhile the external accountability is how the ministry justifies its behaviour 
to the government external bodies which are the public accounting firms, DPR and the BPK. 
Meanwhile, the internal agencies of the ministry answer to their own inspectorate general. 
Figure 8.3 – Monitoring, Controlling and Audit on PAM of a Ministry 
  
Source: (GoI 2006b; MoF 2012a)  
 Opaque Transparency as a Part of Fraud Targeting Accountability 
On being asked the definition or keywords of accountability, eleven out of forty participants 





describe accountability are responsibility, legal, reporting, and audit. More than half of the 
DGSAM participants mention a legal aspect as part of accountability. One DGSAM participant 
views three aspects of accountability namely responsibility, transparency, and the legal aspect 
(P04). 
In the previous question regarding the problems of current PAM, many participants believe that 
the current policy and regulations are too rigid to address the current challenges of PAM 
development. An investigative question was asked every participant to seek their disposition 
toward performance and legal compliance. The answers from government participants are not 
surprising as the majority of them will choose compliance over performance. In contrast, their 
counterparts from the private sector confidently pick performance over compliance as long as it 
is not categorised as a criminal act.  
There is a paradoxical situation when the participants believe that some parts of the regulations 
prevent them from achieving a higher performance result, but they still tend to choose compliance 
over performance. Participant P03 gives a strong argument regarding the situation, with a legal 
background, he explains as follow: 
There are two principles of law enforcement namely the principle of legal certainty, and 
the principle of legal justice. The former is not difficult to prove, as long as the action 
is not different with the text of the regulation, the actor cannot be blamed nor punished. 
Meanwhile, the latter in many cases is really difficult to justify. 
Another participant still from the DGSAM but from a lower management level gives a real-life 
example of a dilemma in managing public assets. Once, there was an article mentioning that the 
lowest selling price of a state asset was its taxable value (NJOP). The NJOP is a property value 
determined for the purpose of property tax matters. Compared with market value, in the city 
areas, NJOP is usually lower than the market value. However, in unusual circumstances, the 
market value could be much lower than the NJOP. 
His institution is given a portfolio of several apartment properties whose market value is lower 
than the NJOP. The DGSAM’s duty is to sell the properties to release the state from paying high 
annual service charges for those empty apartments. The dilemma for the DGSAM is whether to 
sell the properties even with the selling price lower than their NJOP. If they are sold, the proceeds 
will go into the state account, and no more maintenance expenditures will be paid. Yet, the 
consequence is, the decision will be scrutinised by auditors or even worse by the state 
prosecutors. If the officer fails to convince the auditors or the prosecutor, he will be charged with 





convinces the auditor/prosecutor, he will be released from any charges. The participant quotes a 
popular saying among officers of the DGSAM, ‘It is better for doing nothing rather than doing 
something but accused of doing bad thing’.  
The decision taken was not to sell the properties at the market value but to keep the portfolio 
unchanged. Then the institution proposed to amend the regulation to allow selling assets under 
the NJOP as long as it was higher than or similar to its market value. The effect of the decision 
was that the maintenance cost burdened the state budget for several years as the amendment 
process for high-level regulation takes a considerable amount of time and effort. 
An auditor, participant P38 responds to a question regarding valuation methods. He says, ‘In 
valuing a state asset, the valuer should choose a method that will deliver a high market value for 
that asset’. In the valuation standard and practices, where there are options for valuation methods, 
the valuer chooses a method based on his professional judgement regardless of  the market value 
generated (IVSC 2013).  
In regard to the question of whether the participants of the DGSAM are convinced that the reports 
delivered by the state asset users have reflected the existing conditions, some participants say 
that they are not convinced yet that the reports are valid. Participant P15 believes that the 
periodical reports from many government entities regarding their asset records, do not represent 
the real conditions. The reports are sent just as a formality so that the entity has fulfilled its 
obligation. 
 Conclusion  
Six factors namely risk allocation, cost and benefit, social and political impact, expertise, 
collaboration, and performance measurement, are perceived as the factors most influencing PPP 
accountability. The first factor, fair risk allocation encourages accountability practices in two 
ways. Firstly, more qualified companies are interested in joining the tender process. Then, the 
private sector partner can operate in a normal situation without unnecessary pressures to cover 
the unfair risk transfer. Cost and benefit analysis is considered as the second influencing factor. 
A proper cost benefit analysis can act as a filter so that only projects whose benefits outweigh 
costs, can be offered to the private sector. The next factor is expertise which positively influences 
accountability in every stage of the PPPs. The expert private partner can construct better quality 
buildings and operate efficiently in the implementation stage. The fourth factor is performance 





measurement. The government tries to measure the private partner’s performance by conducting 
an audit where one of its objectives is to measure the quality of the construction.  
The penultimate factor is collaboration. The role of the state asset user is in the middle between 
the partner and the state asset manager as can be seen in Figure 8.1. Effective communication 
will build trust between parties. Last, the social and economic impact encourages accountability 
due to public high attention on the building quality and service delivery. More attention means 
more efforts to build the image. 























   




✓  ✓ ✓ ✓   
Termination Managerial ✓    ✓   
Table 8.2 summarises the above discussion regarding forms and influencing factors of 
accountability in relation to stages of PPPs. In the initiation stage, legal and communal 
accountability are dominant. At this time, the state asset custodian conducts a feasibility study as 
requested by law. The communal accountability is also dominant because in deciding the types 
of business operation, the state asset user is accountable to the community. Meanwhile, risk, cost 
and benefit, and expertise are the influencing factors at this stage. 
In the set-up stage, managerial and contractual accountability are dominant. At this stage, the 
tender process is conducted, and the contract signed which is an indication of contractual 
accountability. Meanwhile managerial accountability is shown in how the DGSAM teams 
conduct various analysis. In this stage, expertise and collaboration are the factors most 
influencing accountability. 
Meanwhile in the implementation stage, for the private sector partner, managerial accountability 
is shown when the partner manages their resources to generate revenues. Risk, expertise, social 
and economic impact, and collaboration are the influencing factors. Then in the termination 





collaboration factor is dominant, in order to obtain access and information about the building.  
Last, internal monitoring is part of internal accountability, likewise for the external monitoring. 
Last, transparency is seen as part of accountability for many participants. Some of them believe 
that transparency in the Indonesian PAM is opaque, while the accountability practiced is 







Addressing PAM Problems: PPP Adoption and Its Accountability Concerns 
 Introduction 
The findings regarding PAM, PPPs, and accountability practices have been analysed in Chapters 
6, 7, and 8 respectively. In Chapter 6, it is revealed that the state asset users and the state asset 
managers have a different focus on the development of PAM. In Chapter 7, the challenges and 
opportunities of PPP adoption are summarised from the four case studies. The accountability 
aspects of PPPs are discussed in Chapter 8. This chapter aims to examine the significance and 
implications of the above findings and then analyse them using the lens of current literature.  
Despite different themes emerging from different cases, it is important to realise that the views 
from DGSAM actors are not uniquely case related as most of them have experience across 
different cases. For example, a valuer participant who had served at the headquarters from the 
establishment of DGSAM had been involved in all four case studies. He has a wider perspective 
due to his involvement in a variety of PPP cases. 
This chapter is organised into seven sections including the introduction and conclusion. The 
second section discusses the development and challenges of Indonesian PAM, which answers the 
first investigative question ‘What are the development and challenges of the Indonesian PAM?’ 
The following section analyses the motives of the PPP adoption in the Indonesian PAM context 
to answer the second investigative question, ‘What are the rationales and challenges of PPP 
adoption?’ After that, the problems and impacts of PPPs which arise from the four case studies 
are discussed in the fourth section, which addresses the question regarding ‘What are the 
characteristics of PPPs to be considered in PAM?’ As a result, the first research question ‘How 
and why PPP practices been adopted in the Indonesian PAM context?’ is already answered 
because the first three investigative questions explore it.  
The second research question ‘What are the accountability challenges of PPPs in Indonesia’s 
PAM?’ and its two investigative questions, ‘What aspects influence accountability in PPPs?’ and 
‘How does transparency affect accountability?’ are addressed by the fifth and the sixth sections 





 Indonesian PAM: The Current State and Perceived Challenges 
The discussion in this section is to answer research question 1.1, ‘What are the development and 
the challenges of PAM?’ Firstly, it will describe how PAM practices develop through milestones 
and then compare them with the paths of other selected countries. It will provide a background 
to go deeper into contemporary challenges. Then, the challenges of Indonesian PAM are 
discussed through the lens of the existing literature on PAM, governance and the NPM 
movement.  
 The Current State  
As discussed in Chapter 2, PAM reform in the country was preceded by three major events in 
2003 and 2004 namely the enactment of the State Finance Law, the State Treasury Law and the 
publication of Indonesia’s first central government financial statement. Then in 2006, an asset 
lifecycle-based institution was established. The manual of this new organisation is Government 
Regulation No. 6/2006 concerning state asset management where the duties of the DGSAM were 
arranged following the asset life cycle framework. Not long after its establishment, the DGSAM 
kickstarted a nation-wide state asset arrangement program which targets three aspects of asset 
management: registration, valuation, and certification. 
Eight indicators can be utilised to evaluate the nation’s PAM practices, namely: outline of 
principles, cost recognition, information system, accountability mechanism and performance 
measurement, responsibility and leadership role, policy on surplus assets, private sector 
involvement, and the accounting basis (Conway, Kaganova & McKellar 2006). From those 
aspects, it can be seen what aspects the country has fulfilled and what the relationship between 
the aspect and the NPM principle is. 
Firstly, the outline of principles of the Indonesian PAM are functional, legal certainty, 
transparency, efficiency, accountability, and value certainty (GoI 2014). Two of the six principles 
adopted are in line with the NPM principles (Den Heyer 2011; Hood 1991, 1995). Three other 
principles: functionality, legal certainty, and value certainty are unique to the nation’s practices 
and defined from Indonesia’s legal perspective (Tutik & Widodo 2016). Functionality means that 
all asset decision making is in accordance with the function, authority and responsibility of the 
institution. Meanwhile the legal certainty principle obliges all actors in PAM to be bound to the 





supported by the accurate values of assets as a basis for financial statement presentation as well 
as transfers of assets.  
The second indicator is the recognition of public asset cost. The cost recognition includes three 
aspects namely valuation, depreciation and the cost of capital. Indonesian PAM practices have 
complied with those three aspects. The Indonesian government until recently has conducted asset 
revaluation twice, once soon after the establishment of the DGSAM (President of Indonesia 
2007), the latest is still in progress (President of Indonesia 2017). Since 2017, the national 
government has depreciated their fixed assets (MoF 2013). Their fixed assets are recorded at 
acquisition cost then adjusted with capital expenditures, depreciation, and altered to the result of 
the asset revaluation (GoI 2010).  
Third, in regard to the information system indicator, a management and accounting system for 
fixed assets has been established since 2003.  The system has been upgraded several times to 
adapt to changes of government accounting policies, and the latest version is called SIMAK 
BMN (MoF 2007).  The system generates information regarding public assets to be disclosed in 
the financial statement. 
Fourth, the mechanism of accountability in this context is designed to serve both internal and 
external stakeholders. External accountability is served by providing annual central government 
financial statements, audited by the external body, the BPK. Internally, the actors from the state 
asset users are accountable to the state asset manager, the MoF. In PPP type asset utilisation, 
there are communal, contractual, managerial, and parliamentary accountability as described in 
Chapter 7. Besides the BPK, there are three other types of auditor to audit the reliability of the 
information or reports generated, compliance to the regulations, and performances. There are 
inspectorate-generals in every ministry, the BPKP and public accounting firms. The last two 
conduct audits only by request by the MoF for specific assignments. In terms of performance 
measurement, the government has not developed a robust system to evaluate the performance of 
every property they possess. The only asset performance measurement tool is provided by the 
2011 building standards which can be used to match the need for spaces and the standard of the 
building (MoF 2011). However, the standards applied only for new proposed buildings and their 
scope is still limited to very a few types of buildings.  
The accountability mechanisms include legal, professional, communal, contractual, managerial, 





1987). Legal accountability is served through the process of PPP which is heavily regulated. The 
inflexible regulation prohibits the promotion of PPPs to utilise surplus assets. The legal base of 
PPPs is enacted through the parliamentary process. Once the officers of the DGSAM and the 
asset custodians are satisfied by the PPP proposal, a contract is signed by both government 
officers and the winning private sector parties. There is no indication that the society is invited 
to decide what type of development will be chosen for surplus assets. It indicates that the 
accountability mechanism in the asset-based PPPs does not sufficiently support communal 
accountability. 
With regard to the fifth indicator relating to management responsibility and the leadership role, 
the MoF as the state asset manager plays two roles as the policy maker as well as the policy 
implementer. Most PAM activities are conducted by state asset users but in regard to real 
properties they are required to seek preapproval from the MoF. This circumstance shows that 
most authority has been delegated to government agencies, but the MoF still holds the leadership 
role. A punishment and reward system has been established but it does not operate in real terms.  
In the case of the sixth indicator, regarding surplus or idle assets, only a few government agencies 
are keen to declare that some assets under their custody are surplus or idle. By law, they are 
required to hand over the asset to the MoF or prepare a utilisation plan involving the private 
sector. As a developing country where a number of infrastructure facilities are still below 
standard compared to developed countries, the current policy design discourages the disposal of 
real properties. The selling of properties with a market value of more than ten billion rupiah 
requires approval from the president (MoF 2016a). Ten billion rupiah is considered a low value 
for a property in Indonesia, but that still needs the approval of the president. 
The seventh indicator concerns the involvement of the private sector in the Indonesian PAM in 
asset utilisation. For short term contracts, government agencies rent the properties but for a long 
term, they have to adopt PPPs mostly the BOT scheme. Hiring private companies to manage 
government buildings is not common practice. Most institutions prefer to own and manage their 
own properties. Building management is conducted by their own general affairs division. 
Finally, the basis of accounting, in 2015 the central government for the first time published its 
accrual financial statement (GoI 2016). It took five years for the nation to fully convert to accrual 
basis from the issuance of its accrual accounting standard in 2010 (GoI 2010). A full accrual 





government wants to benefit from this adoption as the system delivers higher accountability and 
better asset valuation (Chan 2008; Wynne 2007). 
To sum up, Indonesian PAM has met six out of the eight indicators of reformed PAM practices: 
the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and eighth indicators. Regarding the sixth indicator, their 
treatment of surplus assets does not indicate a willingness to dispose of them to the private sector 
which is reasonable for developing countries. As a developing country, land is required for many 
infrastructure developments. Also, the government has not involved the private sector to manage 
their office buildings as they are still served by in house activities. The involvement of the private 
sector; cost transparency; accrual-based accounting; and outlining transparency, efficiency, and 
accountability; are signs that Indonesian PAM is shifting from traditional public administration 
to the new public management (Dunleavy & Hood 1994; Kaganova 2012; Reichard 1998). 
 Different Perceived Challenges  
The research found that actors from different institutions see the current challenges of the 
Indonesian PAM differently. Six challenges emerged from the actors’ perspectives namely the 
asset registry, asset security, asset utilisation, regulations and policies, performance measurement 
and asset management skills. Those six emerging challenges are analysed through the perspective 
of NPM principles and the lens of the asset management framework as can be seen in Figure 9.1. 
NPM Perspective 
Through the lens of NPM, the six challenges to the Indonesian PAM can be linked to NPM 
premises (Hood 1995). Lack of asset performance measurement means that Indonesia’s PAM 
does not meet the sixth premise ‘explicit standards and performance’. Despite the adoption of the 
asset lifecycle approach (Abdullah et al. 2012; GoI 2006a), the absence of performance measures 
indicates that the PAM cannot accurately monitor each phase of asset cycle as indicated by the 
performance management framework (Poister, Aristigueta & Hall 2015). The absence of 
performance measurement leads to difficulties in identifying surplus or underutilised assets 
which is the second challenge of the Indonesian PAM. 
The existence of surplus assets indicates that the government has not fully adopted the NPM 
principle of greater usage of resources. This problem is also experienced by developed countries 
such as the UK and US (Kaganova & Polen 2006). Inefficiency is the negative effect of the 





to allocate resources to manage the asset.  At the same time, the problem of the asset registry and 
asset security worsen the circumstances as those problems are also related to the principle of 
greater usage of resources. Invalid asset registration lowers the reliability of the financial 
statement and limits the ability to apply benefit cost analysis (Grubišić, Nušinović & Roje 2009). 
Figure 9.1 – PAM Challenges through the Lens of NPM and the PAM Framework 
 
Insufficient property management skill mostly in the state asset users, links to the premise 
‘private sector styled management practices’. The skill is essential if the government wants to 
gain the benefit from the private sector practice for greater efficiency (Hood 1991; Poister, 
Aristigueta & Hall 2015). Last, the problems related to the regulations and policies indicate that 
the Indonesian PAM has not fully employed the fifth and sixth premises of NPM. The regulations 
and policies have to meet two criteria, namely show clear assignment of responsibility without 
any diffusion of power, and clearly state the goals of the organisation. Those criteria deal with 
the fifth ‘active and visible high ranking management’ and the sixth ‘explicit standards and 
performance measurement’ premises respectively (Hood 1995). 
The impact of the above problems prevents the Indonesian PAM from fully obtaining the NPM 
benefits (Pollitt, C 2005). Instead of saving and efficiency, lack of performance measurement 
and a large number of surplus assets show that the government wastes its resources due to high 
inefficiency. Lack of knowledge of its staff, problems in asset registration and asset security, and 
the weaknesses of its regulations and policies prevent the Indonesian PAM from improving its 






The absence of asset performance measurement in current PAM practices means the government 
has difficulty in classifying their assets based on how fully they are utilised. The current system 
can separate surplus assets from utilised assets but is not yet able to properly differentiate 
between underutilised and fully utilised assets. Nevertheless, from the perspective of four types 
of managing performance (Bouckaert & Halligan 2008), Indonesian PAM practice can be 
categorised as performance administration, the second of five stages charted by the study. Current 
Indonesian practice has administrative data registration in the form of asset attributes, it has 
already taken into account different databases from different institutions yet in a very limited 
nature. The report generated is also limited and still cannot be used for further decision-making 
processes. 
The existence of surplus or underutilised assets indicates an inefficiency in utilising the 
organisation’s resources. However, the problem is not uncommon as not just other developing 
countries like Malaysia but several developed countries such as the US and the UK have the same 
problem, yet each country has different reasons and approaches (Abdullah et al. 2011; Hentschel 
& Utter 2006; Kaganova & Nayyar-Stone 2000; Kaganova & Polen 2006; Lu 2011). In 
Indonesia, asset utilisation and disposal are the way outs provided by the current policy, with the 
former encouraged and more favoured by most actors.  
Lack of skilled human resources is also an accountability issue. Highly skilled personnel are 
required to interpret the regulations and apply them to address the problems accordingly. 
However, in Indonesian PAM, a statement about problems with unskilled personnel in the state 
asset user institutions could be misleading. The problem could come from the regulations by 
which the institutions are required to perform a duty which is not their main function. Several 
countries at some point of their PAM development experienced the problem of human resources. 
Human resources is in Group 5 in the PAM framework (Den Heyer 2011; IAM 2015; Kaganova 
& Nayyar-Stone 2000). 
Transparency problem: asset registry 
Still perceived as a problem for some actors of the state asset users, asset registry was once a 
significant obstacle in developing Indonesian PAM. Massive assets were registered during the 
first asset revaluation program from 2006 until 2009. Actors from the DGSAM believe their 





employed in many developed countries such as New Zealand (Audit New Zealand 2010). There 
is no more asset reconciliation between institutions required. In many countries such as France, 
Germany and Switzerland, under commercial law it is legally obligatory to register public assets 
(Kaganova & Nayyar-Stone 2000). 
Asset registration is the first step toward an advanced asset information system in which 
transparency is displayed and improved (Zimmermann 2008). In addition, the asset register can 
serve several other interests such as asset security and provide a basis for the decision making 
process (Shepherd 2006). The view from non MoF actors is supported by the auditors who see 
that there are still some weaknesses in the current recording system including asset registration 
as massive an issue as those in the past. The extreme failure of asset registration could bring 
severe destruction to the organisation (Shepherd 2006). From the perspective of the PAM 
framework (IAM 2015), asset registration will create a data base that can be standardised, 
processed, and reported on for other purposes of the organisation.  
Rule of law related challenges  
As an archipelago country, Indonesia has government assets spread in many remote areas or even 
on isolated islands. During Soeharto’s era, people were afraid of taking government assets 
illegally, but after the collapse of the regime, large areas of government land were occupied 
illegally. The situation got worse as many of those lands were not supported by legal 
documentation. Compared to other countries, like Malaysia, the country also experiences 
problems regarding legal aspects of land property. Its concern is the lack of specific legal 
provisions to safeguard the public land (Abdullah et al. 2011).  
As discussed further, public land has different roles than that owned by the private sector. For 
example, there should be a linkage between the legal status and the land use (Zimmermann 2008), 
so the public can benefit more from the utilisation of government-owned lands. People who live 
in the surrounding areas can be involved in utilising government vacant lands but with clear and 
valid contracts. Once the people receive the benefit, the government land can be more secure 
from illegal occupation. 
In regard to challenges in current regulations and policies, there are four aspects which concern 
many participants namely inflexibility, ineffective sanction policy, inappropriate authority 
delegation, and the burden of the past. The main source of inflexible policy is that it tries to 





shift from traditional public administration to new public management, the government needs to 
deregulate many detailed aspects of its PAM practices, and open the door wider for the private 
sector (Dunleavy & Hood 1994). 
Ineffective sanctions and inappropriate authority delegation are perceived as a problem arising 
from the relationship between the state asset manager and the state asset users. The role of the 
MoF in Indonesia is mostly similar to that of the MoF in Australia and New Zealand (Conway 
2006; Dow et al. 2006). The problem in Indonesia goes back to the condition of not enough 
incentives nor punishments for the ministries retaining surplus assets. On the one hand, some 
ministries/institutions, usually the old ones, hold a large number of surplus assets. On the other 
hand, many ministries propose office spaces to the MoF. Yet, as the state asset manager, it is not 
easy to transfer assets from one ministry to another. In New Zealand, the capital charge policy 
discourages ministries from holding assets above what is needed as this will reduce their budget 
allocation. In Australia, the PAM emphasises integrated strategic asset management where the 
role of the MoF is central in managing all federal government properties located in the country 
excluding military assets. Two keys of central government asset management are seen as the 
leadership role and the incentive/disincentive of holding efficient/surplus properties. 
Through the lens of the PAM Framework 
From the perspective of the PAM framework, the security problem relates to the risk and review 
group where risk assessment and management are conducted to mitigate the risk arising from the 
undocumented properties. No legal documentation gives the potential for legal disputes in the 
future. Meanwhile regulations and policies are part of a strategy and planning group where the 
organisation prepares asset management policy, strategy and objectives, and planning (IAM 
2015). 
 Motives for PPP Adoption 
There are two options available to address the problem of surplus assets: dispose of or develop 
them. As the government still sees the need for the assets in the future, they do not opt for asset 
disposal but seek private sector partners to develop them. As discussed in Chapter 7, there are 
five motives for PPP adoption in addressing the surplus asset problem namely: accessing external 





safeguarding the assets from illegal occupation, acquiring additional fixed assets for the 
custodian agencies, and leveraging a bargaining position for an additional budget allocation.  
The first two motives are not different to PPP adoption for infrastructure development. When the 
government cannot afford to develop projects with its own budget then it invites the private sector 
to invest their money (Grimsey & Lewis 2005; Hodge & Greve 2007; Yescombe 2007). The 
government also realises that they do not have the expertise nor the experience to run the project 
and they look for a private sector partner with the appropriate background (Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff 2011; Evans & Bowman 2005; Hodge & Greve 2007).   
The thesis finds that in all case studies, the motives for the PPP adoption are both for financial 
access and for the private sector expertise and experience. In CS-2, there are several PPP 
contracts utilising some parcels of land. Some contracts are for projects to develop vacant lands 
and other contracts are for managing existing sporting facilities. The former has no differences 
from other case studies, but the latter is mostly driven by the motive to gain private sector 
expertise and experience.  
The above motives are also mentioned in the MoF regulation which states that private sector 
partners are required to provide financial resources, experience, expertise, managerial and 
technical skills, human resources, and equipment (MoF 2014a).  
PAM unique motives 
Besides the above two common motives for the adoption of PPP, the research also find that in 
property based PPPs, there are three other motives namely safeguarding the surplus asset, 
acquiring additional fixed assets for the custodian agencies, and leveraging their bargaining 
position for additional budget allocation. Those three motives arise from the perspective of the 
asset users. In addition to those motives, it is also revealed that one participant recognises that 
his institution receipt fund from the private sector partner.  
As discussed in Chapter 7 and the previous section, government land which is left vacant is highly 
likely to be illegally occupied. If the occupied land does not have legal certification, the potential 
to lose the land becomes much higher. Illegal occupation of government lands is quite common 
in the country especially when the land is left vacant (Rachmawati 2014). To mitigate the risk of 





pieces of land across the archipelago. That number represents less than 60% of the total 
uncertified state-owned as can be seen in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1 – Legal Certification of State Lands 
No. Regions Realisation Target  
1 Aceh              965       4,110  
2 Sumatera Utara           1,055       1,534  
3 Riau, Sumbar, Kepri           1,267       2,685  
4 Sumsel, Jambi, Babel           2,073       2,825  
5 Lampung dan Bengkulu           1,257       2,017  
6 Banten              839       1,093  
7 DKI Jakarta              204          374  
8 Jawa Barat             390       2,157  
9 Jateng & DIY           1,497       1,777  
10 Jawa Timur           1,666       2,485  
11 Kalimantan Barat              530       1,789  
12 Kalsel & Kalteng              716       1,203  
13 Kalimantan Timur dan Utara              211          850  
14 Bali dan Nusa Tenggara              713       2,629  
15 Sulsel, Sulteng, Sulbar           2,252       3,142  
16 Sulut, Sulteng, Gorontalo, Malut           2,297       4,252  
17 Papua and Maluku Islands           1,364       2,505  
  Total         21,296     37,427  
Source: the DGSAM (2019) 
Next, the research find that the partnership becomes a tactic for the asset user to obtain additional 
fixed assets from the private sector partner. It seems the PPP becomes a shortcut for that agency 
to procure assets without passing through the normal channel of budgeting where the decision is 
not always favourable. This situation can be seen as a breach of the most fundamental budgetary 
principle namely comprehensiveness. Comprehensiveness requires that all government revenues 
and expenditures must pass through the budgetary cycle (Sundelson 1935). In this circumstance, 
the revenue from the partner goes directly to the asset user in the form of fixed assets.  
For a public service unit (BLU), this excuse is justifiable as it is a semiautonomous agency which 
has the authority to manage its revenues and expenditure (GoI 2012a). The practice in CS-3, the 
BLU as the government vehicle to manage the sporting complex, has the authority to negotiate 
with the private sector partner, and to manage its own budget. In another case study, there is no 
justification from the budgetary perspective, for the asset user to receive any direct contribution 





The second motive is that the asset user can increase their bargaining position to propose an 
additional budget allocation from the nontax revenue from the PPP contribution. By law, a 
ministry is entitled to obtain additional revenue from nontax revenue it contributes (GoI 2018b). 
A stream of revenue flows to the state budget annually from asset-based PPP projects. The asset 
custodian can claim back a certain percentage of those revenues to fund their activities. To do 
this, the agency still needs approval from the MoF. Using this channel, the asset custodian gets 
additional revenue through the proper budgetary cycle in which all revenues go to the state budget 
and the additional expenditure for the agency also comes from the budget. 
The two above motives are explicit and legal transactions where the asset users get additional 
revenue. However, from governance point of view, the second motive is a better way for the asset 
user to benefit from the PPP projects as all revenues from the partner contribution and the 
additional expenditure allocation are coming from the budgetary cycle (the principle of 
universality).  
To understand why the private sector partner provides assets to the asset custodian, it is important 
to consider the Indonesian culture regarding how members of society deal with government 
officials. For most Indonesians, giving gratification for officials is necessary in return for the 
public service they receive (Robertson-Snape 1999). This is also the case, when the private sector 
partner gets ‘help’ from the officials of the asset custodian during the PPP process. However, due 
to the fact that gratification is forbidden by the current law (GoI 2001), the private sector partner 
gives the gratification to the institution instead. 
One participant who is an official of the asset custodian suggested that gratification to the 
officials most likely still exists in asset utilisation projects. Yet, in the asset utilisation context, 
the research has not found any gratification charges issued by law enforcement institutions. 
Gratification is a part of the corruption activity which is part of PPP risk and this kind of risk 
should be assigned to the government (Chan et al. 2010). 
 Problems and Impacts of PPPs  
Sixteen themes emerged from the research which have been classified into three categories: 
regulation and policies, contracting party issues, and PPP impacts. In this section all those themes 
will be discussed based on the literature. It has been found that the current regulations and policy 
contain uncertainty due to the changes in government direction. In addition, the regulation is 





situation. One of the impacts of the inflexibility is the lack of a dispute settlement mechanism. 
Some articles in the government regulations can be interpreted in different ways which can lead 
to different actions to fulfil the demands of those articles. In some projects where the assets from 
other levels of governments are also utilised, it seems there is a lack of coordination between 
government agencies themselves. The private sector also complained about intervention by 
political figures of the parliament in several tender processes.  
NPM is dynamic and so is the government organisation (Oehler-Sincai 2008) yet not as dynamic 
as the private sector. It changes its direction and as a result, the regulations and policy are altered. 
In CS-1, the private sector partner claims the new regulation added new obligations that differed 
from the contract. The research found under the previous regulation, that in BOT partnership 
projects, approval from the MoF had been required and the government had been entitled to a 
portion of the asset once the building was ready. In another case. CS-2, the private sector partner 
was required to provide additional documentation due to the changes in government regulation.  
Regulation related risks are one of the principal risks in PPPs (Akintoye, Taylor & Fitzgerald 
1998; Wettenhall 2005; Yescombe 2007) which should be allocated to the government. 
Meanwhile cross-sectoral collaboration is believed to bridge relationships between partners 
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 2011). As with the corruption problem, political intervention both 
from the government officials or MPs is a risk that should be addressed by the government (Chan 
et al. 2010).  
Meanwhile, the request from company C4 of the CS-4 that the government should lower the 
contribution payment from PPP infrastructure projects, is considered appropriate as the 
government is obliged to provide public infrastructure (Adams, Young & Zhihong 2006; 
Akintoye & Beck 2009; Greve & Hodge 2005). The same requests  came from several other 
projects and the government responded by issuing a MoF regulation regarding procedures on 
state asset utilisation for infrastructure projects (MoF, MoF 2014). Under that regulation, the 
contribution payment for the government is significantly lower and for some selective projects, 
can be waived. 
Other types of challenges come from the contracting partners. The private sector partners are 
reluctant to disclose the project financial statement fully. This fact is not surprising as in other 
countries, the private sector partner is not transparent at several stages of PPPs (Abdul Aziz 2001; 





to encourage and to push them to be more transparent and an audit process can mitigate the risk 
of opacity (Hood, Fraser & McGarvey 2006). 
From CS-3, it is revealed that the government has suffered from weak legal expertise in drafting 
contracts and the problem has continued to do damage until recently. In the case study, the BLU 
did not have enough experts in conducting the PPP process, mostly in the contract drafting before 
and after the tender process. Contract drafting is a focal point as it becomes the reference for all 
activities conducted by both partners until the end of the partnership (Evans & Bowman 2005).  
Meanwhile, on the asset custodian side, they have difficulties preparing the feasibility studies as 
an entry point for an asset-based PPP. In a PPP, one of the government’s motives is to gain 
expertise from the private sector (Liu & Wilkinson 2011), including their expertise in preparing 
valid and reliable feasibility studies to decide which project to develop on government land. 
There is a view that the asset custodian is not the proper entity to develop such studies.  
The social and economic impact of property-based PPPs may not be as large as those for 
infrastructure development, nevertheless, there are some noticeable contributions from the four 
case studies. CS-3 displays how the government manages the largest sporting complex in the 
country. Two intriguing facts emerge about CS-3. Firstly, of the four case studies, it is the only 
one that utilises a semiautonomous entity to represent the government dealing with the private 
sector partners in managing the complex. This entity can overcome the barriers arising from 
governmental body attributes in dealing with the private sector. To do this, the entity must have 
hybrid characteristics as a governmental body yet be flexible enough to mimic the behaviour of 
the private sector (GoI 2012a). The CS-3 also shows that commercialised public assets can 
support funding the core function of the asset itself. The proceeds from the business are mostly 
channelled to maintain and upgrade the facilities. 
The other three cases also contribute to local economic development. The CS-1, despite its legal 
dispute, has used underutilised land in the prime area of Jakarta. Its main tenant includes a newly 
established government body. Meanwhile the role of the CS-2 is more to do with driving medium 
to small size entrepreneurs in the surrounding areas. That can be seen from their list of tenants. 






 Accountability: The Influencing Factors and Accountability Forms 
Most actors define accountability as involving responsibility, transparency, legal compliance, 
reporting, audit, and resource use. The choice of words from the actors indicates that most of 
them focus on the mechanisation of accountability. In the discourse of mechanisation, 
accountability promises control which can be achieved through overseeing, directing operations 
and behaving within the organised context (Dubnick 2014). One actor believes that the 
relationship between the asset user and the asset manager is between the agent and the principal. 
Likewise, the relationship between the private sector partner and the asset user shows the same 
mechanism. This confirms that accountability is being mechanised. In addition to that, the 
accountability discussion is not monolithic. Some other actors use the term legal compliance in 
relation to the context of formalisation, and law enforcement. This is a sign of a formalisation 
discourse in which accountability promises justice (Dubnick 2014). 
 Factors Influencing Accountability 
The six most influential PPP accountability factors have been identified and ranked according to 
their influence based on the actors’ perception. They are risk allocation, cost and benefit, 
expertise, performance measurement, collaboration, and social and economic impact as can be 
seen in Table 8.1. 
Risk allocation is perceived as the most influential factor in PPP accountability. When risk is 
allocated to the party who can best control it, the partnership as a whole will be able to maximise 
its benefit (Forrer et al. 2010). Proper risk allocation comes from good project governance. The 
two together result in a high performance for the project (Abednego & Ogunlana 2006) which 
accountability can refer to. Proper risk return trade off is recognised by the government (MoF 
2014a) where the private sector partner who bears more financial and business risk will be 
required to pay a lesser percentages of the profit sharing agreement. 
The concept of  risk and accountability can be seen from the perspectives of risk avoiders and 
risk takers (Weigold & Schlenker 1991). Accountable risk avoiders still take the risk but with 
caution and prefer a situation that provides safety and satisfaction. Meanwhile, risk takers seek 
for risk even when accountable. Accountability will be enhanced when both risk takers and 
avoiders are allocated risks that they can manage. The difference is only how they see the risk. 





Secondly, cost and benefit analysis is conducted prior to the decision to adopt a PPP. There are 
several types of such analysis, from a simple one to a complicated full analysis (Forrer et al. 
2010; Grimsey & Lewis 2005). The aim of this analysis is to make sure that the benefit of the 
PPP is higher than its cost, in other words, that value for money is achieved (Grimsey & Lewis 
2005). In the PAM context, as the project is initiated by the asset custodian, the cost benefit 
analysis is conducted by their officials. The hazard of this situation is, if in aggregate the project 
benefit overcomes its cost but they do not see the benefits for their agency, they will be 
discouraged from pursuing the initiation process. Having realised this situation, the asset 
manager still does not forbid the practice of giving assets to the asset custodian. 
Thirdly, it has emerged that expertise is perceived as the third most influential accountability 
factor. Expertise is one of the main reasons for PPP being adopted (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 
2011; Evans & Bowman 2005; Hodge & Greve 2007; Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton 2012). A 
stronger notion claims that expertise is the key to professional accountability (Romzek & 
Dubnick 1987) as it is a fundamental requirement for assessing risk management (Palermo 2014) 
The government itself already appreciates the need for expertise (MoF, MoF 2014). Expert staff 
are required not only for the private sector partner but also for the government especially in the 
initiation and set up process.  
Furthermore, performance measurement ranks fourth as an influencing factor. It influences 
accountability by providing the basis for reward and punishment decisions (Forrer et al. 2010), 
Despite the fact that a performance measurement system is not yet available, the Indonesian 
government has set up a monitoring and auditing system to verify private sector partners 
compliance (MoF, MoF 2014). It should be noted that performance measurement for 
accountability can mislead the organisation to focus only on how the resources are used to 
achieve the objectives and disregard exploration and learning from experience to improve the 
performance (Halachmi 2002). 
The penultimate factor is collaboration. Only a few actors consider collaboration as the main 
factor influencing PPP accountability, yet some told how they collaborate with their counterparts. 
It was evident that both control and collaboration occur in practice. By law, the asset manager is 
required to control the asset user, and the asset user controls the private sector partner (MoF, 
MoF 2014). Despite collaboration creating strong commitment between partners (Sundaramurthy 
& Lewis 2003), collaboration between actors is just part of the leadership style of one of the 





Finally, actors believe that PPP in PAM does not have a large impact compared to the impact of 
PPPs on infrastructure development. They therefore rate this factor as the least influential on 
accountability. Even so, the social and economic contributions from all case studies have been 
mentioned by them. Instead of the social and political impact (Forrer et al. 2010), they prefer to 
consider the social and economic impacts of the projects because these impacts are easier to 
discuss. In short, the more social and economic impacts, the more accountable the PPP projects 
are. Public attention either in the form of satisfaction or criticism, encourages the partnership to 
be more accountable. The CS-3 has had the most public exposure as it holds many national and 
international sporting events. 
 Accountability Concerns in PPP Stages 
Accountability forms 
As discussed in Chapter 3, accountability can be classified in different approaches such as 
internal and external, legal and professional, bureaucratic and political vertical, external or 
horizontal (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 2004; Halligan 2007; Romzek & Dubnick 1987). In 
regard to PPP stages, a series of accountability mechanisms starting from communal, contractual, 
managerial, and parliamentary can be assigned to each stage (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 
2004). In the PAM context, the research applies two PPP accountability frameworks (Demirag, 
Dubnick & Khadaroo 2004; Forrer et al. 2010) and finds the accountability – PPP stages 
relationship as can be seen in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2 – PPP Stages: Accountability Types and Influencing Factors 
No. PPP Stages 
Accountability Forms Factors Influencing 
Accountability in 
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Slightly differing from the PPP accountability form framework (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 
2004), the research adds one additional stage, the termination because actors view this stage as 
critical. At this stage, the government will get its assets and the buildings. To make sure that the 
building is still in good shape before being handed over to the government, a construction audit 
is conducted (MoF 2014a). 
In the initial stage, the forms of accountability are the legal and communal while in the PPP for 
infrastructure, there is only one form of accountability, communal accountability (Demirag, 
Dubnick & Khadaroo 2004). In PAM, the PPP is proposed by the asset custodian as it is obliged 
by the regulation to utilise surplus or idle assets. Therefore, the asset custodian is legally 
accountable. The agency is also accountable to the community because in determining the type 
of project, it considers the circumstances and the needs of the community. At the initiation stage, 
risk, cost and benefit, and collaboration are the most influencing factors. Before deciding to 
choose a PPP project, the asset custodian conducts a cost benefit analysis, verifies the risk, and 
collaborates with the asset manager to obtain initial approval. 
The research found that in this stage the asset custodian is required to conduct a brief feasibility 
study to determine what project to develop (MoF, MoF 2014). The human resources of the asset 
custodian do not have sufficient skills to conduct a study or a complex asset utilisation project. 
The practice discourages accountability as the asset custodian is assigned to conduct studies and 
this is not its main function.  
In the second stage, the accountability forms in the PAM context are managerial and contractual 
while in the infrastructure development context, the form is contractual only. At this stage, the 
asset manager conducts several managerial actions to evaluate the request from the asset 
custodian. After the tender process, the asset custodian and the winning party sign the PPP 
contract. Meanwhile the influencing factors are expertise and collaboration.  
In the following stage, besides the managerial form in the PAM context, there is also the 
contractual form of accountability. This is due to the order of the current regulation that once the 
construction is completed, the government will assign an audit team to verify whether the 
construction is in line with the specifications stated on the contract. The implementation stage 





In the PAM context, the termination stage at which the government will receive the project assets 
is crucial and prior to that, the government sends a construction audit team. The team is assigned 
to make sure that the asset is in good condition before it is handed over. 
There is no difference in the internal and external monitoring processes of the PPP stages between 
the PAM and infrastructure context. In the internal government process, there are monitoring and 
auditing activities conducted by the inspectorate-general of every ministry, the MoF, and the 
BPKP.  Meanwhile, in the external accountability process, the ministry reports to the parliament 
and they are audited by the BPK. 
 Toward Accountability: Compliance and Transparency 
The research discovers that most government participants rank compliance over performance 
given that they realise that the current regulations can prevent the achievement of performance. 
The actors measure their behaviour against the text of regulation known as legal accountability 
(May 2007). This is the most elementary accountability where the content of the regulatory 
provisions is propagated. Despite the opportunity to innovate in order to enhance performance, 
the actors overemphasise administrative veracity and anti corruption measures (Bovens 2007, 
2007 ; Bovens, Schillemans & Hart 2008) In many cases, the view that compliance is more 
important than performance, together with a reluctance to deviate from the rules when 
circumstances require, delivers unfavourable results for the larger national interest. 
In contrast, actors of private sector partners prioritise performance over compliance. This 
behaviour serves profit orientation and the longevity of their organisation well. A complicated 
situation occurs when the performance oriented private sector actors meet with the compliance-
oriented government actors.  
All government actors understand transparency and accountability as the keys to good 
governance. Moreover, the actors’ adherence to legal accountability influences the type of 
transparency adopted from which the fairness and appropriateness of their behaviours can be 
measured against the regulations. As described in Chapter 8, the state asset users answer to the 
asset manager periodically by reporting to comply with the regulations. However, some actors 
from the asset manager view the reports as merely a formality to show compliance with the 
regulations. Not much information could be extracted to measure the performance of the asset 
utilisation. This is a sign that opaque transparency is evident, where the information does not 





accountability determines how they conduct the audit in measuring the compliance or 
performance of the auditees. Some auditors display their misperception of the behaviour of the 
auditee who seems to have fully complied with the regulations. This behaviour delivers negative 
affects to the performance of the organisation.  
 Conclusion 
The discussion presents the current state of Indonesian PAM practice through the lens of eight 
indicators of public sector reform toward good governance and new public management. Six 
indicators regarding the principles, cost recognition, information systems, accountability 
mechanisms, managerial roles, and accounting recording basis, have been met by the current 
PAM practice. In regard to the treatment of surplus assets and the involvement of the private 
sector. Those indicators have not been fully implemented. 
The chapter also shows the differences between actors from different institutions of perceived 
challenges and analyses them through the NPM principles and PAM framework. The current 
challenges are performance measurement, surplus or idle assets, skills, asset registration, asset 
security, and regulation-related issues. The first, second and third challenges deal with 
accountability issues from the NPM perspective, and deal with risk and review, strategy and 
planning, and organisation and people. The registry challenge is a transparency issue that 
influences the quality of asset information. The security and regulation challenges are related to 
the rule of law principle that relates to the strategy and planning of the organisation. 
There are five reasons behind the PPP adoption. The first and second reasons are to access 
external financial resources as well as the expertise and experience of the private sector. These 
motives are no different from those of PPP for infrastructure development. The other three 
motives regarding safeguarding assets, acquiring additional fixed assets, and leveraging 
bargaining positions are unique to the PPP in the PAM context.  
After the adoption motives, the chapter also discussed the emerging themes of PPPs divided into 
three categories: regulation and policy issues, the related party concerns, and the impact of PPPs. 
The problems related to regulation and policy should be the responsibility of the government. 
The government has problems with contract drafting issues and the expertise of the asset 
custodian. Meanwhile the private sector partners should be more transparent in providing their 
operational activities. The PPPs of those four case studies deliver positive social and economic 





In regard to accountability practices, the chapter discusses the six influencing factors based on 
the perceptions of the actors. Those factors together with various forms of accountability can be 
allocated to every stage of PPP projects from initiation to the implementation stages. Last, the 













Conclusion and Recommendations 
 Introduction 
The purpose of the thesis is to investigate PPP practice and accountability concerns in the 
Indonesian PAM context. To gain a complete picture, it is essential in the very beginning to 
understand how the nation manages its public assets, what challenges it has, and how it addresses 
them. PPPs have been adopted to address the problems arising from surplus assets, but the 
adoption brings consequences for accountability due to the involvement of the private sector in 
public affairs. 
The thesis explores the practice of Indonesian PAM to understand its development and 
challenges. Its development shows that the nation transformed its public sector management 
through the implementation of good governance principles and joining the NPM movement. 
Once the principles and practices of private sector management were adopted, the government 
set the objective of sound asset management but encountered several challenges. One of these is 
the existence of surplus or idle assets that obstruct the goals of high financial returns and service 
excellence. For decades, some measures were taken to address the problem by renting or long 
term leasing the properties to the private sector. 
PPPs have been adopted for several purposes, including in PAM where property-based 
partnerships were set up to utilise surplus assets. Several countries have adopted this policy 
including Indonesia. The complications of the policy and the context of Indonesian PAM raise 
accountability and transparency challenges. Every stage of the PPP process has different forms 
of and influences on accountability. 
The discussion in this chapter is divided into six sections with the introduction and summary the 
first and last sections. Section 2 summarises the main findings of the research while section 3 
answers two research questions and the five investigative questions. The contribution of this 
research and its policy recommendations are discussed in the following section. The final section 





 The Aim and Approach of the Research 
The research aims to explore the key features of the Indonesian PAM, the reasons for and 
practices of PPPs in the PAM context and the impact of the partnership on accountability. The 
research poses two main research questions: 
1) How and why have PPPs been adopted in the Indonesian PAM context? 
2) What are the accountability challenges of PPPs in Indonesia’s PAM? 
To answer the above questions, the research employs a multiple case study approach where an 
in depth understanding is obtained through the analysis of the complexities of each case based 
on its social, economic and historical context (Yin 2014). 
In a case study research, the interpretation and analysis are built based on information coming 
from three different sources. Firstly, interviews with forty participants provide insight 
information from parties deeply involved in the process of policy making and implementing, 
auditing, and parliamentary debates. Those participants come from five different interest groups 
namely the Ministry of Finance as the state asset manager, other ministries as the asset 
custodians, private sector parties, auditors and members of parliament. The second source of 
information is government documentation regarding its PAM policies and PPP practices. Besides 
that, it plays a role in verifying the validity and consistency of the views of the interviewed 
participants. Last, publicly available information presents the current social and economic 
context behind the Indonesian PAM and PPP practices.  
The research runs thematic analysis on its data set to identify emerging themes. Those themes 
can be classified into four groups: the challenges of the Indonesian PAM (Table 6.1), motives of 
the PPP adoption (Table 7.1), the challenges of PPP adoption (Table 7.2), factors influencing 
PPP accountability (Table 8.1). These groups of themes provide the basis to answer the research 
questions.  
 Findings to Answer Research Questions 
Chapter 6 and 7 have answered the first main question of ‘How and why have PPPs been 
adopted?’ Meanwhile, Chapter 8 responds to the second main question, ‘What are the 
accountability challenges of PPPs?’ The main findings which answer those research questions 






 The Development and Challenges of the Indonesian PAM 
The first investigative question is. ‘What are the development and challenges of the Indonesian 
PAM?’ To answer this question, the research explores the milestones of PAM practices of the 
country, its institutional transformation, and the perspectives of its actors. The research found 
that Indonesian PAM practices can be traced back to the time when infrastructure development 
began. The PAM did not formally employ governance principles until the enactment of the 2003 
State Finance Law. The 2003 State Finance Law, the 2004 State Treasury Law, the 2004 Auditing 
of State Finance Law provided the foundation for public sector management in the nation. Not 
long after, the government issued its accounting standard and the first central government 
financial statement. The concepts of result-oriented accountability, professionalism, 
proportionality, transparency, and independent audits were recognised. In PAM policies, the 
asset life cycle framework has been applied in which the full cycle includes planning, procuring, 
operating, and disposing. 
Lacking accountability for its asset management, a state arrangement program was conducted 
from 2007 to 2009. The program was able to provide the registration and valuation of all 
government assets and to some extent revealed the problems. Based on the result of the program, 
the institution in charge, the DGSAM generated long term plans involving asset utilisation, asset 
legal documentation, budget and asset integrated planning, and an accrual-based asset accounting 
system.  
The development  
There are eight indicators or criteria to measure the progress of the Indonesia PAM. Firstly, the 
nation has established its PAM principles namely functionality, legal certainty, transparency, 
efficiency, accountability, and value certainty. Secondly, it has recognised the cost of public 
assets. Thirdly, an asset information system has provided the basis for decision making although 
it has not been able to generate asset reports in real time. Fourth is an accountability mechanism 
involving internal government bodies as well as the parliament. To ensure the quality of reports, 
audits have been conducted by both internal and external auditors.  
Fifth, most authorities have been decentralised to the asset users although the asset manager still 
plays a strong leadership role in setting PAM policies and delivering approval or rejection in 
important asset transactions. The reward and punishment system has not been effective because 





Sixth, the surplus or idle assets can be disposed of, transferred to the asset manager or utilised by 
involving the private sector. The first and second options are not favourable to the asset user as 
they will lose potential benefits in the future. Selling properties is also discouraged by the current 
policy as high-level approvals, as high as the president or the parliament, are required. The private 
sector has been involved in utilising surplus assets. Seventh, private sector involvement in the 
PAM is still limited to surplus asset utilisation. No private companies have been involved as 
property managers of government properties. The current system is contracting out services 
required from the private sector. Finally, since 2015, the government has employed an accrual 
basis accounting system. 
The challenges 
The challenges of the current practices can be linked to the seven premises of NPM and 
categorised into accountability, transparency, and the law-related issues. In addition, the 
challenges also affect certain groups of the PAM framework. In regard to the first category, the 
current PAM has not established performance measurement. As a result, it still cannot conduct 
the risk and review properly. Then, the nation has the problem of surplus assets which influences 
its strategy and planning. Skills especially in the asset user institutions, still need to be upgraded. 
In the second category, transparency, some ministries still have problems dealing with an asset 
registry which is under the spotlight of the BPK audit. This problem is included in the asset 
information group of the PAM framework. 
The third challenge, law related issues include asset security and regulation and policies. Two 
types of asset security issues are: vacant properties at risk of being illegally occupied; and a large 
number of public lands which do not have legal documentation. The former influences the risk 
and review section of the PAM framework, and the latter affects the strategy and planning group. 
 The Rationales and Challenges of PPP Adoption 
The second investigative question is, ‘What are the rationales and challenges of PPP adoption?’ 
To address this question, the research analyses the documents and the semi-structured interviews 
from four case studies. The perspectives of the participating actors are summarised, compared, 
grouped and analysed. The emerging themes are verified with the result of document analysis as 






The research found that there are five motives for PPP adoption namely: accessing external 
financial resources; gaining the expertise and experiences of the private sector partner; 
safeguarding the surplus asset; acquiring additional assets for the asset user; and leveraging a 
bargaining position for an additional budget allocation. The first two motives are no different 
from the ones of PPP for infrastructure development and are explicitly mentioned in the current 
regulations. Meanwhile the last three, are unique motives in the PAM context.  
The challenges 
As in the literature, the research found that PPP adoption comes with challenges arising from the 
regulations and policies. In addition, there are also issues regarding both contracting partners. 
Nine regulation related challenges are: the changing of regulations that brings uncertainty; the 
narrow room for discussion given to the private sector partner; multi interpreted regulations and 
policies; inflexibility; inappropriate organisational structures; inharmonious policies and 
coordination between levels of governments; intervention during the tender process; lack of 
dispute settlement mechanisms; and lack of support for infrastructure projects.  
Considering the contracting parties, the research found that the private sector partners seem to 
lack transparency. The government actors requested more transparency for better accountability. 
Then, the government especially the asset user, lacks expertise in legal contracting. They have 
suffered financially due to weaknesses from past partnership contracts. The asset users also lack 
expertise in preparing a feasibility study. However, this is fully accepted because that kind of 
study is not the main function of the asset users. 
 The Characteristics of PPPs 
The third investigative question is ‘What are the characteristics of PPPs to be considered in 
PAM?’ To answer the question, the research analyses the documents and perspectives of actors 
regarding five aspects of PPPs: the motives, types of projects, flow of payment, risks, and the 
government orientation toward profit. The research found that four of those five aspects of PPPs 
in the PAM context are different compared to those of PPPs in infrastructure development. 
The motives of PPPs for infrastructure development are mostly concerned with getting access to 
the external financing. The government also assumes the expertise and experience of the private 





two reasons are also relevant. However, as discussed above, the government agencies especially 
the asset users or asset guardians have additional motives. They expect that the project will 
safeguard their vacant properties. They also expect that the private sector partner, besides 
constructing the project, will deliver additional fixed assets for the use of the agencies. Those 
agencies thus increase their bargaining position against the MoF for additional budget 
allocations. 
In terms of project types, infrastructure PPPs construct both economic and social infrastructure 
such as toll roads, ports, hospitals, and schools. Meanwhile PAM related PPPs develop mostly 
commercial type buildings such as shopping centres, hotels and offices. Not many PAM related 
PPPs operate in infrastructure projects like the CS-3 and the CS-4. In the CS-3, some of the 
contracts are related to the sporting facilities, and in the CS-4, the project is the current airport 
extension. 
Regarding the movement of payments, in many infrastructure PPPs, payment flows from the 
government to the private sector partner to cover its investment. In other cases of infrastructure 
PPPs, the government gives guarantees to cover the risks of the private sector partner. In 
property-based PPPs, it is the other way around. The private sector partner pays a contribution to 
the government for utilising the government properties. 
In infrastructure projects, the government orientation is not for profit. This is because the 
government has to provide infrastructure for its people. However, in PAM related PPPs, the 
government is mostly profit oriented. The analysis in approving or rejecting project proposals is 
mostly in economic and financial terms. 
 The Accountability Concerns 
The second research question is ‘What are the accountability challenges of PPPs in Indonesia’s 
PAM?’ This question has two investigative questions: ‘What factors do influence accountability 
in PPPs?’ and ‘How does transparency affect accountability?’ The challenges of PPP 
accountability can be answered through understanding how the actors view the concept and 
practice of accountability in their organisation. The thesis analyses the documents to understand 






Accountability is perceived as involving responsibility, transparency, legal compliance, 
reporting, auditing, and efficient use of resources. There are two tendencies based on those views: 
accountability mechanisation and accountability formalisation. The former promises control 
through overseeing and directing operations and behaviour. The latter promises justice through 
legal compliance, procedures and law enforcement. 
Factors influencing accountability 
Ranked based on the significance of their influence, the factors are risk allocation, cost and 
benefit, expertise, performance measurement, collaboration and social and economic impact. The 
rankings are arranged based on the perceptions of the participating actors. Firstly, risk can 
enhance accountability only if the risk is allocated to the party who can manage it best. Secondly, 
cost and benefit analysis means if the benefits of the PPP adoption are greater than its cost, the 
circumstance is conducive to accountability. Thirdly, both parties have to be expert in the field 
where the project operates. The private sector partners have the expertise and experience to run 
the project, meanwhile the government officers are expert enough to effectively monitor and 
control the partnership project.  
Fourthly, performance measurement enhances accountability as it provides the basis for reward 
and punishment. Moreover, performance measurement can be utilised for accountability or 
performance improvement. The former could mislead by merely focusing on the efficient use of 
resources, but the latter encourages exploration and learning from experience to improve the 
performance itself. Fifthly, collaboration between partners generates strong commitment which 
positively influences accountability. It emerged in the case studies, that the nuance of control is 
much stronger than collaboration. Control and collaboration have contrasting assumptions and 
prescriptions as discussed in Chapter 2. Good governance should balance the use of those two 
approaches to obtain the optimal result (Sundaramurthy & Lewis 2003). Last, the more social 
and economic impacts, the more accountable the partnership. The social and economic impacts 
bring public attention to the partnership that in the end will encourage accountability. 
Accountability practices in PPP stages 
Based on the accountability framework (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 2004; Forrer et al. 
2010), document analysis, views from actors of PPPs in the Indonesian PAM, the map of 





According to  the literature (Demirag, Dubnick & Khadaroo 2004), in PPPs for infrastructure 
development the forms of accountability in the initiation, set up, and implementation stages are 
communal, contractual, and managerial respectively. With internal and external monitoring is 
the implementation of managerial and parliamentary accountability. 
In the PAM context in Indonesia, the forms of accountability in each stage from the perspectives 
of participating actors are as follows: legal and communal in the initiation, managerial and 
contractual in the set up, managerial and contractual in the implementation, and last, managerial 
in the termination stage. The parliament has no direct involvement in the activities. The internal 
and external monitoring are conducted by internal and external auditors. The BPK as the external 
auditors reports to the parliament periodically. Then, concerning factors influencing 
accountability, the factors are as follows; risk, cost and benefit, and expertise in the initiation, 
expertise and collaboration in the set up, risk, social and economic impact, expertise, 
collaboration, and performance measurement in the implementation, and collaboration in the 
termination stage.  
Compliance, transparency, and accountability  
From the actors’ view regarding compliance and transparency and their impact on accountability, 
it emerged that actors from the government and private sector have contrasting arguments 
regarding compliance and performance. As at times, performance achievement conflicts with 
compliance policy, most government actors choose compliance over performance. However, the 
private sector actors have the contra view that performance is more important than compliance. 
This complication creates concerns for accountability, unless both partners manage their 
differences through control and collaboration. 
The research also found that most government actors adhere to legal accountability. Some actors 
saw reports as being more of a formality than factual and relevant information. This is a sign of 
opaque transparency in a fraud targeting accountability environment. However, the research did 
not extend to understanding the phenomena. 
 Other Findings 
In addition to the main findings, the research also found three issues related to the topic namely 
the role of a public service unit in asset utilisation, significant support for national sporting 





answer the research questions, but they offer possible solutions to address or to influence the 
challenges of PPP adoption. 
Firstly, in the CS-3, the state asset user does not have any direct transaction with the private 
sector partner. A public service unit (BLU) conduct the duties of the asset user in all stages of 
PPPs. Moreover, the BLU is not required to seek approval from the asset manager. In other 
words, the BLU becomes the representative of the government. It cuts a time-consuming process 
for the asset user as well as for the asset manager. The flexibility it possesses comes from its 
organisational structure that follows the 2014 public sector unit law. Under the DGSAM itself, 
there is also another asset management unit called the Government Property Agency (LMAN), 
taking the same structural form as the BLU in the CS-3.  
Secondly, the CS-3 presents an example of the significant roles of PAM related PPPs in the 
national program. The nation benefits from the partnership in the form of the maintenance and 
upgrading of sporting facilities and from the proceeds of the contracts utilising commercial areas 
in the sporting complex. Last, property-based PPPs contribute positively to national or local 
economic growth. Some small projects impact on local economic growth, and larger projects 
contribute more at the provincial or national level. Compared to infrastructure PPPs, PAM related 
PPPs are seen as much smaller in terms of financial investment. Nevertheless, PAM related PPPs 
improve the performance of public sector management. 
 Contribution to Knowledge 
The research contributes to knowledge from three standpoints. Firstly, the findings of the 
research enlarge academic understanding at the national level of governance, NPM and PAM  in 
the developing world. While most literature discusses governance, NPM and PAM practices in 
the context of developed countries, research on developing nations context is still scarce. 
Discussion of the topic of PPP adoption and its accountability at the national level of PAM 
practice, is also limited as can be seen in the literature gap section of the methodology chapter. 
The research gives a comprehensive understanding of the topic because it offers an in depth 
understanding regarding the PAM practice and its surplus asset problem, the adoption of PPPs to 
address the surplus asset problem, and the accountability concerns of the PPP adoption. 
Next, the research focuses on project level, property-based PPPs. The four case studies display 
examples of property-based PPP projects from different types of business. The research expands 





government property becomes the basis of the PPPs. Perspectives from four groups of 
participating actors namely the government, the private sector, the auditor, and the member of 
parliament, enrich understanding of the topic. In addition, the thesis also provides a comparison 
between infrastructure PPPs and PAM-related PPPs from their adoption motives, types of 
projects, payment flows, risk, and the government orientation toward profit.  
Finally, the thesis participates in the current debates on accountability theory by offering new 
evidence regarding factors influencing PPP accountability. It also explores those influencing 
factors and forms of accountability in every stage of PPP process. In the Indonesian PAM 
practice, PPPs have been adopted for decades, the perspective from experienced actors 
strengthens the evidence that accountability issues can be discussed in several discourses in 
which the study has discussed the formalisation and mechanisation approaches. 
 Policy Recommendations 
The findings from the research not only answer the research questions but also contribute to the 
policy and practices. The research has captured, compared, and analysed ideas, views, and 
experiences from actors of various functional, institutional, and managerial level backgrounds. 
Their unique positions and perspectives complete the big picture of PPP and accountability in 
the Indonesian PAM context. Their views regarding the burden from the past, the regulation’s 
flaws, and human resources aspect can be important factors for further policy improvement. 
Cutting the impact of the past unsound practices 
The thesis proposes that to give room for current officers in taking decisions regarding 
problematic contracts from the past, the asset amnesty program should be discussed and issued 
immediately. The unsound business practices and contracts of PPPs in the past have continued 
to loom over current PAM practice as large amounts of time, budget, and human resources have 
been consumed addressing the problem. Despite that, no significant progress has been made. The 
idea of a public asset amnesty program offered by one government actor, is worthy of discussion. 
Given a clear cut off date and the private sector partner agreeing to meet its obligations, all past 
contracts are allowed to continue until expiring without legal action being taken by the 
government. Once, the contract expires, the government can decide what policy it will take 





The consequences are severe if the government fails to secure the assets that have been bounded 
by the past problematic contracts. The private sector partners could take advantage of the 
weakness of the contract. If the government launches an asset amnesty program, the contracting 
parties are requested to recognise government rights and they are obliged to obey the current 
contract until the end of the period.  
Applying more flexible regulations  
The thesis argues that it is time for the government to provide more flexibility for their officers 
in making decisions regarding surplus or underutilised assets. A number of obstacles in PPP 
practice originate from problems with regulations and policies. Several participating actors wish 
to reconstruct the current regulations regarding complex asset utilisation, delegation of authority, 
and the asset utilisation approval process. The current policy requires the asset user to conduct a 
feasibility study prior to proposing asset utilisation approval from the DGSAM. Considering the 
asset users’ lack of expertise, it would be far more effective if the DGSAM took over the 
feasibility study as the institution has sufficient human resources both in quantity and quality. 
The participants do not suggest taking over the asset because such an action would be considered 
hostile by the asset user and could trigger unproductive disputes between the asset manager and 
the asset user. 
By taking over responsibility for conducting the feasibility study, the length of the initiation and 
set up stages could be cut significantly. In addition, the quality of the study would be enhanced 
if it were conducted by the skilled and experienced government valuers of the DGSAM. In regard 
to operational activities, the DGSAM could fully delegate them to the asset users. 
Encouraging innovative policies 
In addition, officers must be encouraged to figure out innovative solutions to utilise government 
assets. As the current policy regime requires more explanation for actions taken by the officers, 
it fails to investigate officers who take no or little action to utilise government surplus assets. In 
order to promote innovations, the asset performance measurement should be applied to all 
government properties and become the base of rewards and punishment delivery.  
Finally, several large PPP proposals consumed a significant amount of time in seeking approval 
from the DGSAM before the projects could be tendered. This is mostly because of the risk 





behaviour is understandable given that the current PAM regulation is prescriptive in nature. 
Therefore, it is essential to transform the regulation into a performance-based or at least system-
based policy that gives more room for the officers’ discretion. In addition, the DGSAM could 
issue policy measurement to differentiate the actor’s behaviour whether it is considered to 
involve fraud and irregularities, or to be an innovative decision to deal with the current situation. 
 Limitation and Direction 
 Research Limitation 
Due to the approaches adopted and time as well as cost constraints, the research has limitations 
in scope and the number of participants. The scope of the research is the PAM practices in the 
Indonesian central government. The case study has been employed as the research design and 
four cases have been purposively selected from Indonesian asset-based PPP projects. Those four 
cases come from only three different ministries as the asset users. It may not be appropriate to 
generalise the findings of the research to practices in other countries as well as to other Indonesian 
ministries. Nonetheless, several lessons from the four property-based PPPs pertaining to PAM 
and the accountability problems can be drawn. 
The research may not include all aspects of PPP and accountability issues experienced by those 
four case studies of the three ministries. Yet, the research captures the most important problems 
and aspects of PPP adoption and accountability practices considering the responses from the 
participating actors. 
A limited number of participants were selected during the research coming mostly from the MoF, 
two other ministries, the private sector, auditors and a member of the national parliament. The 
absence of more members of parliament is a particular limitation. Different findings might 
emerge should the views of law enforcement, more law makers, academics, and members of civil 
society be included.  
 Directions for Future Research 
Due to the limitations of this research, besides the PPP accountability issue, recommended future 
studies in the Indonesian PAM context include asset performance measurement, the role of 






Currently the country has not fully developed their asset performance measurement despite the 
claim that the government has adopted governance and private sector practices. It is important to 
realise that asset performance measurement is an indivisible part of modern public asset 
management. 
The thesis has highlighted the paradoxical roles of control and collaboration in governing the 
PPPs. A further study could investigate more about the assumptions and the prescriptions of those 
roles in the context of Indonesian PAM or in other developing countries. 
Last, another interesting finding is related to the behaviour of high officials from the Indonesian 
government towards risk. Further research could explore that behaviour and its possible 
relationship with the three types of regulations: prescriptive, system based or performance based 
(May 2007). 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised the thesis by outlining the main findings, the research contribution, 
limitations, and directions for future studies. The main findings have explained the reasons 
behind and process of PPP adoption in the Indonesian PAM context by providing analysis on 
PAM development and challenges, discussing the rationales and challenges of PPP adoption, and 
identifying the influential characteristics of PPP adoption. Furthermore, by discussing the PPP 
accountability influencing factors and the relationship between transparency and accountability, 
the main findings have addressed the second main question regarding the accountability. 
The thesis contributes to knowledge by enlarging the academic understanding of PAM practice 
in Indonesia, focusing on the project level and property-based PPPs, and participating in 
accountability debates by delivering new evidence of PPP influencing factors. The thesis delivers 
recommendations to remove the burden of past PPP unsound practice, to amend regulations in 
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 Participant Information Form 
Participant Information Form 




Research Title: Key features and accountability of public-private partnerships in the context of 
Indonesian public asset management  
Judul Riset     : Karakteristik dan akuntabilitas kerja sama pemerintah swasta (KPS) dalam  
   konteks  manajemen aset publik (MAP) Indonesia. 
 
Researcher/Peneliti 
Name (Nama)  : Rohmat 
Institute (Institusi) : Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of Canberra 
Phone (Telpon) : +61  and (dan) +  
Email (Email)  :  
 
Supervisor/Pembimbing 
Name (Nama)  : Prof. John Halligan  
Institute (Institusi) : Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of Canberra 
Phone (Telpon) : +61 (  
Email (Email)  :  
 
Research Aim 
The aim of this research is to analyse the key features and accountability of public-private 
partnerships (PPP) in the context of Indonesian public asset management (PAM). The objectives of 
this research are to examine the present development in PPP practices and PAM in Indonesia, the 
extent to which PPPs in PAM have achieved their objectives and to assess the accountability of 
PPPs in PAM. This is an academic research whose outcome will be written in a thesis of a doctoral 
program at University of Canberra.  
 
Tujuan Riset 
Riset memiliki maksud untuk melakukan analisis atas karakteristik dan akuntabilitas kerjasama 





tujuan dari riset ini adalah untuk meneliti: perkembangan terkini dari praktik KPS dan MAP di 
Indonesia,sejauh mana KPS dalam MAP telah mencapat tujuannya dan aspek akuntabilitas KPS 
dalam MAP. Ini merupakan riset akademis yang hasil akhirnya akan dituangkan dalam sebuah 
disertasi program doctoral di University of Canberra. 
Benefits of the Research  
The research is expected to contribute to the knowledge, public policy making and government 
practices. In the knowledge, the research will provide further evidence regarding the adoption of 
PPPs in PAM perspective. In the public policy making, the research is going to deliver a new outlook 
from the people involved both from Indonesian authorities and the private companies. Last, it is also 
projected that the research will gather ideas and opinion from relevant parties from which the 
accountability challenge of PPPs in Indonesian PAM could be enhanced.  
 
Manfaat Riset:  
Riset ini diharapkan memberikan kontribusi kepada ilmu pengetahuan, penyusunan kebijakan 
publik dan praktik pemerintahan. Dalam ilmu pengetahuan, riset ini akan memberikan perspektif 
baru mengenai penerapan KPS dalam MAP. Dalam penyiapan kebijakan publik, riset ini akan 
menghasilkan cara pandang baru bagi para pihak yang terlibat baik di pemerintah maupun di swasta. 
Terakhir, diharapkan pula bahwa riset ini akan mengumpulkan beragam ide dan opini dari pihak-
pihak yang berkepentingan dimana permasalahan akuntabilitas dapat dijabarkan dengan seksama. 
 General Outline of the Research 
The research employs case study as its design because it tries to answer the research questions, that 
start with ‘why’ and ‘how’ and the researcher has no control over this contextual phenomenon of 
PPP and PAM. Furthermore, several cases are purposefully nominated with the rationale that those 
cases could serve the diverse as well as influential criteria. A multi-case study enlarges the analytical 
advantage of the research by enabling analytical comparison. The cases selected are PPPs utilising 
public asset under the jurisdiction of Indonesian Ministry of Finance. 
 
The research methods in data collection are document analysis and in-depth interviews. The 
document analysis is expected to deliver contextual data in the research field which could be 
developed more in arranging questions for the next steps of research. The convenience of using 
document analysis offers benefits for the research process because it is considered to be efficient in 
collecting process, already available in many institutions, and non-reactive. The documents to be 
analysed include but not limited to government policies and regulation, project specified 







Data will be coded and classified to simplify and decrease the amount of data from an enormous 
variation of different spectacles. The researcher will utilise thematic grouping in coding, classifying 
and analysing the data. Furthermore, a qualitative data analysis software namely NVivo will be 
intensely utilised. The output of this analysis is a selection of clear and convincing extracted 
information and its relation to the research questions and literature. 
 
Gambaran Umum Riset  
Riset menerapkan desain studi kasus karena riset ini berusaha menjawab pertanyan-pertanyan 
yang dimulai dengan ‘kenapa’ dan ‘bagaimana’ dan peneliti tidak memiliki pengaruh terhadap 
fenomena KPS dan MAP. Lebih lanjut, untuk memperluas analisis, beberapa kasus dipilih dengan 
seksama dengan maksud untuk memenuhi persyaratan keberagaman dan keberpengaruhan. Kasus 
yang dipilih adalah KPS yang menggunakan aset publik dibawah yurisdiksi Kementerian Keuangan 
Indonesia. 
Tiga metode riset dalam mengumpulkan data, akan digunakan meliputi analisis dokumen dan 
wawancara secara mendalam. Analisis dokumen akan memberikan informasi terkini atas bidang 
yang diteliti dan hasilnya dapat dikembangkan lebih lanjut dalam penyiapan pertanyaan untuk 
tahapan riset berikutnya. Kenyamanan dalam penggunaan analisis dokumen menawarkan 
beberapa keuntungan bagi riset yaitu sifatnya yang efisien, sudah tersedia di berbagai institusi, dan 
tidak reaktif. Dokumen yang akan dianalisis meliputi namun tidak terbatas pada kebijakan dan 
peraturan pemerintah, informasi spesifik atas suatu proyek, dan bahan-bahan publik dari media 
massa terkait kebijakan pemerintah dan implementasinya. 
 
Data yang dikumpulkan akan diberikan kode dan, diklasifikasi untuk menyederhanakan dan 
mengurangi data dari berbagai sudut pandang. Peneliti akan menggunakan pengelompokkan 
berdasarkan topik dalam melakukan koding, klasifikasi dan analisis. Selanjutnya, sebuah aplikasi 
analisis data kualitatif bernama NVivo akan dimanfaatkan secara intens. Output dari aplikasi ini 




Government officer and their private counterparties who agree to participate in the research will be 
requested to: 
1) Take part in an in-depth interview within upon agreed time and venue. During 60-minute 
interview, the participants will articulate their knowledge, experience and opinions 
regarding PPPs and PAM. The conversation will be recorded with the participant’s consent 
and transcribed for data analysis. 
2) Present relevant documents in regard to the interview questions. 
 
Participation in the research is completely voluntary and participants may, without any penalty, 





question. Should the participants withdraw from the research, the researchers will destroy the 
records of the participants. All records both in forms of hardcopies and digital recording wills be 
destroyed, unless the participant agrees that the researcher may retain and utilise the information 
obtained prior to the participant’s withdrawal. 
Keikutsertaan Partisipan 
Pejabat Pemerintah dan swasta yang setuju untuk berpartisipasi dalam riset ini akan diminta untuk: 
1) Berpartisipasi dalam interview dengan peneliti dengan jadwal dan tempat yang disepakati. 
Dalam 30 menit waktu wawancara, Partisipan akan menceritakan pengetahuan, 
pengalaman dan pendapat terkait KPS dan MAP. Pembicaraan ini akan direkam atas ijin 
Anda dan selanjutnya akan ditranskrip untuk data analisis. 
2) Memberikan dokumen yang relevan terkait dengan pertanyaan wawancara. 
 
Partisipasi dalam riset ini adalah sepenuhnya sukarela dan partisipan berhak, tanpa ada sanksi, 
menolak berpartisipasi atau menarik diri dari partisipasi kapanpun tanpa perlu memberikan 
penjelasan, atau menolak mejawab suatu pertanyaan. Jika partisipan menarik diri dari riset ini 
baik sebagian maupun keseluruhan, peneliti akan menghormati keputusan tersebut dan 
menghancurkan catatan sesuai permintaan partisipan. Penghancuran tersebut meliputi hardcopy 
dan softcopy yang tersimpan secara digital. 
 
Confidentiality 
Only the researcher will have access to the individual information provided by participants. Privacy 
and confidentiality will be assured at all times. The research outcomes may be presented at 
conferences and written up for publication. However, in all these publications, the privacy and 
confidentiality of individuals will be protected. 
 
Kerahasiaan 
Hanya peneliti yang memiliki akses atas informasi individu yang disampaikan partisipan. Privasi 
dan kerahasiaan partisipan dijamin setiap waktu. Hasil riset mungkin dipresentasikan dalam suatu 
konferensi dan ditulis untuk publikasi. Namun, dalam semua publikasi tersebut, privasi dan 
kerahasiaan individu akan dilindungi. 
 
Anonymity 
All reports and publications of the research will contain no information that can identify any 







Semua laporan dan publikasi riset tidak mengandung satu pun informasi yang dapat 
mengidentifikasi perseorangan dan semua informasi akan disimpan dengan tingkat kerahasiaan 
tertinggi.   
 
Data Storage 
The information collected will be stored securely on a password protected computer throughout the 
project and then stored at the University of Canberra for the required five year period after which it 
will be destroyed according to university protocols. 
 
Penyimpanan Data 
Informasi yang diperoleh akan disimpan secara aman dalam suatu komputer yang ber-password 
sepanjang masa proyek ini dan selanjutnya disimpan di University of Canberra selama periode 
lima tahun yang disyaratkan untuk selanjutnya akan dihancurkan sesuai dengan ketentuan 
universitas.  
 
Ethics Committee Clearance 
The project has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University (HREC 
– 16-226). 
 
Persetujuan Komite Ethic 
Riset ini telah disetujui oleh Human Research Ethics Committee of the University (HREC –16-226).  
 
Queries and Concerns 
Queries or concerns regarding the research can be directed to the researcher and/or supervisor. Their 
contact details are at the top of this form. You can also contact the University of Canberra’s Research 
Ethics & Integrity Unit. You can either contact Mr Hendryk Flaegel via phone +61 2 , 
Ms Maryanne Simpson via phone 02  or email   
 
If you would like some guidance on the questions you could ask about your participation please 








Pertanyaan dan Perhatian 
Pertanyaan dan hal-hal yang menjadi perhatian berkaitan dengan riset ini dapat diarahkan kepada 
peneliti dan/atau pembimbing. Detail kontak mereka ada di bagian atas formulir ini. Anda juga 
dapat menghubungi University of Canberra’s Human Research Ethics & Integrity Unit, Mr 
Hendryk Flaegel melalui telephone +61 , Ms Maryanne Simpson melalui telephone  
+61 2   atau email  
 
Jika Anda ingin mengetahui lebih lanjut mengenai beberapa petunjuk atas pertanyaan yang dapat 


































 The Participants 
Codes Levels Institutions Roles 
P01 Director MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P02 Director MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P03 Director MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P04 Director MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P05 Head of subdivision MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P06 Director MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P07 Head of subdivision MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P08 Head of subdivision MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P09 Head of division MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P10 Head of subdivision MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P11 Head of subdivision MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P12 Head of division MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P13 Director MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P14 Director MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P15 Head of subdivision MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P16 Head of division MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P17 Chief of Regional Office MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P18 President Director MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P19 Director MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P20 Head of division MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P21 Head of subdivision MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P22 Head of division MoF - DGSAM Asset manager 
P23 Director Ministry M1 Asset user 
P24 Head of division Ministry M2 Asset user 
P25 Head of division Ministry M3 Asset user 
P26 Director Ministry M3 Asset user 
P27 Director Ministry M4 Asset user 
P28 Director Private sector Private sector 
P29 Director Private sector Private sector 
P30 Director Private sector Private sector 
P31 Director Private sector Private sector 
P32 Division Manager PSA3 Asset user 
P33 Legal Manager PSA3 Asset user 
P34 Director PSA3 Asset user 
P35 Auditor BPK Auditor 
P36 Auditor BPKP Auditor 
P37 Auditor MoF Inspectorate - General Auditor 
P38 Auditor MoF Inspectorate - General Auditor 
P39 Auditor MoF Inspectorat - General Auditor 










 The Interview Questions  
Questions 
Participant Groups 
A B C D E 
Opening questions      
1. How long have you been involved in public asset 
management? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
2. What problems or challenges do exist in managing those 
assets? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
3. What are the causes of those problems/challenges? √ √ √ √ √ 
PPP Related questions      
4. What are the reasons the adoption of PPP in utilising the assets 
in your organisations? 
√ √ X √ √ 
5.   a.  Are there some difficulties, obstacles and challenges in   
          PPP? 
      b.  What is the root cause of those difficulties, obstacles and  
            challenges? 
√ √ X √ √ 
6.   a.   What type of PPPs are adopted in utilising your assets? 
      b.   Moreover, why? 
√ √ X √ √ 
7.   a.   Are there some specific problems related to those types of  
             PPPs? 
      b.  What is the root cause of those specific difficulties,  
           obstacles and challenges? 
√ √ X √ √ 
8. What are the aspects to be considered as the success factors 
of PPPs? 
√ √ X √ √ 
9. What are the aspects to be considered as the barriers of PPPs? √ √ X √ √ 
Accountability related questions      
Initiation stage      
10. What are the processes before the assets utilised through a 
PPP? 
√ √ X √ √ 
11. Who are involved in the process? √ √ X √ √ 
12.  a. Have you considered alternative uses of the assets before it  
           is proposed to be put in a PPP? 
       b. What are the alternative uses? 
√ √ X √ √ 
Set up      
13. a. What factors should be considered before entering a tender  
          process? 
      b. Could you please explain more of every factor above? 
√ √ √ √ √ 







A B C D E 
15. What expertise do you expect from the tendering companies? √ √ X √ √ 
16. How do you value your company before entering the tender? X X √ X X 
Monitoring      
17. What are the mechanisms to control the performance of the  
      private party? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
18. How do you make sure that the private parties behave based   
      on the contract?  
√ √ X √ √ 
19. How do you measure that your performance meets the  
      contract requirement? 
X X √ X X 
20. What are the problems or challenges during this stage? Please  
      explain the cause of those problems? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
21. What happens if the private party obtains supernormal profit  
      or experience long term losses? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
22. Is it possible for you to amend the contract for any reasonable  
      events? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
23. Do you have any flexibility in doing the business within the  
      PPP? 
X X √ X X 
Termination      
24. What is the mechanism in the termination period? √ √ √ √ √ 
25. What are the problems or challenges during this stage? Please  
      explain the cause of those problems? 






Interview questions in Bahasa Indonesia: 
Daftar Pertanyaan Interview 
Daftar Pertanyaan 
Grup 
A B C D E 
Pembukaan      
1.  Berapa lama the BPK/Ibu berkecimpung di manajemen aset  
     publik? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
2.  Apakah permasalahan dan tantangan yang dihadapi selama  
     ini? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
3.  Apakah penyebab dari semua permasalahan/tantangan  
    tersebut? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Pertanyaan terkait KPS      
4.  Apakah latar belakang mengadopsi KPS dalam memanfaatkan  
     aset dalam organisasi the BPK/Ibu? 
√ √ X √ √ 
5.  a. Apakah kesulitan, hambatan dan tantangan dalam KPS? 
     b. Apakah akar masalahnya? 
√ √ X √ √ 
6.  a. Apakah tipe KPS yang dipilih?  
     b. Apakah alasannya? 
√ √ X √ √ 
7.  a. Apakah masalah spesifik terkait dengan tipe KPS tersebut? 
     b. Apakah penyebabnya? 
√ √ X √ √ 
8.  Apakah aspek yang menjadi faktor kunci kesuksesan KPS? √ √ X √ √ 
9.  Apakah aspek yang menjadi hambatan KPS? √ √ X √ √ 
Pertanyaan terkait akuntabilitas      
Tahapan inisiasi      
10. Apakah proses yang harus dilalui dalam suatu KPS BMN? √ √ X √ √ 
11. Siapa sajakah yang terlibat? √ √ X √ √ 
12. a.  Apakah the BPK/Ibu sudah mempertimbangkan alternatif  
           penggunaan aset tersebut sebelum diajukan untuk dimanfaatkan  
           melalui KPS? 
      b. Apakah alternative lain tersebut? 
√ √ X √ √ 
Set up      
13. a.  Apakah faktor yang harus dipersiapkan sebelum mengikuti  
          tender? 
      b. Mohon dijelaskan lebih lanjut? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
14. Apakah risiko yang timbul pada tahapan ini      
15. Apakah keahlian (expertise) yang the BPK/Ibu harapkan dari  
      peserta tender? 
 







A B C D E 
16. Bagaimana the BPK/Ibu menilai perusahaan sendiri sebelum  
     mengikuti tender? 
X X √ X X 
Pengawasan      
17. Bagaimana mekanis control kinerja partner swasta? √ √ √ √ √ 
18. Bagaimana memastikan bahwa partner swasta bertindak sesuai  
      kontrak?  
√ √ X √ √ 
19. Bagaimana the BPK/Ibu mengukur kinerja perusahaan sesuai  
      dengan kontrak? 
X X √ X X 
20. What are the problems or challenges during this stage? Please  
      explain the cause of those problems? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
21. Apakah yang terjadi bila partner swasta memperoleh keuntungan  
      yang luar biasa atau mengalami kerugian yang terus menerus? 
√ √ √ √ √ 
22. Apakah ada celah untuk merevisi kontrak untuk alasan tertentu? √ √ √ √ √ 
23  Apakah the BPK/Ibu memiliki fleksibilitas dalam menjalankan  
     bisnis di skema KPS ini? 
X X √ X X 
Terminasi      
24. Bagaimana mekanisme terminasi kontrak? √ √ √ √ √ 
25. Apakah masalah atau tantangan dalam tahapan ini? 
      Mohon dijelaskan penyebab dari masalah tersebut? 


















 Risk Indicators and Preferred Risk Allocation 
 
 











 Research on PAM, PPPs and Accountability 
No. Literature Issues Countries 
1 Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011) Good governance  
2 Conway (2006) PAM reform 
Australia 
3 Duffield (2005) PPP practices 
4 Hodge et al. (2017) Good governance in PPPs 
5 Mahmood et al. (2014) Policies and guidelines 
6 Watson (2003) 
Challenges for public 
accountability  
7 
Boardman, Poschmann and Vining 
(2005) 
PPPs in infrastructure 
Canada 8 McKellar (2006a) Management framework 
9 McKellar (2006b) Delivery models 
10 Vanier (2001) Management tools 
11 Grubišić, Nušinović and Roje (2009) Efficiency Croatia 
12 Bizet (2006) PAM framework France 
13 Schulte and Ecke (2006) Empirical study Germany 
14 Abednego and Ogunlana (2006) 
Governance and legal 
aspect of PPP 
Indonesia 
15 Hanis (2012) PAM framework 
16 
Hanis, Trigunarsyah and Susilawati 
(2011)  
Local PAM practices 
17 Lukito (2018) PAM and climate change 
18 Mardiasmo (2012) PAM practices 
19 Mardiasmo, Sampford and Barnes (2012) Governance in PAM 
20 Prayoga (2016) Good governance 
21 Maryouri (2017) PPP delivery framework 
22 Wulan (2005) Indonesian toll roads 
23 Abdul Aziz and Jahn Kassim (2011) PPPs in public housing 
Malaysia 
24 Abdullah et al. (2012) PAM practices 
25 Abdullah, Razak and Pakir (2011) PAM practices 
26 Ismail and Harris (2014a) PPP rationales 
27 Phua, Ling and Phua (2014) PPPs in health sector 
28 Yusof et al. (2012) Space management 
29 Dow et al. (2006) 
PAM reform and 
framework 
New Zealand 
30 Liu and Wilkinson (2011) Procurement techniques 
31 Provost (2011) PPP implications 
32 Chua (2014) Chua (2014) Public housing Singapore 
33 Demirag, Dubnick and Khadaroo (2004) Accountability in PPPs 
The UK 
34 Forrer et al. (2010) 
Public accountability 
questions 





No. Literature Issues Countries 
36 Den Heyer (2011) 





37 Hood (1995) NPM themes in 1980s NA 
38 Oehler-Sincai (2008) 
Strength & weaknesses of 
NPM NA 
39 Poister, Aristigueta and Hall (2015) Performance management NA 
40 Steets (2010)s 




















 The Corruption Perception Index in Asia Pacific Region: 2019 
Countries Scores World Ranks 
New Zealand 87 1 
Singapore 85 4 
Australia 77 12 
Hong Kong 76 16 
Japan 73 20 
Bhutan 68 25 
Taiwan 65 28 
Brunei Darussalam 60 35 
Korea, South 59 39 
Malaysia 53 51 
Vanuatu 46 64 
Solomon Islands 42 77 
China 41 80 
India 41 80 
Indonesia 40 85 
Sri Lanka 38 93 
Timor-Leste 38 93 
Vietnam 37 96 
Thailand 36 101 
Mongolia 35 106 
Nepal 34 113 
Philippines 34 113 
Pakistan 32 120 
Laos 29 130 
Maldives 29 130 
Myanmar 29 130 
Papua New Guinea 28 137 
Bangladesh 26 146 
Cambodia 20 162 
Korea, North 17 172 
Afghanistan 16 173 
 
Source: Transparency International (2020) 
 
 
 
 
